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Introduction
“Law is institutional normative order.”1 Nothing about this statement seems
controversial. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any three-word definition of “law” that
would be more accurate. But each of those three words carries a second-order
connotation that reveals as much about law’s nature as its first-order denotation. To
wit: Institutions have walls—sometimes literal, sometimes figurative—that keep
things out. Norms are abstractions, distillations, and purifications that leave things
out. Orders are systems, and systems seal things out. What are these “things” that
wind up outside the law (or, perhaps more to the point, must fight to get in)? There
are many possible answers, but the one that I am concerned to examine in this work
arises from narrative, which is one of the most fundamental modes of human
expression. By keeping narratives at a distance or delay, law loses some of its
essential humanity. My project is, then, an attempt to explain the relationship
between law and narrative, and—in the end—to suggest ways to (re)humanize law
by (re)connecting it to its narrative roots and certain cognates in the humanities.
The process of packaging law in bundles of rules is an exercise in relentless
reduction. By the time a common-law rule is stated or a statute is codified, it’s
impossible to tell from the face of that rule or statute what went into the mix that
created it. What that mix includes, I submit, is a healthy dose of narrative. Thus,
any account of law that ignores or skims over this fact is neither wholly valid nor
completely accurate. The contention that I will advance is designed to fill this
lacuna, not to upend or supplant other descriptions of the law and its operation. In
1 NEIL MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS OF LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL THEORY 1
(2007).
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essence, I intend to do nothing more than peel back law’s normative veneer just far
enough to reveal its narrative foundation. To do this, I offer four related (and
ultimately converging) propositions. First, although law is often posited to be
“autonomous,” that autonomy is not necessarily absolute, though it is quite potent.
It is, therefore, a force requiring active resistance. Second, narratives often stand in
the formative background of laws. This is true for statutory and common law alike.
Third, the ability of a legal system to absorb and digest extra-systemic narratives
serves democratic ends. Fourth, educating lawyers to think of law “narrativistically”
(i.e., as something more than a system of rules to be extracted from texts) can help to
ameliorate the dehumanizing effect of the Rule of Law’s inherent drive to
universalize all that comes before it. This is the case that I hope to make throughout
the remainder of this book, which is broken into four parts, each of which engages
one of the four central themes. The first three parts are essentially descriptive and
designed to show different aspects of the relationship between laws, legal actors, and
ordinary citizens and demonstrate the significance of this relationship for both law
and democracy. The fourth is prescriptive and suggests ways to improve legal
education and, thereby, the entire justice system.
Part One begins with a look across the spectrum between full-blown theories
of legal autonomy (like autopoiesis) and humanities-based accounts (like Percy
Shelley’s belief that legislation has a literary basis). Although it is impossible fully
to reconcile the two extremes, narrative is a possible bridge between them because
both law and the humanities often take a storytelling form. To illustrate this point, I
offer a reading of Camus’ The Stranger. Taking Shelley as a cue, I next consider
whether literature can in fact prompt legislation. I conclude that it can, but the
3
process is neither as simple nor as direct as Shelley would have it. By tracing Upton
Sinclair’s The Jungle and Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring through legislative history,
I am able to show that literary works can figure in the adoption of important
legislation. I then take the first step towards explaining the process of literature-
becoming-law by looking at an elaboration of Margaret Somers’ seminal work on
the interaction of personal narratives with higher-order, public narrative forms. This
feeds into a discussion of narrative interaction based, once again, on The Jungle and
Silent Spring and the historical record surrounding the principal actors (e.g., Teddy
Roosevelt) involved in the legislative offshoots of the two works. Along the way I
stop to consider whether the “factual” versus “fictional” nature of a narrative is
conclusive as to its potential to impact law-making. (It is not.)
Part Two first considers Bernard Jackson’s narrativistic account of rule
formation and observes that account at work in specific case law. I follow that
discussion with a reading of Antigone that cautions against dominant public
narratives that—though consistent with a narrow definition of the Rule of Law—do
not offer paths along which new narrative material can be absorbed into the system.
I then move to a concrete application of my theoretical observations and show how
personal narratives can become institutionalized as new (or modifications of old)
rules. The cases that I examine to demonstrate this process ultimately suggest a link
to Ronald Dworkin’s chain novel metaphor and Stanley Fish’s attack on it. I
conclude that—although Dworkin’s metaphor is not a complete description of rule-
building in all cases—it holds in at least some cases. But Fish is correct as well:
law is a conservative institution—and one packed with generic constraints that cause
it to lag behind other institutions in the face of change. We can see this at a
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linguistic level by looking at how slowly Scots law anglicized compared to other
genres in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries or, more recently, how scientific
evidence gained currency in legal proceedings much later than when it was
considered conclusive in other spheres. This elides into the question of what it
means to “find facts,” and I turn to Robert Browning’s The Ring and the Book as a
tool for answering that question and the related question of what it takes to “justify”
a decision.
Part Three is concerned with the relationship between law and democracy. It
begins with an exploration of two concepts that are often linked in both popular and
theoretical discussions: “democracy” and the “Rule of Law.” To show that the
latter is not sufficient to the former, I offer a reading of Melville’s Billy Budd that
demonstrates the problematic nature of legal rules untempered by notions of
proportionality, mitigation, and a larger sense of morality. This leads to an
articulation of what a democratic Rule of Law must entail and how that can be
achieved. For general insight, I invoke Jürgen Habermas’ discourse theory of
democracy and show how that “discourse” can take a narrative form. Specifically, I
show how the American jury system adds a democratic dimension to the legal
system by assuring that non-elites participate in matters of public import. Stanley
Fish’s theory of “interpretive communities” provides the theoretical backdrop for
this discussion, which is focused on the famed O.J. Simpson and Rodney King
cases. This Part concludes with observations on “objectivity” in the interpretation of
legal narratives and how a proper conception of objectivity can have pro-democratic
consequences.
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Part Four spins together two strands generally related to education, one being
the popular notion that education should serve democratic ends, the other being the
more particular observation that American legal education suffers from a dearth of
imagination. To help conceptualize the discussion, I ask us to reconsider the myth
of Bellerophon’s taming of Pegasus and its suggestion that taming (i.e., educating)
can be either a process of binding one to a democratic social order or an instrument
of strangulation. I then anchor the discussion by examining some of the recurring
criticisms lodged against legal education (e.g., those raised in the recent Carnegie
Report). I attend in particular to the casebook method of instruction and identify a
paucity of narrative in that method as a serious deficiency. But this deficiency is not
one unique to legal education; in fact, it arises not from law schools per se but from
their primary object of study: the appellate opinion. By studying appellate
opinions—which by design already squeeze narratives beyond recognition—to
extract rules, law students are trained to read (and think) in a narrowly instrumental
way. I demonstrate this pedagogical defect at work through a close reading of cases
and several casebooks. I conclude with a practical (and relatively simple)
suggestion for ameliorating this problem and speculate how the solution will not
only improve legal education but strengthen democratic institutions.
This, in outline, is the account of law that I will offer in this work. I stake no
claim to a Grand Unified Theory of either law or humanities, but I do believe that
story telling—when considered as a method of arguing—can expand our
understanding of how some laws come to be, other laws come to be changed, and
how many laws come into democratic institutions in ways that strengthen and
perpetuate those institutions. But stories are not everything. Although they help us
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make the world intelligible by suggesting agency and causation, they suffer the
inherent limits of all things metaphoric. Other accounts—physics, for example—
often offer more complete and accurate pictures (almost inevitably, another
metaphor) of “how things really are.” Most of us do not, however, have the
mathematical skills to understand physics in anything other than an indirect, trope-
laden way. So we must do with what works, all the while realizing that our
descriptions are incomplete.
And what holds at the universal level holds at the narrative level as well: our
law-stories can be incomplete in devastating ways. Let me illustrate and close—
appropriately enough, I think—with a story about a story (infected with multiple
levels of hearsay and attendant unreliability). A few years ago, I represented a
number of the defendants in an antitrust class action. The case settled, and—as the
law requires—the judge to whom the case was assigned held a final fairness hearing
to assure that the settlement was fair, adequate and reasonable to the members of the
class. Some small detail that I can’t even remember now caused the judge to want to
modify the proposed judgment that the parties had negotiated; this occasioned a
brief delay in the hearing. While the papers were being edited and copied, the judge
decided to divert us with a yarn about his first murder trial, which had taken place
many years before when he was a newly minted prosecutor. It was an open-and-shut
case. The defendant had viciously knifed his victim multiple times, and there was
overwhelming evidence of his guilt. The judge told us about his meticulous
preparation, masterful handling of the actual trial, and—as a crowning
achievement—his brilliant summation, in which he stood before the jury and, in a
final flourish, pretended to plunge the knife into his own chest over and over again.
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He then sat down, at once exhausted and pleased. His opposing counsel slowly rose
and—addressing the court—said, “Move to dismiss the indictment, Your Honor; the
State hasn’t proved that anyone died.” Alas! Our fearless young prosecutor had
forgotten an element of his case and thereby learned a lesson that should serve to
caution us as well: a good story is not always a legally sufficient story. (Oh, by the
way, the court allowed our young friend to reopen his case and prove that the victim
had died, which shows, I guess, that even a good lawyer sometimes needs a good
editor.)
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I. Law and Narrative: Reexamining the Relationship
Introduction
Is law an autonomous discipline? That question animates much that follows
here, and my answer—an equivocal “it depends on whose definition of ‘autonomy’
we’re using”—gets at much of the theoretical disagreement about what law is and
what it can reasonably be expected to achieve in complex modern societies. I
despair that law may have become more closed than I believe desirable; this despair
flows from a deep-seated belief that law has suffered from overreaching experiments
that have tried to refashion every area of human inquiry into a “science.”1 Now I do
not mean to deny that law is not “different” in meaningful ways from what we think
of as the humanities or the social sciences, but I will argue—and I hope
demonstrate—that law shares common, fundamental features with them, the most
important being a narrative element. But first, let me stake some metes and bounds.
Two decades ago, Charles Fried struck back at the ascendance of what is now
broadly referred to as “interdisciplinarity” in legal studies and practice by arguing
that judges and law professors had lost sight of the signal, yet unassuming, role that
lawyers had traditionally played in the social order:
I would like to propose the picture of lawyers, not as the architects of
society, but as its janitors. I would like to suggest that we are modest people,
laboring in the basement of the building of society, doing really important
1 It seems to me that Richard Rorty is exactly right when he says that “[t]he
rhetoric of scientific objectivity, pressed too hard and taken too seriously, has led us
to people like B.F. Skinner on the one hand and like Althusser on the other—two
equally pointless fantasies, both produced by the attempt to be ‘scientific’ about our
moral and political lives.” Richard Rorty, Solidarity or Objectivity, in FROM
MODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM 573, 585 (Lawrence Cahoone ed., 1996). The
human calculus is, I think, more complicated than a deterministic behaviorist’s rat-
in-a-box experiments or a structuralist Marxist’s hypotheticals would suggest.
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work, while the great things that happen, happen up in the upper stories, and
that they are done by entrepreneurs, by businessmen, by artists, by painters,
by politicians, by poets, and by philosophers and economists, as well. One
of the really bad things that has happened is that we have tried to get out of
the basement. In an earlier day, a kind of bargain was struck with lawyers.
If they would stay in the basement, doing something rather boring and
technical (the picture is of Bartleby, the Scrivener), then we would be
partially left alone, honored after a fashion and paid quite well. Now I think
we have welshed on the deal. We insist, these days, on being paid well and
running the show too. I think law studies should once more be hard,
rigorous, full of memorization and that we should see far fewer citations in
law reviews to Derrida and Foucault.2
As the references to Derrida and Foucault suggest, Fried’s target here was
the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement that had found some traction in the
1970s and ’80s. But that is not, in my view, the (sole) ground upon which law’s
autonomy should be adjudicated. For even if we concede that some mischief has
been done in the law reviews in the name of deconstruction or some other faddish
theory, lawyers have continued to learn and apply rules, and judges have continued
to justify their decisions with precedent and principles of logic. What I am
proposing is that law and the humanistic disciplines share certain deep structures and
that some of law’s features can be explained by insights derived from the
humanities, especially the literary humanities. My ultimate aim is to give a partial
explanation of what law is, how it works, and how it changes, and—in the end—to
suggest how a properly institutionalized and humanistically informed legal order
contributes to democracy.
To be clear, I am not proposing that law is one of the humanities. To that
extent, I agree with the position that Judge Richard Posner has taken from time to
2 Charles Fried, Jurisprudential Responses to Legal Realism, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 331, 333-34 (1987-88).
10
time in his influential critiques of the law and literature movement.3 But I don’t
agree with his further belief that law is just “a technique of government.”4 I think,
rather, that law is in some respects an “applied” humanity, in much the same way
that, for instance, electrical engineering is applied physics.5 James Boyd White
comes close to the mark when he states that both judicial and literary texts can each
be seen “as a kind of argument with its culture, or, better, as an argumentative
reconstitution of it . . ..”6 In other words, White proposes that the two types of text
run on parallel tracks and, moreover, that the arrow of cultural influence is not
mono-directional. The humanities and the law both inform and sustain culture, but
they are themselves in the process reciprocally refreshed by that culture and
(perhaps only indirectly) by one another.
But before we can begin to reach conclusions (or even see them off on the
horizon), we must stop to consider what “autonomy” may or may not mean when
applied to the law. Let’s return to Fried’s jeremiad for a moment. He is not (really)
3 See, e.g., Richard Posner, Law and Literature: A Relation Reargued, 72
VA. L. REV. 1351, 1392 (1986).
4 Id.
5 Cf. David Howarth, Is Law a Humanity (or is it more like Engineering)?, 3
ARTS & HUMANITIES IN HIGHER EDUC. 9 (2004). Howarth argues that
law is connected with the Humanities, but it is no more connected by those
means than any other creative or practical activity. Otherwise, law stands in
relation to the Humanities and the Social Sciences as engineering does to the
Sciences. . . . Law is a user of the Humanities and the Social Sciences, albeit
sometimes a reluctant and covert user.
Id. at 23.
6 James Boyd White, The Judicial Opinion and the Poem, reprinted in LAW
AND LITERATURE 5, 21 (Lenora Ledwon ed., 1996).
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saying that law is or should be hermetic—his complaint is that with the Realists and
after philosophy and economics “erupted” into the law in ways that led to false
conceptions of it (e.g., that “it is not possible to work with doctrines and precedents
and texts”). I’m not sure that anyone ever seriously advanced such a claim as an
absolute (or that very many people took such a claim seriously if it was even made),
but we need to keep in mind that Fried’s underlying lament is that much of the
“interdisciplinary” work that he had reviewed was in fact “undisciplined”: “I think
one of the worst effects . . . of the huge amount of philosophy and economics and
political science and sociology leaking into law is the poor quality of the philosophy
and the economics and the sociology which we see there.”7 And this should stand, I
think, as an indictment of poor scholarship, teaching and opinion writing, not as
proof that law is better off when it is in some sense sealed off from other disciplines.
Perhaps the simplest way into a discussion of law’s autonomy is to look at
the impetus for Fried’s argument, an influential article by Judge Posner that had then
recently appeared in the Harvard Law Review.8 In that article, Posner traded on the
notion that law historically had been (more accurately, I should probably say, “law
historically had been treated as if it were”) an autonomous discipline, both in
practice and as a matter of training:
7 Id. at 331.
8 Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law and an Autonomous Discipline:
1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987); see also Richard A. Posner,
Conventionalism: The Key to Law as an Autonomous Discipline?, 38 TORONTO L. J.
333 (1988) (describing efforts to refurbish the idea that law is best left in the hands
of those trained in law and only law as “conventionalism,” and concluding that this
conventionalism does not effectively compete with or refute contending
interdisciplinary theories of law’s nature and operation).
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The idea that law is an autonomous discipline, by which I mean a subject
properly entrusted to persons trained in law and in nothing else, was
originally a political idea. The judges of England used it to fend off royal
interference with their decisions, and lawyers from time immemorial have
used it to protect their monopoly of representing people in legal matters.
Langdell in the 1870s made it an academic idea. He said that the principles
of law could be inferred from judicial opinions, so that the relevant training
for students of the law was in reading and comparing opinions and the
relevant knowledge of what those opinions contained. He thought that this
procedure was scientific, but it was not in the modern sense at any rate.9
Posner suggests that the Langdellian project was really just a form of Platonism
(e.g., a contract decision embodies the concept of a contract) and that—even in its
heyday—it was properly assailed by Holmes, “who pointed out that law is a tool for
achieving social ends, so that to understand law requires an understanding of social
conditions.” But Posner also notes that Holmes’ assault fell short: it took another
sixty year or so for serious breaches to appear in the law’s citadel. In the end,
Posner traces the relatively recent decline of law’s autonomy to a variety of sources,
ranging from, among others, the shattering of political consensus in the Vietnam era,
to the proclivity of the United States Supreme Court to stray into areas that had
traditionally been marked off as “political,” and to—most important for our
discussion—“a boom in disciplines that are complementary to the law, particularly
economics and philosophy.”
As Posner’s analysis indicates, the question of law’s autonomy resolves into
a couple of overlapping inquiries, one having to do with how law functions (i.e.,
how lawyers and judges go about doing the business of law), the other with what
legal teacher-scholars-theorists do. The first inquiry looks at law from a process
perspective and asks questions like: How are legal arguments constructed? How are
9 Id. at 762.
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legal decisions made and justified? And, even more telling, are legal arguments and
decisions different from other types of arguments and decisions? The second
inquiry looks at law as an object of study and pedagogy and asks questions like:
Should legal scholarship and teaching focus on anything other than doctrine? Can
legal thought be enriched by insights and approaches developed in other disciplines?
Should a law student be taught “to think like a lawyer” (and little else) and what
does that mean anyway?
1. Describing Law in Terms of Autonomy
Brian Bix proposes that law’s autonomy (or lack thereof) should be viewed
through three lenses: one descriptive, one analytic, one prescriptive.10 This multi-
perspective approach ensures that an investigation of a particular legal system will
describe the level of autonomy assumed or encouraged by that system, analyze
whether claims of autonomy can withstand heavy scrutiny, and prescribe greater or
lesser interdisciplinarity in legal reasoning, decision-making or education. This
makes sense to me, and I have loosely adopted it as a method of testing my own
predilection in favor of interdisciplinary enterprises. I do this in recognition that the
case in favor of interdisciplinarity can never be more than partial. For at bottom I
agree with Neil MacCormick that “[l]aw is an argumentative discipline” and that
“[l]egal arguments are always in some way arguments about the law, or arguments
about matters of fact, of evidence, or opinion, as these have a bearing upon the law,
10 Brian H. Bix, Law as an Autonomous Discipline, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=315719 at 1.
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or as the law has a bearing on them.”11 But MacCormick’s description is, I think,
just a statement of limitation—he doesn’t mean it as a statement of law’s wholesale
autonomy.
At this point, it may be useful to consider theories that—at least facially—
tend towards either the “autonomous” or “non-autonomous” pole of our discussion.
In “A Declaration of Rights,” the Romantic poet Percy Shelley proposed that “Law
cannot make what is in its nature virtuous or innocent, to be criminal, any more than
it can make what is criminal to be innocent. Government cannot make a law, it can
only pronounce that which was law before its organization, viz. the moral result of
the imperishable relations of things.”12 In other words, law is anterior to
Government. Is anything anterior to law? Shelley would say “yes” and draw our
attention to the literary humanities, poetry in particular. In what Paul Fry calls
Shelley’s most famous hyperbole, Shelley asserted that
The progress that culture owes to poetry and that poetry partakes in consists
in the forging of ever new and better legislation. Shelley’s favorite example
of how this progress works is the literature of ‘chivalry’ in the Middle Ages,
mainly that of Dante, which advanced the conditions both of slaves and of
women towards equality.13
Behind this assertion was Shelley’s bedrock belief that “[i]nstitutionalized laws,
whether scientific, moral, or political, cannot change . . . because they are inert.
They can be altered only from without, by revolution or by some kind of
11 NEIL MACCORMICK, RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW: A THEORY OF
LEGAL REASONING 14 (2005).
12 Percy Shelley, A Declaration of Rights (1812), available at
http://www.otal.umd.edu/~msites/devil/declright.html.
13 PAUL H. FRY, THE REACH OF CRITICISM: METHOD AND PERCEPTION IN
LITERARY THEORY 145 (1983).
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revolutionary poetry.”14 Shelley’s positions are of course indefensible in their
breadth, but they are of a sort not unique to him. White, for example, has much
more recently argued that “law can be best understood as a set of literary practices
that at once create new possibilities for meaning and action in life and constitute
human communities in distinctive ways.”15 Defensible in whole or not, positions
like those of Shelley and White nonetheless raise at least a couple of related
questions worth investigating—namely, can law be changed in important ways from
without, and do the humanities in some sense forge larger cultural institutions via
the mediating force of law-as-instrument?16
Before seeking answers to these questions, we should glance towards the
other end of the spectrum and one of the cases that has been advanced in favor of
law as an insular system. “Autopoiesis” is the notion that many systems (biological,
ecological, and even social) contain self-reflexive mechanisms that allow those
systems to self-govern.17 Put broadly, “[a]n autopoietic system produces and
14 Id.
15 White, supra note 6, at 21.
16 I should probably state what I have in mind when I apply the label
“humanities.” For present purposes, I propose that we think of the humanities as
imaginative representations (I would include the descriptive and analytical under
this umbrella) of the human condition. This roughly coincides with Nietzsche’s
definition of truth: i.e., “a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and
anthromorphisms—in short a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced,
transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically and which after long use
seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people.” Rorty, supra note 1, at 584
(quoting Nietzsche). So conceived, the humanities are a storehouse of morals,
values and standards of right conduct across cultures and over time.
17 I offer autopoiesis as an example. Other theories of law’s relative
autonomy would serve to illustrate the point just as well. For instance, Kelsen’s
16
reproduces its own elements by the interaction of its elements.”18 When applied to
law, as Zenon Bankowski maintains, this means that
The law is a system of meaning which creates its own objects and criteria of
truth. It is those that determine its cognition. All input coming from other
systems such as the economy, politics and even individual actors (psychic
systems for the theory) is filtered through these criteria. It cannot properly
be called knowledge of the other system at all since the legal system has
transformed it into legal knowledge. It does not even perceive the input as
knowledge. Rather it senses an irritation, a noise, to which it adapts.19
I think that the law’s adaptability in the face of “noise” suggests a middle
ground between the law-as-humanity and law-as-closed-system camps. Hugh
Baxter signals this possibility when he discusses the idea of “relative autonomy”:
While [Niklas] Luhmann [one of the seminal autopoietic theorists] expressly
refuses the term “relative autonomy,” his work can nonetheless be
understood as an attempt to capture theoretically the intuition behind that
enigmatic phrase. Despite his emphasis on “operative closure,” Luhmann
readily acknowledges that social subsystems, among them the legal system,
are at the same time “cognitively open” and able to “observe” one another.
He insists, further, that the legal system is connected—“structurally
coupled”—to other social subsystems, particularly the economic and political
systems. Luhmann’s account of the law’s simultaneous openness and
closure, and its simultaneous distinction from and “coupling” to other
“pure theory” and neo-formalism are often cited for the proposition. See Bix, supra
note 10, at 9.
18 Gunther Teubner, Introduction to Autopoietic Law, in AUTOPOIETIC LAW:
A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1988); see also
NIKLAS LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS (John Bednarz, Jr. & Dirk Baecker trans.,
1995).
19 Zenon Bankowski, How Does it Feel to Be on Your Own? The Person in
the Sight of Autopoiesis, 7 RATIO JURIS 254, 256 (1994). See also Howarth, supra
note 5, at 23 (“Law’s central activity of making structures and devices out of legal
rules has its own internal logic and standards, an activity that cannot be taught by
reference to any other discipline, just as one cannot become an engineer merely by
knowing mathematics and the relevant sciences.”).
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systems, corresponds to the opposing impulses that the phrase “relative
autonomy” expresses.20
If law remains open to other systemic influences, can one of those influences be the
humanities and, if so, exactly how does this process work?21 And, even more
interesting, I think, does such an influence have a collateral influence on the
institutions necessary to assure the possibility of democracy?
2. Narrative as the Basis of Law and the Humanities
My answers to these just-posed questions are in the affirmative and turn on
the fact that both the law and the humanities often transmit information in a
narrative form. In the end, I conclude that law may be conservative and resistant to
outside influence, but it is not autonomous in the sense of “hermetically sealed.”
This is not to say that narrative “noise” from another system can automatically be
transcribed as legal norms or, more generally, legally useful information, but
narratives can and do “get through” to the system. They do so through a process of
translation and assimilation, not direct absorption. Accordingly, a legal system
cannot comprehend a “story” in its raw, natural form, be that in the form of a play, a
20 Hugh Baxter, Autopoiesis and the “Relative Autonomy” of Law, 19
CARDOZO L. REV. 1987, 1992 (1997-98).
21 Although the humanities are not a system of the same order as, say, the
economy or the ecology, they exhibit a degree of self-reflexivity, structure, and
generic constraint sufficient to qualify as a system for purposes of this discussion.
Indeed, it is the systemic nature of literature that postmodernist writers like John
Barth (who crafts a short story from a Möbius strip that endlessly loops, “ONCE
UPON A TIME THERE WAS A STORY THAT BEGAN ONCE UPON A TIME
THERE WAS A STORY THAT BEGAN . . .”) have parodied and pilloried. John
Barth, Frame-Tale, in LOST IN THE FUNHOUSE 1-2 (1968).
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novel, or personal confession.22 It must first be massaged into a legal shape through
things like questions-and-answers at trial, cross examination, and compliance with
the rules of evidence—in short, it must undergo an alchemic process23 through which
it is transformed into a legal narrative.24 What this suggests is that legal narratives
are subject to generic restrictions only slightly less stringent than those associated
with literature. They are not as structured as, say, sonnets, but they are nonetheless
conventional.
As a further complicating factor, we must remember that a narrative has not
only an author (or many) but an auditor or reader (or many) as well. Thus, the
“meaning” and consequent legal significance of a narrative is a function of the
interpreter, the context, and author’s selection of facts and construction of those
22 Gunther Teubner makes this point, I think, in arguing that “[t]he law
autonomously processes information, creates worlds of meaning, sets goals and
purposes, produces reality constructions, and defines normative expectations—and
all this quite apart from the world constructions in lawyers’ minds.” Gunther
Teubner, How the Law Thinks: Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law, 23 L.
& SOC’Y REV. 727, 739 (1989).
23 I intend the metaphor to capture not only the notion of changing one thing
into another but also the fact that there is often a gap between the aims and ends of
such a process.
24 See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, EVIDENCE: TEXT, RULES, ILLUSTRATIONS &
PROBLEMS 567-68 (rev. 2d ed. 1989). Graham notes that certain questions (e.g.,
“Tell us everything that was said that night?” or “How did the accident happen?”)
are objectionable because they call for a “narrative” answer that may include
irrelevant or hearsay matters. Id. at 567. Nonetheless, “[t]here is . . . some scientific
indication that a spontaneous narration is more accurate, while interrogation by
specific questions is said to present a more complete picture of the facts.” Id.; see
also Goings v. United States, 377 F.2d 753, 762-63 (8th Cir. 1967) (“Ritualistic
formality in presenting evidence should not deter untrained witnesses from telling
their story in their own words. We hold here, it is only when evidence which is
traditionally considered unworthy or unreliable, assumes the stature of undue
significance that we must recognize error.”).
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facts into a story. (This is of course just an application of Aristotle’s rhetorical
triangle of ethos-pathos-logos.) To make this a little more concrete, let’s look at an
example. Albert Camus’ The Stranger neatly illustrates both the power of narrative
forms and the danger inherent in them.25 This danger arises because, simply put, we
are gullible. We too quickly equate a coherent narrative with a complete (or
truthful) narrative. But that is not always the case, as Camus shows us through the
process of what might be called comparative renarration. Here’s how it works as a
matter of structure. The novel is broken into two parts, each of which—among other
things—casts the same series of facts into a different narrative form and within a
different interpretive context.
Part One of the novel is told from the first-person point of view of the
protagonist, Meursault. It begins with one of the most famous opening paragraphs
in western literature, a paragraph that immediately alienates readers from Meursault:
Maman died today. Or yesterday maybe, I don’t know. I got a telegram
from the home: “Mother deceased. Funeral tomorrow. Faithfully yours.”
That doesn’t mean anything. Maybe it was yesterday.26
By carefully accreting details of his behavior at the vigil, funeral, and period of
mourning for his mother, Meursault confirms our first impression of him: he is an
outsider. In his conversations with others and in his description of the events
leading up to Maman’s funeral, he reveals that he didn’t know her age, that he put
her in a retirement home against her will, that he didn’t want to see her body before
the burial, and that he slept and breached other social conventions during the vigil:
25 ALBERT CAMUS, THE STRANGER (Matthew Ward trans., Vintage 1989)
(1942).
26 Id. at 3.
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The caretaker turned the switch and I was blinded by the sudden flash of
light. He suggested I go to the dining hall for dinner. But I wasn’t hungry.
Then he offered to bring me a cup of coffee with milk. I like milk in my
coffee, so I said yes, and he came back a few minutes later with a tray. I
drank the coffee. Then I felt like having a smoke. But I hesitated, because I
didn’t know if I could do it with Maman right there. I thought about it; it
didn’t matter. I offered the caretaker a cigarette and we smoked.27
Even at this early point in the novel, we understand that Meursault will be judged on
his indifference. We learn as much when his mother’s friends come into the vigil
and are seated as if they were a jury: “It was then that I realized they were all sitting
across from me, nodding their heads, grouped around the caretaker. For a second I
had the ridiculous feeling that they were there to judge me.”28 And so they were,
just as all of us are in our daily social interactions.
After Meursault returns home from the funeral, he continues to violate social
norms. He goes swimming at a public beach, where he meets up with his soon-to-be
lover, Marie, and then takes in a movie—a comedy. Soon thereafter, he helps a
neighbor of dubious character (he’s a reputed pimp), Raymond, execute a plan to
exact revenge on Raymond’s former mistress, an Arab. Raymond winds up beating
the woman and getting himself arrested. To get out of this fix, Raymond needs
Meursault to testify “that the girl had cheated on him,” a fact of which Meursault has
no personal knowledge. But Meursault readily agrees to testify anyway, and
Raymond gets off with a warning because the police “didn’t check out [Meursault’s]
statement.” Despite Meursault’s willingness to flout convention at the urging of his
physical appetites and to comply blindly with improper requests on behalf of others,
27 Id. at 8.
28 Id. at 10.
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we learn that he is not a scofflaw. In fact, he’s actually something of a rule-
follower: he worries about breaking even petty dictates like the general prohibition
in his office against taking personal phone calls, and he declines to accompany
Raymond to a whorehouse “because,” as he explains, “I don’t like that.”29 From all
this we conclude that Meursault is perhaps selfish and egoistic—maybe even
something of a lout—but we don’t see him as a sociopath or menace to society.
Unfortunately for Meursault, though, his real troubles have not yet begun.
Soon after the incident with the Arab woman, Raymond invites Meursault
and Marie to spend a Sunday at the beach house of Raymond’s friend, Masson. It
will not be a relaxing day, though, because they have been followed by the Arab
woman’s brother and a friend. They meet three times on the beach. In the first
encounter, Raymond and Masson provoke a fight that results in the Arabs being
thrashed until one of them pulls a knife, with which he slashes Raymond. Once
Raymond is bandaged, he sets off again for the beach, this time with a gun.
Meursault follows him, and they again encounter the Arabs at the far end of the
beach, lying next to a spring. Raymond reaches for his gun, but Meursault wisely
counsels Raymond to reconsider:
Raymond asked me, “Should I let him have it?” I thought that if I said no
he’d get himself all worked up and shoot for sure. All I said was, “He hasn’t
said anything yet. It’d be pretty lousy to shoot him like that. . . .” Then
Raymond said, “So I’ll call him something and when he answers back, I’ll let
him have it.” I answered, “Right. But if he doesn’t draw his knife, you can’t
shoot.” Raymond started getting worked up. . . . “No,” I said to Raymond,
“take him on man to man and give me your gun. If the other one moves in,
or if he draws his knife, I’ll let him have it.”30
29 Id. at 38.
30 Id. at 55-56.
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Here, Meursault evinces at least some sense of morality (it would be “lousy” to
shoot an unarmed man), as well as a tacit feel for the law of self-defense. His stance
is nonetheless equivocal because—once the gun is in his hand—he “realized that
you could either shoot or not shoot.” None of this is yet put to the test, though,
because the Arabs slip away, and Meursault and Raymond head back towards
Masson’s bungalow.
But Meursault makes it no farther than the steps leading from the beach up to
the bungalow. Echoing his statement about shooting/not shooting, Meursault finds
himself “unable to face the effort it would take to climb the wooden staircase and
face the women again. . . . To stay or go, it amounted to the same thing.”
Throughout the entire time on the beach, the sun’s intensity has risen like a
drumbeat that impels him back down the beach to his doom. Accompanied by a
final burst of synesthesia (the sun not only dazzles his eyes but presses on his back,
burns his skin, and crashes like cymbals), a disoriented Meursault again confronts
the Arab:
The sun was the same as it had been the day I’d buried Maman, and like
then, my forehead especially was hurting me, all the veins in it throbbing
under the skin. It was this burning, which I couldn’t stand anymore, that
made me move forward. I knew that it was stupid, that I wouldn’t get the
sun off me by stepping forward. But I took a step, one step, forward. And
this time, without getting up, the Arab drew his knife and held it up to me in
the sun. The light shot off the steel and it was like a long flashing blade
cutting at my forehead. . . . All I could feel were the cymbals of sunlight
crashing on my forehead and, indistinctly, the dazzling spear flying up from
the knife in front of me. The scorching blade slashed at my eyelashes and
stabbed my stinging eyes. That’s when everything began to reel. . . . My
whole being tensed and I squeezed my hand around the revolver. The trigger
gave; I felt the smooth underside of the butt; and there, in that noise, sharp
and deafening at the same time, is where it all started. . . . I knew that I had
shattered the harmony of the day, the exceptional silence of the beach where
I’d been happy. Then I fired four more times at the motionless body where
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the bullets lodged without leaving a trace. And it was like knocking four
quick times on the door of unhappiness.31
Part One of the novel thus ends with Meursault having narrated two key events: his
mother’s funeral (and its immediate aftermath) and the killing of the Arab. Part Two
examines the relationship of the former to the latter within a larger narrative context.
As I think the discussion thus far has shown, Part One involves two types of
acts by Meursault, those observed by others and reported by Meursault-as-narrator
(e.g., the vigil and funeral) and those that are unobserved by others yet narrated by
Meursault (e.g., the shooting on the beach). Part Two complicates this structure by
placing another interpretive and narrative lens between the “facts” and our
interpretation of them. And lenses always both refocus and distort what passes
through them. In The Stranger, this happens in two ways. First, in the investigation
phase of Meursault’s case, he learns from his lawyer that “there had been some
investigations into [his] private life,” and that “[t]he investigators had learned that
[he] had ‘shown insensitivity’ the day of Maman’s funeral.”32 Meursault is unable to
rebut the charge of insensitivity, and he makes matters rather worse for himself in
the trying:
He asked if I felt any sadness that day. . . . I answered that I had pretty much
lost the habit of analyzing myself and that it was hard for me to tell him what
he wanted to know. I probably did love Maman, but that didn’t mean
anything. At one time or another all normal people have wished their loved
ones were dead. Here the lawyer interrupted me and he seemed very upset.
31 Id. at 58-59.
32 Id. at 64.
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He made me promise I wouldn’t say that at my hearing or in front of the
examining magistrate.33
Meursault is of course correct in noting that “none of this had anything to do with
my case,” but he grossly miscalculates the power of a narrative that is coherent
(though irrelevant) and the ability of others to read this narrative as anything other
than evidence of a black heart.
Meursault fares no better with the examining magistrate, who is willing to
help him but demands an explanation for the group of four shots that Meursault fired
after the Arab was already down (and probably dead). That is an explanation that
Meursault cannot give, especially since the Magistrate demands that it be in the form
of a Christian confession, lest Meursault’s narrative infect his own:
I vaguely understood that to his mind there was just one thing that wasn’t
clear in my confession, the fact that I had hesitated before I fired my second
shot. . . . I was about to tell him that he was wrong to dwell on it, because it
didn’t really matter. But he cut me off and urged me one last time, drawing
himself up to his full height and asking me if I believed in God. I said
no. . . . He said it was impossible; all men believed in God, even those who
turn their backs on him. That was his belief, and if he were ever to doubt it,
his life would become meaningless. “Do you want my life to be
meaningless?” he shouted. As far as I could see, it didn’t have anything to
do with me, and I told him so.34
After this meeting, “[t]he magistrate seemed to have lost interest in me and to have
come to some sort of decision about my case.” That decision is, of course, that
Meursault should be tried for premeditated murder.
33 Id. at 65. This would appear to be a problem invariant across legal
systems. What practicing lawyer has not had a client seemingly determined to say
exactly the wrong thing—or to say something in exactly the wrong tone—in his
defense? I admit to my share.
34 Id. at 68-69.
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Meursault’s trial in some sense tracks—in reverse order—the narratives first
constructed in Part One of the novel. Thus, the trial begins with the presiding judge
simply reading from a dossier the narrative of what Meursault had done and
verifying its accuracy with Meursault every few sentences. Those facts are
undisputed, and so the remainder of the trial is focused on the issue of intent and
collateral questions like why Meursault had returned to the spring and why he was
armed when he did. The prosecutor’s approach is to elicit testimony—and thereby
sponsor evidence—that he can recraft into a narrative of evil. He therefore calls to
testify people who were present with Meursault at his mother’s vigil and funeral and
in the days thereafter.35 For example, the prosecutor elicits testimony from an
unwitting Marie that he is able to summarize in a single damning sentence at the end
of her examination: “Gentlemen of the jury, the day after his mother’s death, this
man was out swimming, starting up a dubious liaison, and going to a movie, a
comedy, for laughs.”36 Armed with this and other similar building blocks, the
35 To those reading with eyes trained under an “adversarial” system, this type
of testimony seems strange, erroneous even. But under a French-influenced system,
a deep exploration of a defendant’s individual background is both relevant and
necessary:
The first phase of a trial in the Cour d’assises reflects the French interest in
the psychology and personal circumstances of the defendant, and is called
the “personality” (personnalité). The defendant’s life history and personality
are explored over the course of a day or two. . . . The French do not share
American concerns about character evidence and poisoning the well,
reflected in the United States’ elaborate rules of evidence.
Renée Lettow Lerner, The Intersection of Two Systems: An American on Trial for
an American Murder in the French Cour D’Assisses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 791, 822
(2001).
36 CAMUS, supra note 25, at 94.
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prosecutor, in his summation, constructs a narrative edifice that even Meursault
concedes is coherent and plausible:
He reminded the court of my insensitivity; of my ignorance when asked
Maman’s age; of my swim the next day—with a woman; of the Fernandel
movie; and finally of my taking Marie home with me. It took a few minutes
to understand the last part because he kept saying “his mistress” and to me
she was Marie. Then he came to the business with Raymond. I thought his
way of viewing the events had a certain consistency. What he was saying
was plausible. I had agreed with Raymond to write the letter in order to lure
his mistress and submit her to mistreatment by a man “of doubtful morality.”
I had provoked Raymond’s adversaries at the beach. Raymond had been
wounded. I asked him to give me his gun. I had gone back alone intending
to use it. I had shot the Arab as I planned. I had waited. And to make sure I
had done the job right, I fired four more shots, calmly, point-blank—
thoughtfully, as it were.37
All the basic facts underlying this narrative are true, but it is not the truth. How do
we know this? It’s because we’ve already read the story and reached our own
conclusions. Those conclusions may vary from reader to reader, but more often than
not readers convict Meursault of rather venal sins, not ones that lead the presiding
judge to declare, after receiving the jury’s verdict of guilty, “that [Meursault] was to
have [his] head cut off in a public square in the name of the French people.”38 What,
then, is the difference between the readerly and judicial judgments? Context, I
think. That is, readers have more context within which to view Meursault’s
behavior and to assess it as odd, yet relatively benign, and certainly not conclusive
(or even relevant) proof that Meursault acted with murderous intent on the beach.
Readers believe Meursault because he gains our narrative trust through his brutal
37 Id. at 99.
38 Id. at 107.
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honesty, which is aimed—more often than not—at himself. The jurors do not have
the advantage of this critical perspective.
The point here is that good stories—and even legally cognizable stories—are
not always true stories. So if we are to improve the odds of doing justice, we must
always—because the warp and woof of law is so often of narrative origin—be on the
lookout for additional facts, contexts, and perspectives that can help us better to
weave and interpret stories in ways that are truthful (or, if that is an ideal that must
remain merely aspirational, then at least accurate). Where better to start this
excursion than with a consideration of the discipline-artform that is mainly
concerned with stories: literature?
3. Shelley’s Case, Part 1: Law of The Jungle
One of the principal criticisms of the law and literature movement has been
that it doesn’t really prove anything meaningful about the relationship between the
two.39 Yes, To Kill a Mockingbird has a trial in it and understanding law can add a
subtle dimension to a reading of the novel. Yes, Justice Cardozo and Lord Denning
wrote with what might be called a literary flourish and recognizing their effective
use of tropes and other rhetorical devices leads to a better understanding of why
some case law is more persuasive than others. And yes, critical theory offers
valuable insights into modes of interpretation that are as applicable to legal texts as
to literary texts. But none of this demonstrates a typical claim of the movement:
that literature plays a noteworthy role in the development of the law. In the
following pages, I hope to contribute something concrete to the discussion. My
39 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 3.
28
claim at this point is a narrow one: sometimes literary works at least partially cause
the enactment of legislation.
Shelley was not the first literary figure to suggest that literature influences
the development of the law. Ben Jonson had made the same claim nearly two
centuries before:
I could never think the study of Wisdom confined only to the Philosopher; or
of Piety to the Divine: or of State to the Politic: but that he which can feign a
Commonwealth (which is the Poet), can govern it with counsels, strengthen
it with laws, correct it with judgments, inform it with religion, and morals, is
all these. We do not require in him mere Elocution, or an excellent faculty in
verse, but the exact knowledge of all virtues, and their contraries; with ability
to render the one loved, the other hated, by his proper embattaling them.40
This accords with what most serious writers think about their work (i.e., that it rises
above mere entertainment), but how do we move from the level of assertion to that
of accomplishment? An answer—but perhaps not the only answer—can be found in
legislative history, which has been kept with increasingly meticulous care in the
United States since the late Nineteenth Century.
In 1906, Upton Sinclair published The Jungle, a socialist screed aimed
specifically at the Chicago meat-packing industry and more generally at the plight of
American workers.41 Although the novel often descends into melodrama, episodes
in the first few chapters are crafted with a stark realism that effectively portrays the
ghastly conditions in which much of the United States’ meat supply was then
produced. These few pages stir the reader’s conscience—and raise her ire—on a
number of fronts: the horrors of animal slaughter, the back-breaking misery of work
40 Ben Jonson, Discoveries in 3 THE WORKS OF BEN JOHNSON 403 (Francis
Cunningham ed., Chatto & Windus 1903) (emphasis supplied).
41 UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (Penguin 1985) (1906).
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on an ever-quickening production line, the lack of competition in the packing
industry, the open and wanton environmental pollution practiced by the packers, and
the disgusting genesis of processed food. To make this all a bit more tangible, it is
perhaps wise to pause and look carefully at a few groups of excerpts from the novel,
each directed to a particular ill associated with Chicago’s Union Stockyards.
A guided tour of one of the plants in the Stockyards offers the occasion for
readers to witness the carnage visited upon an array of unwitting hooved creatures,
which—through personification—portends still greater ills to be suffered by the
novel’s protagonist (Jurgis Rudkus), his family and his fellows:
[O]nce started upon [the mechanized death] journey, the hog never came
back; at the top of the wheel he was shunted off upon a trolley, and went
sailing down the room. And meantime another was swung up, and then
another, until there was a double line of them, each dangling by a foot and
kicking in frenzy—and squealing. . . . [O]ne by one, they hooked up the
hogs, and one by one with a swift stroke they slit their throats. There was a
long line of hogs, with squeals and lifeblood ebbing away together; until at
last each started again, and vanished with a splash into a huge vat of boiling
water.42
It is the mechanized nature of the slaughter (in an eerie anticipation of World War I)
that Sinclair finds most disturbing. He sees it as a breach of a grand social contract,
one extending beyond humans and including animals:
It was all so very businesslike that one watched it fascinated. It was
porkmaking by machinery, porkmaking by applied mathematics. And yet
somehow the most matter of fact person could not help thinking of the hogs;
they were so innocent, they came so very trustingly; and they were so very
human in their protests—and so perfectly within their rights! They had done
nothing to deserve it; and it was adding insult to injury, as the thing was done
here, swinging them up in this cold-blooded, impersonal way, without a
pretense at apology, without the homage of a tear. Now and then a visitor
wept, to be sure; but this slaughtering-machine ran on, visitors or no visitors.
42 Id. at 44.
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It was like some horrible crime committed in a dungeon, all unseen and
unheeded, buried out of sight and out of memory.43
Sinclair goes on to describe ever-more-horrifying atrocities, including the “knocking
pens” in which cattle are stunned with sledge hammers, then rolled onto “killing
beds” to be disemboweled while still alive. Through textual juxtaposition and
elaboration, this callous indifference to life foreshadows the protagonist’s own
doom. And because Jurgis is a sort of Everyman, the animals-to-the-slaughter
imagery extends and applies with equal force to an entire class of American worker.
Sinclair pointedly develops this aspect of his critique by widening his scope
beyond Jurgis. The humiliations of workers in the packing yards are manifold
and—even in some literal sense—equal to those of the animals. First, there are the
physical injuries:
There was another interesting set of statistics that a person might have
gathered in Packingtown—those of the various afflictions of the workers. . . .
The workers in each [part of the plant] had their own particular diseases. [A]
wandering visitor . . . could not be skeptical about these, for the worker bore
the evidence of them about on his own person—generally he had only to
hold out his hand. . . . Worst of any, however, were the fertilizer men, and
those who served in the cooking rooms. These people could not be shown to
the ordinary visitor, —for the odor of a fertilizer man would scare any
ordinary visitor at a hundred yards, and as for the other men, who worked in
tank rooms full of steam, and in some of which there were open vats near the
level of the floor, their particular trouble was that they fell into the vats; and
when they were fished out, there was never enough of them left to be worth
exhibiting, —sometimes they would be overlooked for days, till all but the
bones of them had gone out to the world as Durhams’ Pure Leaf Lard!44
These physical ailments are, of course, merely symbolic of a more general
maleficence:
43 Id. at 44-45.
44 Id. at 118-19.
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The peculiar bitterness of all this was that Jurgis saw so plainly the meaning
of it. In the beginning he had been fresh and strong, and he had gotten a job,
the very first day; but now he was second-hand, a damaged article, so to
speak, and they did not want him. They had got the best of him—they had
worn him out, with their speeding-up and their carelessness, and now they
had thrown him away! And Jurgis would make the acquaintance of others of
these unemployed men and find that they had all had the same
experience. . . . They had been overworked and underfed so long, and finally
some disease had laid them on their backs; or they had cut themselves, and
had blood poisoning, or met with some other accident. When a man came
back after that, he would get his place back only by courtesy of the boss. To
this there was no exception, save when the accident was one for which the
firm was liable; in that case they would send a slippery lawyer to see him,
first to try to get him to sign away his claims, but if he was too smart for that,
to promise him that he and his should always be provided with work. This
promise they would keep, strictly and to the letter—for two years. Two
years was the “statute of limitations,” and after that the victim could not
sue.45
In the beginning, however, Jurgis is thrilled to be part of the Durham
meatpacking firm and is swelled with corporate pride. The business represents for
him the apotheosis of freewheeling American capitalism, a portal to the American
Dream: “[N]ow he had been admitted—he was part of it all! He had the feeling that
this whole huge establishment had taken him under its protection, and had become
responsible for his welfare.”46 We, of course, know better, and Jurgis himself later
learns the truth: namely, that the entire meatpacking industry is—in antitrust
terms—nothing short of a massive horizontal conspiracy targeting its workers, its
suppliers, and its customers:
So guileless was he, and ignorant of the nature of business, that he did not
even realize that he had become an employee of Brown’s, and that Brown
and Durham were supposed by all the world to be deadly rivals—were even
45 Id. at 149-50.
46 Id. at 51.
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required to be deadly rivals by the law of the land, and ordered to try to ruin
each other under penalty of fine and imprisonment.47
Once or twice there had been rumors that one of the big houses was going to
cut its unskilled men to fifteen cents an hour, and Jurgis knew that if this was
done, his turn would come soon. He had learned by this time that
Packingtown was really not a number of firms at all, but one great firm, the
Beef Trust. And every week the managers of it got together and compared
notes, and there was one scale for all the workers in the yards and one
standard of efficiency. Jurgis was told that they also fixed the price they
would pay for beef on the hoof and the price of all dressed meat in the
country . . ..48
The narrator also reports of collateral consequences flowing from the
meatpackers’ socially casual way of conducting business. We learn, for instance, of
air thick with soot and other pollutants and a landscape that recalls the bareness of
winter even at high summer. But the Stygian vision of the Chicago River that he
summons is the most stunning:
“Bubbly Creek” is an arm of the Chicago River, and forms the southern
boundary of the yards; all the drainage of the square mile of packing houses
empties into it, so that it is really a great open sewer a hundred or two feet
wide. One long arm of it is blind, and the filth stays there forever and a day.
The grease and chemicals that are poured into it undergo all sorts of strange
transformations, which are the cause of its name; it is constantly in motion,
as if huge fish were feeding in it, or great leviathans disporting themselves in
its depths. Bubbles of carbonic acid will rise to the surface and burst, and
make rings two or three feet wide. Here and there, the grease and filth have
caked solid, and the creek looks like a bed of lava; chickens walk about on it,
feeding, and many times an unwary stranger has started to stroll across, and
vanished temporarily. The packers used to leave the creek that way, till
every now and then the surface would catch on fire and burn furiously, and
the fire department would have to come and put it out.49
Ultimately, Sinclair is most effective in his food polemic. He makes what is
essentially a two-pronged attack on food quality, one directed to regulatory
47 Id. at 51-52.
48 Id. at 133.
49 Id. at 115.
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misfeasance, another to corporate malfeasance. First, he criticizes lax inspection
and ineffective legislation:
It was late, almost dark, and the government inspectors had all gone . . ..
That day they had killed about four thousand cattle, and these cattle had
come in freight trains from far states, and some of them had got hurt. There
were some with broken legs, and some with gored sides; there were some
that had died, from what cause no one would say; and they were all to be
disposed of, here in darkness and silence. “Downers,” the men called them;
and the packing house had a special elevator upon which they were raised to
the killing beds, where the gang proceeded to handle them, with an air of
businesslike nonchalance which said plainer than any words that it was a
matter of everyday routine. It took a couple of hours to get them out of the
way, and in the end Jurgis saw them go into the chilling rooms with the rest
of the meat, being carefully scattered here and there so that they could not be
identified.50
Although condemned meat slips through the net because of the packer’s chicanery,
Sinclair makes it clear that inspection laws of the day were deeply, conceptually
flawed and easily circumvented anyway:
The people of Chicago saw the government inspectors in Packingtown and
they all took that to mean that they were protected from diseased meat; they
did not understand that these hundred and sixty-three inspectors had been
appointed at the request of the packers, and that they were paid by the United
States government to certify that all the diseased meat was kept in the state.
They had no authority beyond that; for the inspection of meat to be sold in
the city and state the whole force in Packingtown consisted of three
henchmen of the local political machine.51
But even if the laws had not been drafted so as to be meaningless in application, the
haphazard system of inspection would have eviscerated them:
Before the carcass was admitted [to the dressing line], it had to pass a
government inspector, who sat in the doorway and felt the glands of the neck
for tuberculosis. This government inspector did not have the manner of a
man who was worked to death; he was apparently not haunted by a fear that
the hog might get by him before he had finished his testing. If you were a
50 Id. at 77-78.
51 Id. at 115-16.
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social person, he was quite willing to enter into conversation with you, and
to explain to you the deadly nature of the ptomaines which are found in
tubercular pork; and while he was talking with you you could hardly be so
ungrateful as to notice that a dozen carcasses were passing him untouched.
This inspector wore a blue uniform, with brass buttons, and he gave an
atmosphere of authority to the scene, and, as it were, put the stamp of
approval upon the things which were done at Durham’s.52
The second prong of Sinclair’s attack on food quality was the one that
resonated most deeply with the public. And it is the depictions of adulterated and
unsanitary foodstuffs that are to this day most often invoked in the popular press
when the novel is recalled at all. In due course, we will explore why this might be
so. For now, it is enough to note how skillfully Sinclair weaves metaphor, irony and
naturalistic detail into a rhetorically powerful appeal to shared values and
experience:
They were regular alchemists at Durham’s; they advertised a mushroom-
catsup, and the men who made it did not know what a mushroom looked
like. . . . And then there was the “potted game” and “potted grouse,” “potted
ham,” and “deviled ham”—de-vyled, as the men called it. “De-vyled” ham
was made out of the waste ends of smoked beef that were too small to be
sliced by the machines; and also tripe, dyed with chemicals so that it would
not show white; and trimmings of hams and corned beef; and potatoes, skins
and all; and finally, the hard cartilaginous gullets of beef, after the tongues
had been cut out. All this ingenious mixture was ground up and flavored
with spices to make it taste like something.53
There was never the least attention paid to what was cut up for sausage; there
would come all the way back from Europe old sausage that has been
rejected, and that was moldy and white—it would be dosed with borax and
glycerine, and dumped into the hoppers, and made over again for home
consumption. There would be meat that had tumbled out on the floor, in the
dirt and sawdust, where the workers had tramped and spit uncounted billions
of consumption germs. There would be meat stored in great piles in rooms;
and the water from leaky roofs would drip over it, and thousands of rats
would race about on it. It was too dark in these storage places to see well,
52 Id. at 46.
53 Id. at 117-18.
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but a man could run his hand over these piles of meat and sweep off handfuls
of the dried dung of rats. These rats were nuisances, and the packers would
put out poisoned bread for them; they would die, and then rats, bread, and
meat would go into the hoppers together. This is no fairy story and no joke;
the meat would be shoveled into carts, and the man who did the shoveling
would not trouble to lift out a rat even when he saw one—there were things
that went into the sausage in comparison with which a poisoned rat was a
tidbit.54
As these excerpts plainly show, The Jungle was (and is) a comprehensive
indictment of American business practices. In theory, then, the work could have
inspired cries for reform in each of the regulatory areas that correspond to the
passages that we just reviewed: animal rights, workers’ rights, antitrust,
environmental standards and pure food requirements. Sinclair himself sought to
effect radical change across the board and, in especial, to improve the lot of the
working class. To that end, the bulk of the work is devoted to following the
devolution of a representative, hapless immigrant, one quickly eaten up and spitten
out by the meat packers. But as Sinclair later bemoaned, he missed the mark with
respect to the largest target: “I aimed at the public’s heart and by accident hit it in
the stomach.”55 For as we will presently see, there is a direct and demonstrable
connection between publication of The Jungle and adoption of the Meat Inspection
Act and the Pure Food and Drugs Act, both of 1906, but no others.
From a literary and rhetorical perspective, Sinclair’s various commentaries
on the wide range of bad acts that constitute the packing industry are narrated with
equal skill (even if you conclude, as have many critics, that Sinclair was not
54 Id. at 63.
55 Quoted in JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, PURE FOOD 229 (1989) [hereinafter
PURE FOOD].
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particularly skillful). Why, then, did The Jungle take hold in only one relatively
narrow area? In other words, why didn’t Sinclair’s novel—which plainly had a
considerable impact on the public imagination and concomitant political
ramifications—lead to immediate, widespread legislation? What we find, instead, is
that landmark legislation that would have reformed an array of practices in the
packing industry (or, in some cases, in business generally) did not follow close on
the heels of The Jungle. For example, the Packers & Stockyards Act (antitrust) was
not adopted until 1921, the Occupational Safety and Health Act (worker’s health and
safety) until 1970, the Clean Water Act (putting teeth into older environmental
legislation like the Water Pollution Control Act of 1948) until 1972, and the
Humane Slaughter Act (abolishing certain gruesome butchering practices like
“knocking”) until 1972. I will ultimately suggest that—as I hinted at before—it is
all a matter of context. Literature—even persuasively powerful literature—does not
operate in a void: conditions must be ripe if it is to draw energy from the social
milieu and thereby attain a kinetic force capable of influencing the law. This, as I
shall argue, requires an alignment of narratives: the literary narrative with the larger
cultural narrative within which it subsists. But before turning to that subject later in
this chapter, we must first take a closer look at how a literary work can actually
“cause” legislation and, even more important, demonstrate that this in fact happens.
The late-Eighteenth and all of the Nineteenth Centuries witnessed massive
changes to social structures in the West. As societies industrialized and urbanized,
attendant changes appeared in widely disparate areas, from the rise of the novel as a
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literary form to the rise of the modern regulatory state as a method of governance.56
Single causes are always difficult to isolate in the context of social change, but there
is general agreement that scientific and technological advances were the principal
impetus behind the movement from rural, agrarian structures to urban, industrial
structures. With these “advances” came a host of consequences, many unanticipated
and, therefore, unintended. “Discoveries in chemistry, for example, led to new
synthetic medicines and altered radically both the growing and the processing of
food. Transportation developments brought processed food to an increasingly
national market, making the growth of giant cities possible. The residents of those
cities lost the ability villagers had possessed of being first-hand judges of the food
they ate.”57
It was within this temporal gap between raw food (meat on the
hoof/vegetables in the ground) and the table that much mischief could be worked.
Some of chemistry’s impact on food production was benign—even salutary in many
cases—but it also permitted unscrupulous latter-day alchemists to transform vile,
inedible dross into slightly less vile, semi-edible (and marketable) dross. Think, for
instance, of Sinclair’s descriptions of “ham” with no ham in it, spoiled sausage
treated with borax then recycled, or rancid butter “oxidized” to remove its smell
before being returned to grocery shelves. None of this was completely lost on
56 With respect to the novel see, e.g., IAN WATT, THE RISE OF THE NOVEL:
STUDIES IN DEFOE, RICHARDSON AND FIELDING (1957); with respect to the
regulatory state see, e.g., LISA HEINZERLING & MARK V. TUSHNET, THE
REGULATORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (2006).
57 James Harvey Young, The Long Struggle for the 1906 Law 1 FDA
CONSUMER, June 1981, available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/history2.html
[hereinafter The Long Struggle].
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lawmakers or the public—even prior to Sinclair’s emergence on the scene. For
example, a Senate report from 1890 cautioned that “it has only been since the great
opportunity for fraud provided by modern science . . . that the sophistication of
articles of commerce has reached its present height.”58 But it is equally clear that—
prior to publication of The Jungle—“pure food crusaders” had had little success in
pushing effective legislation through Congress, despite numerous journalistic
exposés (including Sinclair’s own 1905 serial publication of what was to become
The Jungle in a socialist newspaper) recounting the horrors of Chicago’s Union
Stockyards.59
All this changed in 1906, with the publication of The Jungle in book form,
which “spurred a mighty reaction in the body politic that, in four months, led to the
enactment of two laws.”60 The confluence of several factors contributed to the
novel’s rapid public acceptance. As historian James Harvey Young capably
demonstrates, both Sinclair and his publisher, Doubleday, extensively and
effectively promoted the novel.61 But even more important, Sinclair, Doubleday,
and two key political figures, James R. Garfield and Senator Alfred J. Beveridge, put
the novel into the hands of President Theodore Roosevelt.62 The trust-busting
Roosevelt—still stinging from failed attempts to dismantle the beef trust under the
Sherman Act—was predisposed to read the (perhaps any) novel that offered another
58 Quoted in id.
59 Id.




opportunity to bring the packers to heel. And after Roosevelt’s own investigators
independently verified the major contours of Sinclair’s allegations (and in some
instances supplemented them), 63 the road to legislation was cleared.64
At this point, one may ask: in what sense did The Jungle “cause” passage of
the Meat Inspection Act and Pure Food and Drugs Act? The novel was not, of
course, what in legal parlance would be termed the “sole proximate cause,” but the
record makes it reasonably clear that it was a significant contributing cause. For
evidence of this type of causation, we can look first to the legislative history of the
acts. Although Sinclair is never mentioned by name in the floor debates attendant to
the Meat Inspection Act, at least one Senator alluded to him and his novel.65 There
is, moreover, a wealth of indirect evidence of provocation in the legislative history.
In the House hearings, much energy was devoted to attacking or buttressing the
conclusions of the Neill-Reynolds Report, which was created at Roosevelt’s request
either to confirm or to refute the factual assertions upon which Sinclair based his
63 One of the most contentious items taken up in the House hearings involved
the now infamous “pig that fell into a privy”:
As an extreme example of the entire disregard on the part of employees of
any notion of cleanliness in handling dressed meat, we saw a hog that had
just been killed, cleaned and washed, and started on its way to the cooling
room fall from the sliding rail to a dirty wooden door and slide part way into
a filthy men’s privy. It was picked up by two employees, placed upon a
truck, carried into the cooling room and hung up with other carcasses, no
effort being made to clean it.
Id. at 242 (quoting Conditions in the Stockyards, 59th Cong. 1 sess., House Doc.
873).
64 Id.
65 Id. at 251 (quoting Senator Lodge’s reference to “a man who wrote a
book”).
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book. Roosevelt ordered the independent investigation at Sinclair’s behest, as his
directive to Secretary Wilson reveals: “I would like a first-class man to be
appointed to meet Sinclair, as he suggests; get the names of witnesses, as he
suggests; and then go to work in the industry, as he suggests.”66 Sinclair himself
hoped that the ultimate report would give “a sort of governmental sanction to The
Jungle.”67 Thus, the official report became something of a stalkinghorse for the
novel: criticism or praise leveled at it was in essence criticism or praise of its
original impetus, the novel. Of this, there is ample evidence in the legislative
history, including the report itself and the testimony of its two authors.68
There is also considerable contemporaneous evidence of the novel’s
influence existing outside the official record. Roosevelt’s correspondence cited
above is, of course, germane, as are the recollections of many of the key players in
the political scene of the time.69 These include, for example, Harvey W. Wiley, the
66 Id. at 233 (quoting from Roosevelt’s papers).
67 Id. at 235.
68 Id. at 235-46 (discussing, among other things, the Neill-Reynolds Report
and the testimony of its two authors).
69 Interestingly, Roosevelt almost immediately sought to distance himself
from Sinclair once his legislative agenda was achieved. The correspondence
between Roosevelt and Sinclair shows that Roosevelt always saw Sinclair as a
mixed blessing—a useful tool, yet constant irritant. Once the usefulness was past,
only the irritant (mostly Sinclair’s strident socialism, with which Roosevelt had little
sympathy) remained. This explains the position that Roosevelt took in a letter to
Kansas newspaper editor William Allen White:
Thus in the beef packing business I found that Sinclair was of real use. I
have an utter contempt for him. He is hysterical, unbalanced, and untruthful.
Three-fourths of the things he said were absolute falsehoods. For some of
the remainder there was only a basis of truth. Nevertheless, in this particular
crisis he was of service to us, and yet I had to explain again and again to
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Chief of the Bureau of Chemistry, and Sinclair himself.70 Most historians, after
combing the relevant archives, have ascribed a “causal” relationship between The
Jungle and the Meat Inspection Act and, perhaps as a collateral consequence, the
Pure Food and Drugs Act.71 Case law is to similar effect.72 And two economists
well-meaning people that I could not afford to disregard ugly things that had
been found out simply because I did not like the man who had helped in
finding them out.
Id. at 251 (quoting THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN
AUTOBIOGRAPHY 443 (1920)).
70 According to Wiley, The Jungle “brought public opinion to the pitch of
indignant excitement” at a time when “President Roosevelt was eagerly in quest of a
law supervising the packing of our animal food products.” HARVEY W. WILEY, THE
HISTORY OF A CRIME AGAINST THE FOOD LAW, Chapter 7 (1929), available at
www.soilandhealth.org/03sov/0303critic/030305wylie/030305toc.html. Although
Sinclair was initially disappointed that he had not ameliorated the overall plight of
the workers, he later conceded with some pride that he “helped to clean up the yards
and improve the country’s meat supply.” Quoted in PURE FOOD, supra note 55, at
252.
71 See, e.g., The Long Struggle, supra note 57 (Sinclair’s “few pages
describing filthy conditions in Chicago’s packing plants, widely reported and
confirmed by government inquiry, cut meat sales in half, angered President
Roosevelt, and pushed a meat inspection bill aimed at protecting the domestic
market through the Congress.”); C. C. Regier, The Struggle for Federal Food and
Drugs Legislation, L. & CONTEMP. PROBLS. 3, 13 (1933) (Roosevelt “had received
the Neill-Reynolds report on June 2, and two days later he sent . . . the first part of
the much feared report [to the House], which was immediately broadcast by the
press. This compelled favorable action on the part of the committee.”); Thomas A.
Bailey, Congressional Opposition to Pure Food Legislation, 1879-1906, 36 AM. J.
OF SOCIOLOGY 52, 62 (1930) (“Roosevelt sent . . . the first part of the Neill-Reynolds
report [to the House]. Startled by the revelations given forth in this manner, an
indignant public, which flooded the House with telegrams, would not thereafter
permit further dilatory action on the part of Congress.”).
72 See, e.g., Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 645 n.1 (2d Cir. 2003)
(dissenting op.) (“It bears noting . . . that the federal government’s initial efforts to
regulate American meat quality were motivated in no small part by public reaction
to The Jungle, Upton Sinclair’s 1906 novel about Chicago’s meat packing plants.”);
IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 339 F.3d 894, 898-89 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[P]ublication of Upton
Sinclair’s novel The Jungle provoked President Theodore Roosevelt to secure
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recently concluded—after performing an econometric analysis of Senate voting
patterns—that “[t]he muckraking press [including Sinclair] eventually galvanized
widespread consumer interest in food and drugs regulation and broke the [then-
existing] impasse, allowing the [food and drugs] law to be finally enacted.”73
What this proves, then, is that literature can have a demonstrable—not
merely posited—impact on the law. I could pile up dozens of other examples from
the humanities and social sciences (Harriet Beecher Stowe, Karl Marx, Ralph Nader,
Jonathan Swift, and on and on), but there would little point now that the basic point
is made. I do think, however, that one more fairly detailed example will prove
useful, if only because it will figure prominently in the next stage in my argument—
i.e., the question of why certain humanistic works serve as legislative flash points.
That work, Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, differs from The Jungle both in genre
(literary broadside as opposed to novel) and in purpose (reforming a single area as
opposed to fomenting a wide-ranging socialist revolution).
4. Shelley’s Case, Part 2: Silent Spring
In 1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, a call to arms aimed
specifically at the by-then widespread use of pesticides, more generally at the civil
passage of the Meat Inspection Act of 1906. . . .”); U.S. v Espy, 145 F.3d 1369,
1371 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“The [Meat Inspection] Act was passed in response to Upton
Sinclair’s famous book The Jungle . . ..”).
73 Gary D. Libecap & Mark T. Law, Corruption and Reform? The
Emergence of the 1906 Food and Drug Act and the 1906 Meat Inspection Act 31
(Int’l Ctr. for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20, 2003), available at
http://www.icer.it/docs/wp2003/Libecap20-03.pdf. With respect to the narrower
issue of the impact of the Jungle on the Meat Inspection Act, Law and Libecap state
that “[t]he direct result of Upton Sinclair’s muckraking was the 1906 Meat
Inspection Act, which significantly expanded the USDA’s inspection of the
slaughtering, packing, and canning of meats.” Id. at 20.
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responsibilities of scientists, and even more generally at the post-Enlightenment
belief in technological progress. Although her work has a more than sufficient
scientific basis, it gains its greatest force from its “literary” qualities. It begins with
an epigraph from Keats (“The sedge is wither’d from the lake / and no birds sing”)
before opening the text proper with what Carson herself dubbed a “fable,” a
cautionary vision of middle-America stricken not by the then-feared nuclear
holocaust, but by the insidious—and purposeful—use of pesticides:
There was once a town in the heart of America where all life seemed to live
in harmony with its surroundings. The town lay in the midst of a
checkerboard of prosperous farms, with fields of grain and hillsides of
orchards where, in spring, white clouds of bloom drifted above the green
fields. . . . The countryside was, in fact, famous for the abundance and
variety of its bird life, and when the flood of migrants was pouring through
in spring and fall people traveled from great distances to observe them. Then
a strangle blight crept over the area and everything began to change. Some
evil spell had settled on the community: mysterious maladies swept the
flocks of chickens; the cattle and the sheep sickened and died. Everywhere
was a shadow of death. . . . There was a strange stillness. The birds, for
example—where had they gone? . . . It was a spring without voices. On
mornings that had once throbbed with the dawn chorus of robins, catbirds,
doves, jays, wrens, and scores of other bird voices there was now no sound;
only silence lay over the fields and woods and marsh. On the farms the hens
brooded, but no chicks hatched. . .. The apple trees were coming into bloom
but no bees droned among the blossoms, so there was no pollination and
there would be no fruit. The roadsides, once so attractive, were now lined
with browned and withered vegetation as though swept by fire. These, too,
were silent, deserted by all living things. Even the streams were now
lifeless. No witchcraft, no enemy action had silenced the rebirth of new life
in this stricken world. The people had done it themselves.74
What Carson brought to the debate was a keen sense of literary style,
coupled with a jargon-stripped exposition of scientific principles. Even a general
reader of the time could understand the salient features of her argument: namely,
that synthetic chemicals indiscriminately kill life forms, often with unimagined
74 RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 1-3 (Mariner 2002) (1962).
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consequences, and that, moreover, these chemicals circulate—and move up through
the food chain—far beyond their intended targets:
[S]prays, dusts, and aerosols are now applied almost universally to farms,
gardens, forests and homes—nonselective chemicals that have the power to
kill every insect, the “good” and the “bad,” to still the song of birds and the
leaping of fish in the streams, to coat the leaves with a deadly film, and to
linger on in soil—all this though the intended target may be only a few
weeds or insects. Can anyone believe that it is possible to lay down such a
barrage of poisons on the surface of the earth without making it unfit for all
life? They should not be called “insecticides” but “biocides.”75
In the less than two decades of their use, the synthetic pesticides have been
so thoroughly distributed throughout the animate and inanimate world that
they occur virtually everywhere. . . . They have entered the bodies of fish,
birds, reptiles, and domestic and wild animals so universally that scientists
find it almost impossible to locate subjects free from such contamination.
They have been found in fish in remote mountain lakes, in earthworms
burrowing in soil, in the eggs of birds—and in man himself. For these
chemicals are now stored in the bodies in the vast majority of human beings,
regardless of age. They occur in the mother’s milk, and probably in the
tissues of the unborn child.76
No dry scientific treatise this. It reads, from a rhetorical standpoint, much
like Sinclair’s meat packing exposé, full of tropes, literary allusions, and appeals to
shared values. Her technique is transparently literary, weaving into her fabric a host
of mini-narratives ranging from the pathetic (a boy and his dog stricken by the
insecticide endrin; two small boys—cousins, even—killed at play by another
insecticide, parathion) to the archetypal (retelling the myth of the sorceress Medea
and her robe of “death-by-indirection” to illustrate the mechanics of “systemic
insecticides”). In an excerpt worth quoting at some length, she even slyly invokes
75 Id. at 7-8.
76 Id. at 15-16.
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the authority of law when she appropriates a story from the outdoor biography of a
United States Supreme Court Justice:
Justice William O. Douglas, in his recent book My Wilderness: East to
Katahdin, has told of an appalling example of ecological destruction wrought
by the United States Forest Service in the Bridger National Forest in
Wyoming. Some 10,000 acres of sagelands were sprayed by the service,
yielding to pressure of cattlemen for more grasslands. The sage was killed,
as intended. But so was the green, lifegiving ribbon of willows that traced its
way across these plains, following the meandering streams. Moose had lived
in these willow thickets, for willow is to the moose what sage is to the
antelope. Beaver had lived there, too, feeding on the willows, felling them
and making a strong dam across the tiny stream. Through the labor of the
beavers, a lake backed up. Trout in the mountain streams seldom were more
than six inches long; in the lake they thrived so prodigiously that many grew
to five pounds. . . .
But with the “improvement” instituted by the Forest Service, the willows
went the way of the sagebrush, killed by the same impartial spray. When
Justice Douglas visited the area in 1959, the year of the spraying, he was
shocked to see the shriveled and dying willows—the “vast, incredible
damage.” What would become of the moose? Of the beavers and the little
world they had constructed? A year later he returned to read the answer in
the devastated landscape. The moose were gone and so were the beaver.
Their principal dam had gone out for want of attention by its skilled
architects, and the lake had drained away. None of the large trout were left.
None could live in the tiny creek that remained, threading its way through a
bare, hot land where no shade remained. The living world was shattered.77
Powerful as the contrast between the pastoral lyric prose and its antithesis
might be, Carson does not rest her argument solely on her ability to persuade
through rhetorical devices and logic. Indeed, she raises the ante a few pages later
and locates the overarching issue in law—specifically, as a clash of competing
private commercial and public environmental rights. Once again, she cloaks herself
in Justice Douglas, but this time using his words to make the operative point, not her
own:
77 Id. at 67-68.
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Justice Douglas tells of attending a meeting of federal field men who were
discussing protests by citizens against plans for the spraying of sagebrush. . ..
These men considered it hilariously funny that an old lady had opposed the
plan because the wildflowers would be destroyed. “Yet, was not her right to
search out a banded cup or a tiger lily as inalienable as the right of the
stockmen to search out grass or a lumberman to claim a tree?” asks this
humane and perceptive jurist. “The esthetic values of the wilderness are as
much our inheritance as the veins of copper and gold in our hills and the
forests in our mountains.”78
Although Carson herself had little hope that Silent Spring would make a deep
impact (she wrote to a friend that “[i]t would be unrealistic to believe that 1 book
could bring a complete change”), reality proved otherwise.79 Just as Sinclair struck
the mark with respect to unsanitary and adulterated food, Carson found it with
respect to pesticides and—even more generally—the whole range of environmental
issues. Like Sinclair, she was vilified by the industry whose products she impugned,
but—also like Sinclair—she found a powerful reader in the form of the then-sitting
President, John F. Kennedy. At a press conference in the summer of 1962—in
response to the question whether he would ask a government agency to investigate
the long-term effects of DDT—Kennedy stated, “Yes, and I know that they already
are. I think particularly, of course, since Miss Carson’s book, but they are
examining the matter.”80 In fact, Kennedy asked his Scientific Advisory Committee
to investigate Carson’s claims. The Committee’s report, which issued in May of
1963, largely vindicated Carson’s work, particularly in the report’s condemnation of
indiscriminate pesticide use and call for additional research into potential health
78 Id. at 72.
79 Quoted in PAUL BROOKS, THE HOUSE OF LIFE: RACHEL CARSON AT WORK
13 (1972).
80 Quoted in id. at 305.
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hazards.81 The Chair of the Committee, Dr. Jerome Wiesner, minced no words,
calling the uncontrolled use of poisonous chemicals a “potentially . . . much greater
hazard” than radioactive fallout.82
Where did all this lead? By the end of 1962, dozens of state legislatures had
taken up bills regulating pesticides and by the end of the decade at least three states
banned DDT.83 Of greater ultimate importance, however, were the wheels set in
motion at the federal level. First, the Committee’s report exposed loopholes in the
federal regulatory scheme through which, for example, pesticides that had been
denied approval by the United States Department of Agriculture could still slip
though and reach the market and, thereby, the environment. The more gaping
loopholes of this type were almost immediately closed.84 Second, Government-
sponsored research on pesticides markedly increased after the publication of Silent
Spring; these studies led to agency regulations sharply curtailing DDT use.85 Third,
Senator Abraham Ribicoff introduced a bill (S. 2792) proposing omnibus federal
control over pesticide use and manufacturing. Carson testified before the Senate
81 President’s Science Advisory Committee, Use of Pesticides (1963); see
also CHRISTOPHER J. BOSSO, PESTICIDES & POLITICS 122 (1987) (The PSAC panel
“clearly vindicated Carson.”).
82 Quoted in LINDA LEAR, RACHEL CARSON: WITNESS FOR NATURE 452
(1997).
83 Terence Kehoe & Charles Jacobson, Environmental Decisionmaking and
DDT Production at Montrose Chemical Corporation of California, 4 ENTERPRISE &
SOC’Y 640, 662 (2003).
84 See BOSSO, supra note 81, at 125-32.
85 See Kehoe & Jacobson, supra note 83, at 661-62.
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subcommittee holding hearings on the bill,86 and—although that bill did not become
law—Carson’s suggestions were ultimately adopted in subsequent legislation,
including the ban on DDT and the establishment of the Environmental Protection
Agency.87 Finally, and in some ways most interesting, Silent Spring’s influence did
not stop at the U.S. border: Carson’s work was cited several times in 1963 before
the House of Lords, resulting in significant controls on a number of chlorinated
86 Hearings on S. 1250 and S. 1251 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 88th
Congress 1 sess. (1963) (Statement of Rachel Carson). In the hearings, both
Senators Ribicoff and Gruening compared Carson to Harriett Beecher Stowe.
Ribicoff’s opening remarks even echoed Lincoln’s (legendary) remark to Stowe that
she was “the little woman who wrote the book that started this Great War!”
“Miss Carson . . . we welcome you here. You are the lady who started all
this. Will you please proceed. . . .
There can be no doubt that you are the person most responsible for the
current public concern over pesticide hazards.”
Senator Gruening (D-Alaska) also compared her to Stowe (at the close of
testimony). In addition, Carson testified before another Senate subcommittee. See
Interagency Coordination in Environmental Hazards (Pesticides): Hearings Before
the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Reorganization and International Organizations of
the Committee on Government Operations, June 4, 1963, 88th Congress 1 sess.
(1963) (testimony of Rachel Carson); see also, LEAR, supra note 82, at 454-55.
87 See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 598 F.2d 62, 72 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“One of the most influential
publications in the eventual enactment of the 1972 [Federal Water Pollution Control]
Act [Amendments] was R. Carson, Silent Spring (1962), which devoted
considerable attention to the carcinogenic nature of some heavy metals and some
chlorinated hydrocarbon pesticides.”); Mary Jane Angelo, Embracing Uncertainty,
Complexity, and Change: An Eco-pragmatic Reinvention of a First-Generation
Environmental Law, 33 ECOLOGY L. Q. 105, 155 (2006) (“Rachel Carson’s 1962
book Silent Spring first brought to the public’s attention the downside of the
seemingly miracle pesticide DDT. . . . Carson’s book led to a public outcry against
the threats of DDT and other persistent pesticides.”).
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hydrocarbons (e.g., aldrin and dieldrin), and the book is generally credited with
provoking environmental legislation in dozens of countries.88
How is it that literary works like The Jungle and Silent Spring can have a
deep and direct impact on a process as formalized as the legislative? Or just as
interesting, why is it that those works succeeded so well in some areas, but not in
others? After all, Sinclair had the Chicago River in flames in 1906, but it took
relatively minor oil fire on the Cuyahoga River in 1969 to spur Congress to take
serious action to clean up America’s waterways. The answer, I submit, lies in
narrative—or, more specifically, in an alignment or misalignment of narratives, as
the case may be. To that subject, and a new sub-section, we will now turn.
5. What Is Narrative?
Roland Barthes once remarked that narrative “is simply like life itself . . .
international, transhistorical, transcultural.”89 This cultural invariance thus invites us
to consider what it is about culture or—indeed—human nature that impels the
narrative turn. For Hayden White, “[s]o natural is the impulse to narrate, so
inevitable is the form of narrative for any report of the way things really happened,
that narrativity could appear problematical only in a culture in which it was absent—
absent or, as in some domains of Western intellectual and artistic culture,
88 See Caula A. Beyl, Rachel Carson, Silent Spring, and the Environmental
Movement, 2 HORTTECHOLOGY 272, 275 (1992); BROOKS, supra note 79, at 311-12.
89 ROLAND BARTHES, IMAGE MUSIC TEXT 79 (Stephen Heath trans., Noonday
1988) (1977).
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programmatically refused.”90 One domain that has resisted—even if it has not quite
refused—narrative accounts of its operation is the law.
Some have suggested that the conceptual coupling of law and narrative is of
recent vintage—i.e., that it is just another outcrop from the law and literature vein.91
That is probably true, if one is thinking purely in terms of volume of legal
scholarship. But it is equally true that, at least as far back as the Romans, lawyers
have recognized the central importance of facts to legal decisions: Da mihi facta,
dabo tibi ius (give me the facts, then I will give you the law).92 Not surprisingly,
then, most scholars have focused on “storytelling” in the litigation context,
particularly as a strategy for “outsiders” to achieve legal ends that would not be
90 Hayden White, The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality, 7
CRITICAL INQUIRY 5, 5 (1980).
91 See, e.g., Peter Brooks, Narrativity of the Law, 14 L. & LITERATURE 1, 1
(2002).
92 Jan M. van Dunne, Narrative Coherence and Its Function in Judicial
Decision Making and Legislation, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 463, 466 (1996). Van Dunne
goes on to recount a modern equivalent:
In Dutch literature there is the intriguing story told by Ter Haar, the
specialist on the “Adat law” of then the Netherlands East Indies, now
Indonesia. On one of his field trips in Java, he interviewed the local village
chief and judge, and wanted to know the rule of law according to the
indigenous law, say, for example on inheritance. The chief looked blank and
told him he could not tell him. Ter Haar persisted, and repeated his question.
Finally, the village chief said: “Give me a case, then I will tell you what the
law is. There was no Adat law tradition based on abstract, general rules.
Incidentally, in my experience, legal practitioners in Europe will have the
same response when asked what the substantive law in a certain field is (e.g.,
the rule on force majeure in contract law).
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available solely with reference to rules and logic.93 But this, it seems to me, cuts the
potential for a narrative-based jurisprudence far short and sets an easy target for
those critics—like Judge Posner—who hold the law and literature movement to be
something of an oversell.94
But the biggest detriment, in my view, of cabining narrative legal theory
within an advocacy-based “storytelling” framework is that it misses a larger
conceptual and practical point: law is a system existing within and along side other
systems. It exerts its own force over those systems, but it is also subject to the
gravitational forces of the others. The graviton here is narrative. And like all
natural forces, narrative is morally neutral. There are good narratives and bad
narratives. Narrative is not just a method for the oppressed to receive justice. Hitler
slipped his genocidal programs quite easily into the myth of Lohengrin and the
related narrative of a glorious and heroic Teutonic past (as well as the post-1918
“stab in the back” theory of Germany’s defeat in World War I). The aim, then,
should be to develop an understanding of how narratives work on and within the law
generally—not just within the courtroom.
“Narrative” is a slippery concept, one capable of generalization to the point
of functional meaninglessness. It is therefore necessary to look carefully at some of
the competing definitions offered in (mostly) recent scholarship and then arrive at a
definition that will serve as the starting point for further discussion:
93 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories out of
School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993) (discussing
claims of various “storytelling” schools of scholarship).
94 See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE (rev. ed. 1998).
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 “a story of events arranged in time sequence and offering some sort of
meaning”95
 “the organization of material in a chronologically sequential order and
the focusing of the content into a single coherent story . . . its
arrangement is descriptive rather than analytical and . . . its central focus
is on man not circumstances”96
 “first a ‘selective appropriation of past events and characters;’ second, a
temporal ordering that presents these events with a beginning, a middle
and an end; and third, an overarching structure that contextualizes these
events as part of an opposition or struggle”97
 “a recognizable discourse or operation . . . that . . . can be abstracted from
[its] medium [of expression] . . . as in the plot summary”98
 a story99
 “a metacode, a human universal on the basis of which transcultural
messages about the nature of a shared reality can be transmitted”100
The common thread here is the basic idea of a “story,” a relational and temporal
ordering of human events that culminates in “closure.” Although we may refine this
a bit as we go on, this is a serviceable definition for most of our purposes.
95 David Ray Papke & Kathleen H. McManus, Narrative and the Appellate
Opinion, 23 LEGAL STUD. F. 449, 449 (1999).
96 Lawrence Stone, The Revival of Narrative: Reflections on a New Old
History, 85 PAST & PRESENT 3, 3 (1979).
97 Mark A. Clawson, Telling Stories: Romance and Dissonance in
Progressive Legal Narratives, 22 LEGAL STUD. F. 353, 364 (1998) (citing and
partially quoting Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Subversive Stories and
Hegemonic Tales: Towards a Sociology of Narrative, 29 L. & SOC’Y REV. 197, 200
(1995)).
98 Brooks, supra note 91, at 1.
99 Van Dunne, supra note 92, at 463.
100 White, supra note 90, at 6.
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By further way of groundwork, we must make an additional distinction
between categories of narrative falling under the general definitional umbrella.
There are, for instance, larger cultural narratives and smaller individual narratives.
This is not to suggest that there is a bright line between narratives big and small—to
the contrary, I hope to show that one influences the other in ways essential to the
making of law. Jonathan Hearn—following Margaret Somers—has developed a
useful framework within which to examine narrative forms and how particular
narratives interact.101 For Hearn and Somers, narrative is an antidote to “identity
politics,” a way of explaining human experience and interaction without wholesale
resort to arbitrary or ambiguous labels like race, ethnicity, class and gender. The
focus thus shifts away from labels and onto a picture of the narratives that both
individuals and groups participate in and the web of social relationships upon which
this picture hangs. Under the Hearn-Somers rubric, narrativity has two aspects:
“emplotment” and “evaluative criteria.” Emplotment—unlike, for instance, an
“annal,” which is nothing more than a list of dates and events—locates events within
a contextual matrix: “To make something understandable in the context of narrative
is to give it historicity and relationality. This works for us because when events are
located in a temporal (however fleeting) and sequential plot we can then explain
their relationship to other events. Plot can thus be seen as the logic or syntax of
narrative.”102 Embedded within emplotments are “evaluative criteria,” which serve
101 Jonathan Hearn, Narrative, Agency, and Mood: On the Social
Construction of National History in Scotland, 44 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 745
(2002); Margaret R. Somers, The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational
and Network Approach, 23 THEORY & SOC’Y 605 (1994).
102 Somers, supra note 101, at 617.
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to extract the important from the trivial and bring about narrative coherence: “in the
face of a potentially limitless array of social experiences deriving from social
contact with events, institutions, and people, the evaluative capacity of emplotment
demands and enables selective appropriation in constructing narratives. A plot must
be thematic.”103
Thus conceived, narrative is a tool that mediates between raw experience and
efforts to articulate that experience by, as Barthes explains it, “ceaselessly
substitut[ing] meaning for the straightforward copy of the events recounted.”104 In
other words, narrative is a way to make sense of it all. But making sense is not a
one-size-fits-all proposition. To help sort all this out, Hearn and Somers identify
four main dimensions to narrativity: ontological, public, metanarrative, and
conceptual. Ontological narratives are narratives that individuals use for making
sense of their lives, sometimes fabricating new narratives, sometimes investing in
existing ones. Hearn explains that this process often involves “appropriating and
customizing ‘public narratives’: those narratives attached to cultural and
institutional formations larger than the single individual, to intersubjective networks
or institutions, however local or grand . . ..”105 By way of example, a public
narrative might trace the ups and downs of families like the Medici, the Churchills
or the Kennedys, the rise and fall of empires, or periods of great prosperity or
famine. Metanarratives “are meant in much the sense made popular by Lyotard
103 Id.
104 BARTHES, supra note 89, at 79.
105 Hearn, supra note 101, at 748.
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(1989), as master narratives that encompass much or all of human history—either as
master frameworks for explanation, for example, the Individual versus Society, or
progressive stories of the rise (and sometimes fall) of Nationalism, Liberalism,
Socialism, Globalization, and the like.”106 The final dimension, the conceptual,
concerns the modes of analysis that social scientists conceive in their efforts to
understand society, both past and present. As Hearn aptly notes, conceptual
“narratives often interpenetrate with metanarratives.”107 Indeed, Somers’ entire
enterprise seems designed to extend the notion of metanarrative to a purely
conceptual plane, one “that is more sensitive to human variability, one that
recursively appreciates the role of narrativity both in social theory and throughout
social life.”108
But Somers does not intend to leave things at the level of concept; her
ultimate goal is to offer a description of agency that traces social interaction down
through the ever-more specific narrative dimensions until ultimately arriving at the
ontological level: “So basic to agency is ontological narrativity that if we want to
explain—that is, to know, to make sense of, to account for, perhaps even to predict,
anything about the practices of social and historical actors, their collective actions,
their modes and meanings of institution-building and group-formations, and their
106 Id.
107 Id. at 748-49.
108 Id. at 749.
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apparent incoherencies—we must first recognize the place of ontological narratives
in social life.”109
It is at this point that Hearn begins to diverge from Somers, if only to
supplement her scheme in two key respects. First, Hearn tasks himself with putting
forth a more concrete description of how the various dimensions of narrativity
interact. He accordingly offers a redefinition of agency, one that strives for a fuller
apprehension of how agency works in practice: “for persons, agency is not simply
either raw potential for action, or the actual expression of action, but something that
is deeply felt as an existential need to act, that is either being frustrated or realized in
general. We need another, mediating concept that directs our attention to this
middle ground between the potential for and performance of agency, to our
dispositions towards agency.”110 Second, Hearn notes that narratives—in addition to
emplotments and evaluative criteria—also typically have protagonists. And it is the
protagonist that gives a narrative shape and texture—the features that permit
individuals to invest and participate in higher-order narratives. For Hearn, a troping
process is at work: “A metaphorical link is forged between individual and collective
identities. It is because public and meta-narratives have key protagonists—the
nation, the class, the race, the gender, the members of the profession, the leaders and
employees of the corporation, the great people of ‘this city’—that individuals




collective as protagonist that people become attached to narratives.”111 We can often
observe shifting narrative sands by watching protagonists move on and off the stage
of great public legal debates as they are embodied in case law. Let’s take as an
example the continuing battle over abortion at the United States Supreme Court.
In Roe v. Wade, the Court sought to free itself of “emotion” and
“predilection” by inquiring into and placing emphasis on “medical and medical-legal
history.”112 The Court considered a range of non-legal materials, including the
Hippocratic Oath, the then-current position of the American Medical Association,
and advances in medical technology that had reduced the risk of physical harm
associated with abortion procedures. Almost inevitably, then, “The Physician”
emerges as the protagonist in the drama, a looming presence with whom a woman
must consult in weighing all the factors that go into an abortion decision. And
indeed, the Court aims its holding as much at a physician’s right to practice as at a
woman’s right to privacy: “The decision vindicates the right of the physician to
administer medical treatment according to his professional judgment . . ..”113 Within
two decades, opponents of abortion mounted an assault on Roe. In the Supreme
Court’s opinion in that case, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, the
physician all but disappears into the background, replaced by “The Woman,” whose
“personal decisions,” “right,” and “liberty” are at stake.114 In some cases, she is a
111 Id. at 749-50.
112 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973).
113 Id. at 165.
114 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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tragic victim, one who might suffer bodily injury from an abusive spouse were she
to have only a fettered right to abortion (the statute at issue had, inter alia, a spousal
notification provision). In the Court’s most recent foray into the thicket, Gonzales v.
Carhart, the woman, who must be protected from a choice that she may come to
regret, gives way to the “Unborn Child” (a/k/a “The Infant Life” and “The Baby”),
who is on a quest to enter the world but must be protected along the way (by
Congress-as-St. George) from a barbaric procedure known as a partial-birth
abortion.115 Interestingly, the physician takes another turn across the boards, but this
time in the role of villain, not protagonist. No longer is he the reasonable and
compassionate “consultant”; now he is a comrade of Hitler’s infamous Angel of
Death, Dr. Josef Mengele:
Dr. Haskell went in with forceps and grabbed the baby’s legs and pulled
them down into the birth canal. Then he delivered the baby’s body and the
arms—everything but the head. The doctor kept the head right inside the
uterus. . . . The baby’s little fingers were clasping and unclasping, and his
little feet were kicking. Then the doctor stuck the scissors in the back of his
head, and the baby’s arms jerked out, like a startle reaction, like a flinch, like
a baby does when he thinks he is going to fall. The doctor opened up the
scissors, stuck a high-powered suction tube into the opening, and sucked the
baby’s brains out. Now the baby went completely limp. . . . He cut the
umbilical cord and delivered the placenta. He threw the baby in a pan, along
with the placenta and the instruments he had just used.116
These cases illustrate quite well, I think, Hearn’s point that a narrative’s rhetorical
power flows just as much from who it is about as what it is about.
Hearn goes on to suggest that ontological narratives can bind with higher-
order narratives because the higher-order narratives “appeal to us according to how
115 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
116 Id. at 1622-23.
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they explain, justify, and resonate with our actual experiences of agency, of
empowerment and disempowerment.”117 This means, I think, that there is much to
learn from examining narratives with a “nexus” approach—i.e., to measure
narratives at any given time against one another to see whether they are congruent,
complementary, or contradictory. For law, this means that lower-order narratives
can become actualized only when they align with a higher-order, dominant narrative.
This is not to say, however, that the accretive force of lower-order narratives cannot
incrementally shift dominant higher-order narratives into an ultimate position of
alignment:
Ontological narratives are, above all, social and interpersonal. Although
psychologists are typically biased toward the individual sources of narrative,
even they recognize the degree to which ontological narratives can only exist
interpersonally in the course of social and structural interactions over time.
To be sure, agents adjust stories to fit their own identities, and, conversely,
they will tailor “reality” to fit their stories. The intersubjective webs of
relationality sustain and transform narratives over time. Charles Taylor calls
these “webs of interlocution,” others call them “traditions,” I call them
“public narratives.”118
To illustrate how this plays out in practice, let’s turn to some specific examples,
including our two literary works.
6. How Narratives Interact to Influence Legislation
As I already demonstrated, The Jungle is composed of a number of mini-
narratives, each of which could in theory have led to legislative reforms. Each is as
compelling as its fellows, at least in terms of rhetoric and style. And, taken
collectively, the overall narrative could have inspired a socialist revolution, a
117 Hearn, supra note 101, at 750.
118 Somers, supra note 101, at 618.
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complete revamping of the legal and social systems in the United States. But this
didn’t happen. The question is “Why?” The answer is complicated, but it turns on
narrative.
First, let’s revert to the adulterated food issue and the legislation that The
Jungle inspired. Federal food and drug regulation was a long time coming in the
United States. From the early years of the republic, health and safety regulation was
presumed to reside in the states; consequently, most federal officials thought (to the
extent that they thought about it at all) that the federal government lacked legislative
jurisdiction over the subject matter.119 But two overlapping narratives were destined
to converge in Congress and to clash with the dominant narrative of Nineteenth
Century America: laissez-faire capitalism.120 The unlikely narrative partnership
arose from, on the one hand, a series of fragmented, yet slowly coalescing,
consumer-oriented stories, and from, on the other hand, entrepreneurial businesses
trying to elbow their way to a seat at the table of commerce. Young puts it this way:
The attempt to secure a broad national law to protect citizens of the United
States from the expanding threat of adulterated food, drink, and drugs began
in 1879 and continued through a quarter century, by turns waxing and
waning in intensity, before reaching fruition in 1906. During this extended
campaign, two kinds of voices urged the necessity for action. The reform
voice, sometimes shrill, concerns itself with the welfare of consumers, and,
while bemoaning the way in which adulteration cheats the public, puts major
stress on hazards to health. The business voice speaks in less frenetic tones,
downplays danger, exempts from regulation harmless adulterants sanctioned
119 Regier, supra note 71, at 4-5 (“[T]here were those who objected on
constitutional grounds. They did not wish to have the federal government extend its
police power into the states.”).
120 Bailey, supra note 71, at 64 (“[T]here were those who were personally
interested in the perpetuation of frauds that would be illegal under a pure food
statute. . .. [T]his group was the most dangerous, for it fought most persistently and
most insidiously.”).
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by long trade practice, and defines more serious secret adulteration as a
morally indefensible economic practice that pinches the consumer’s purse
and pushes the honorable entrepreneur, unable to compete, to the brink of
bankruptcy. The reform and business voices criticize each other, as well as
castigating their mutual enemies.121
This dance of narratives continued throughout the closing years of the Nineteenth
Century, with the partners drawn closer by a confluence of key persons and events.
First, it is hard to overestimate the work of Dr. Wiley, who was the chief chemist in
the Department of Agriculture from 1883 until 1912. His obituary in Science
described him as both a tenacious crusader and astute observer of the human
condition: “a very mountain among men, a lion among fighters,” a “keen student of
human nature,” and a “prince of good fellows.”122 Wiley was by all accounts not
only a solid scientist but as well—and probably more important—a capable
bureaucrat and an effective public speaker and writer. He skillfully used the press,
and his “Poison Squad,” whose human volunteers experimented on themselves with
food preservatives, enlivened the public imagination. But, according to his
biographer, Oscar Anderson, Wiley’s greatest contribution was his ability to stay the
course: “He was the one individual who gave continuity to the struggle for pure
food and drugs, the one leader who consistently saw the big picture. Wiley was in
large part responsible for the fact that food and drug legislation came when it did
and in the form that it did.”123
121 PURE FOOD, supra note 55, at 40-41.
122 Quoted in Regier, supra note 71, at 6.
123 Quoted in PURE FOOD, supra note 55, at 174.
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Wiley’s concern with chemical food adulteration and with the quackery
associated with patent medicines at some point soon after the turn of the century
converged with the interests of the muckraking press. Chief among Wiley’s
muckraking collaborators was Samuel Hopkins Adams, who penned a widely
followed polemic aimed at the patent medicine industry. The first installment of
Adams’ series appeared in Collier’s magazine in October of 1905 and ran through
February of 1906. While collecting information for his articles, Adams consulted
with Wiley and later—when Congress took up the pure food and drug bill—he
traveled to Washington to support Wiley’s efforts to secure passage of the
legislation.124 But, as Robert Crunden has shown, Adams left Roosevelt, who felt
that journalistic hyperbole had poisoned the pure-food issue, unpersuaded.125 This,
coupled with Roosevelt’s suspicion of science in general and of Wiley’s science in
particular, might have kept Roosevelt on the legislative sidelines had the food and
drug bill arrived in a vacuum. It did not, however: “Furor over The Jungle, and
public identification of meat and food bills as a ‘single effort’ . . . led Roosevelt to
push hard for them both.”126 An unanswered question hovers above here: Why did
the meat legislation resonate with Roosevelt in a way that the food and drug
legislation did not? An answer may be found—to return to Somers’ vocabulary—in
Roosevelt’s ontological narrative.
124 PURE FOOD, supra note 55, at 201.
125 PURE FOOD, supra note 55, at 289.
126 Id. at 290.
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In April of 1898, the United States declared war against Spain. An
expeditionary force decamped for Cuba in June and won two major battles on July 1.
Soon thereafter, the Americans devastated the Spanish fleet in Santiago harbor,
thereby bringing a quick end to the Spanish-American War. The American forces
stayed on for a few weeks and in the process suffered nine times as many casualties
from disease as from the period of combat. The reason? In almost every respect,
the army was ill-prepared to wage a tropical war. Provisions in general and bad beef
in particular formed an area of special complaint, as one mother of a soldier wrote in
a letter to President McKinley: “We are living under a generous Government, with a
good, kind man at its head willing to give the Army the best possible, and yet
thieving corporations will give the boys the worst.”127
McKinley, who had already been reading newspaper accounts of the food
scandal, quickly appointed a special commission (the “Dodge Commission,” named
for its head, General Grenville M. Dodge) to investigate the Cuban food debacle.
Based on testimony before that commission, McKinley subsequently established a
court of inquiry (the “Wade Court,” named for its head, Major General James Wade)
to probe the mounting evidence of malfeasance in the provisioning of beef. In
testimony before the Dodge Commission, Major General Nelson A. Miles coined
the catch-phrase by which army beef would thereafter be referred:
There was sent to Porto Rico 337 tons of what was known as, or called,
refrigerated beef, which you might call embalmed beef, and there was also
127 Id. at 135 (quoting Exhibit 18, Food Furnished by Subsistence
Department to Troops in the Field, 56 Cong. 1 sess., Senate Doc. 270 (1898)).
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sent 198,508 pounds of what is known as canned fresh beef, which was
condemned . . . by nearly every officer whose commands used it.128
In his autobiography, Always the Young Strangers, the poet Carl Sandburg recalled
with little relish his own experiences with “embalmed beef”:
What we called “Red Horse” soon had all our country scandalized with its
new name of “Embalmed Beef.” It was embalmed. We buried it at sea
because it was so duly embalmed with all flavor of life and every suck of
nourishment gone from it though having nevertheless a putridity of odor
more pungent than ever reaches the nostrils from a properly embalmed
cadaver.129
Sandburg was not the only soon-to-be public figure to have suffered the torments of
embalmed beef. Indeed, the embalmed beef fiasco left a life-long impression on
someone crucial to our larger discussion of consumer legislation: Theodore
Roosevelt.
Roosevelt was a Lieutenant Colonel at the time of the Spanish American
War, which brought him into the limelight as the daring leader of a group of
volunteers known as the Rough Riders. Prior to that group’s famed charge up San
Juan Hill, Roosevelt was faced with grousing from his troops about canned roast
beef. Roosevelt later (by then Governor of New York) recounted these incidents in
testimony before the Wade Court. Roosevelt particularly recalled challenging a red-
haired Kentuckian that he caught in the act of discarding his meat ration. “I can’t eat
the meat,” the soldier explained. Roosevelt retorted, “If you are a baby, you had
better not have come to the war. Eat it and be a man,” whereupon the soldier
128 Id. at 136.
129 Id. at 138 (quoting CARL SANDBURG, ALWAYS THE YOUNG STRANGERS
417 (1952)).
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attempted to comply and vomited.130 Roosevelt first suspected that the problem was
confined to the delicate stomachs of the volunteers, but he soon found that the
regular cavalry also despised canned beef. He even “tried to eat some of it myself
when I was hungry and found that I could not,” finding the substance “slimey . . .
stringy and coarse, . . . like a bundle of fibers.”131 And upon returning from the war,
the only surprise Roosevelt felt in learning of the raging public debate over
“embalmed beef” was that there was any debate at all, given that he had never heard
an affirmative argument put forward:
I never, in the cavalry division, or in the few infantrymen with whom I came
in contact, from the generals down to the privates, heard anybody speak of
the canned roast beef when they did not take it as a matter of course that it
was a bad ration.132
At the end of the day, the findings of the Dodge Commission and the Wade
Court were inconclusive and in many key respects exonerated the packers: yes,
there had been problems with the food supplied during the Spanish American War,
but no, the packers had not poisoned the beef supplied to the expeditionary force
with preservatives. But none of that really mattered. For as Young aptly remarks,
“[f]ew Americans, certainly not Theodore Roosevelt, forgot ‘embalmed beef.’” In
fact, the embalmed-beef story was simply absorbed into a growing, anti-packer
public narrative, as it was into Roosevelt’s own ontological narrative. And there it
lay dormant for several years, awaiting an impetus like Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle
130 Id. (quoting Food Furnished by Subsistence Department, supra note 127,
at 1100-07).
131 Id.
132 Id. at 138-39.
66
to reinvigorate it. Against this backdrop, we can thus see that the 1906 legislation
was possible only because of a felicitous alignment of three narratives: Roosevelt’s
ontological narrative, which contained an “embalmed beef” strand, a public
narrative that increasingly portrayed the beef packing industry as corrupt, and a
literary narrative that sparked these other narratives to life (in the form of
legislation).
7. What’s Truth Have to Do with It?
If narrative alignments can cause shifts in the law, what is it about a literary
narrative that “gets it in the game?” Some have suggested that literature is most
effective when it is “truthful.” That seems a dubious proposition, given literature’s
(mostly) fictional nature, but it is not something that we need resolve for purposes of
our present discussion. I would submit, rather, that a literary work can effect great
change when it is plausible under a public narrative that is on the cusp of becoming
dominant. In other words, a story doesn’t need to be true to be an agent of change;
mere plausibility is sufficient.133 This much may reasonably be derived from our
discussion of the pure food narratives, but it may be more instructive to discuss an
example in which a legislation-inducing narrative is demonstrably false.
133 In the next chapter, I will discuss the central importance of coherence to
the plausibility of narratives. For now, we can simply register Neil MacCormick’s
observation that “[n]arrative coherence . . . is a necessary but not a sufficient
condition of real-world credibility.” MACCORMICK, supra note 11, at 227; cf.
BERNARD S. JACKSON, LAW, FACT AND NARRATIVE COHERENCE 71-76 (1988)
(critiquing Bennett and Feldman’s account of fact construction at trial). For
MacCormick, the difference between a fictional and a non-fictional narrative is that
the non-fictional narrative must be “anchored” in reality. But he also notes the
warning of others against “too ready reliance on a good story as solidifying belief in
‘facts’ established by it.” And that is exactly the situation in the next example that
we will take up: a good story that is anchored, but the anchor is false evidence.
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In the middle of a summer’s day in 1969, a stretch of the Cuyahoga River
passing through Cleveland, Ohio burst into flames. Former Environmental
Protection Agency Administrator Carol Browner spoke for many of us of a certain
age when she said, “I will never forget a photograph of flames, fire, shooting right
out of the water in downtown Cleveland. It was the summer of 1969 and the
Cuyahoga River was burning.”134 The photograph in question then stood and still
stands as graphic proof that the then-current system of environmental regulation
(mostly state/local legislation and common law) was woefully deficient, which
militated in favor of sweeping new legislation at the federal level:
Firefighters battle the 1969 Cuyahoga River fire. The blaze symbolized years of
environmental neglect and, in turn, helped spur grassroots activism that resulted in a wave of
legislation devoted to clean air, clean water, and natural resource protection.135
And that legislation quickly followed in the form of, inter alia, the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act of 1972.136 Even today, the image of the fire is
134 Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History of
Environmental Protection, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 89 (2002).
135 Photograph and caption as they appeared until recently on the National
Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (a subdivision of the Department of
Commerce) web site, http://www.celebrating200years.noaa.gov/events/earthday.
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regularly invoked both as a cautionary tale and as a yardstick against which to
measure how far we have come in our efforts to reclaim the environment. For
example, as a testament to the continuing iconic status of the Cuyahoga fire, CNN
broadcast this report on the thirtieth anniversary of the conflagration:
Three decades ago, an event occurred that would galvanize the U.S.
environmental movement: the Cuyahoga River became a river of fire. A
nauseating brew of flammable pollutants from steel mills, paint factories,
chemical plants and sewage burst into flame. Today, mother ducks swim in
the Cuyahoga with their offspring, blue herons have returned to the river
banks, and rowing teams practice -- all testament to an astonishing ecological
[re]covery.137
This contrasts nicely with media reports of the pre-duck era, including this one from
the August 1, 1969 issue of Time:
Some River! Chocolate-brown, oily, bubbling with subsurface gases, it oozes
rather than flows. “Anyone who falls into the Cuyahoga does not drown,”
Cleveland’s citizens joke grimly. “He decays.”. . . The Federal Water
Pollution Control Administration dryly notes: “The lower Cuyahoga has no
visible signs of life, not even low forms such as leeches and sludge worms
that usually thrive on wastes.” It is also -- literally -- a fire hazard.138
A tidy narrative, this. Except that it never happened—at least not like we
think it happened. The Cuyahoga was indeed polluted in 1969, as were all
American rivers in the rust belt. They had been since the Nineteenth Century. And
the Cuyahoga did briefly catch fire on June 22, 1969, as it had from time to time for
136 Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 351 U.S. 159, 174-75 (2001) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (“In 1969, the
Cuyahoga River in Cleveland, Ohio, coated with a slick of industrial waste, caught
fire. Congress responded to that dramatic event, and to others like it, by enacting the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of (FWPCA) Amendments of 1972.”).
137 http://www.cnn.com/NATURE/9906/22/saving.cuyahoga/.
138 Quoted in Ohio Historical Society, “Cuyahoga River Fire,” Ohio History
Central: An Online Encyclopedia of Ohio History.
http://www.ohiohistorycentral.org.
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over a hundred years.139 But the fire, which arose when sparks from a passing train
ignited a small oil slick and debris, was relatively minor, was quickly extinguished,
and caused only about $50,000 in damage to two train trestles.140 How can that be,
one might ask, especially in light of the famous photograph of a wall of flames, a
towering plume of smoke, and valiant firefighters pouring tens of thousands of
gallons of water onto the inferno? The answer is simple. That’s a photograph of the
1952 fire, a serious fire that caused over $1.5 million in damage.141
Why is it, then, that the 1969 fire provoked such outrage when its much more
significant predecessors like the 1952 fire (or Sinclair’s fictional fires on the
Chicago River in the early 1900s) hardly registered? Jonathan Adler suggests—
correctly, I think—that it was all a matter of timing:
The 1969 fire was a catalyst for change because it was the wrong event at the
right time. It was neither an impressive fire, nor one with a significant
ecological impact. It may have brought greater attention to the serious
environmental problems of the time, but it did not represent a continuing
decline in water quality, let alone worsening environmental degradation
nationwide. Contrasted with the relevant [sic] indifference to burning rivers
in decades past, the public outcry over the 1969 fire signified that
increasingly wealthy Americans now wanted to devote greater resources to
environmental protection — and they likely would have even in the absence
of federal regulations.142
139 Id. (“Fires occurred on the Cuyahoga River in 1868, 1883, 1887, 1912,
1922, 1936, 1941, 1948, and in 1952.”).
140 Adler, supra note 134, at 96.
141 Adler, supra note 134, at 98; Ohio Historical Society, supra note 138.
142 Jonathan H. Adler, Smoking Out the Cuyahoga Fire Fable: Smoke and
Mirrors Surrounding Cleveland, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (June 22, 2004),
http://www.nationalreview.com/adler/adler200406220845.asp; see also Adler, supra
note 134, at 139-40.
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Put differently, a public environmental narrative sufficient to flower into legislation
in the presence of a catalyst like the 1969 fire did not exist prior to the 1960s. And
even then, the putative narrative catalyst was not itself sufficient without some
dressing up—some supplemental narrativizing—as we have seen.143
8. Whose Story to Believe?
If the Cuyahoga example shows that a narrative must be fleshed out (from
time to time with fiction) to have legal consequences, sometimes the issue is one of
contradictory narratives competing for legal recognition. Silent Spring presents one
such case. As we already noted, the book challenged one of the prevailing myths of
the Industrial Revolution and its successors: the notion of technological progress. It
came as no surprise, then, that the chemical industry and its allies deployed that
prevailing narrative as a block against Silent Spring’s potential to influence
legislation. Monsanto Chemical Company, which was a major producer of DDT,
published a “fable” that parodied the introduction to Silent Spring and presented an
apocalyptic vision of a world overrun with insects.144 An industry spokesman,
Robert White-Stevens, invoked a typical image of devolution: “If man were to
faithfully follow the teachings of Miss Carson, we would return to the dark ages, and
143 As Hearn has already reminded us, narratives usually have protagonists.
The Cuyahoga had some help in achieving this status, at least in part, through the
efforts of Randy Newman:
Cleveland, even now I can remember
’Cause the Cuyahoga River
Goes smokin’ through my dreams
Burn on, big river, burn on
RANDY NEWMAN, Burn On, on SAIL AWAY (Warner Bros. Records 1972).
144 See JOHN WARGO, OUR CHILDREN’S TOXIC LEGACY: HOW SCIENCE AND
LAW FAIL TO PROTECT US FROM PESTICIDES 80 (2d ed. 1998).
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the insects and diseases and vermin would again inherit the earth.”145 And even
government officials warned of crops that could not be grown, staples that could not
be maintained in abundant supply, and public health standards that could not be
maintained in the absence of pesticide use.146 Again, all this seems expected.
But it is not all. The most virulent criticism of Silent Spring came packaged
in two of the era’s most dominant public narratives: gender differences and
communism.147 Former Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benton is “credited” with
launching these lines of attack in a letter to Dwight Eisenhower, in which he
wondered “Why a spinster with no children was so concerned with genetics?” The
answer: she was “probably a Communist.”148 As Linda Lear explains, Benton’s
opening volley had serious consequences in the court of public opinion: “The
question reflected increasing attention on Carson’s gender by those who commented
on Silent Spring and its reserved author. The press was inordinately interested in
Carson’s marital status. She was, after all, physically attractive, quiet, and
feminine.”149 In the end, Carson’s sex came to color every argument against her
scientific conclusions:
Finally, mixed in with all the other arguments was Carson’s gender. She
kept cats and loved birds. She was a nature writer, a mystic, a devotee of the
balance of nature. Her arguments were exaggerations born of hysteria at
145 Quoted in id. at 81.
146 Id. (quoting Secretary Freeman).
147 The feminine public narrative was radically revised over the course of the
Twentieth Century. It is difficult to overestimate the impact that these revisions had
on law. More on that will follow.
148 LEAR, supra note 82, at 429.
149 Id.
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worst and an overly sensitive nature at best. Reason had been sacrificed to
sentiment. Behind these charges was understandable resentment of Carson’s
aggressive attack on the scientific establishment and on male dominated
technology. Among her other errors, Miss Carson had overstepped her
place.150
Carson’s narrative ultimately swamped those of her critics, but her struggle
is in many respects representative. In the next chapter, we will look more closely at
narrative combat and how the winners come to be institutionalized, sometimes for
good, sometimes for ill, and sometimes at great cost. For now, it is enough that we
remain both open to and on guard against narrative’s raw power, especially where
that power is actuated through forms in which the human dimension has either
atrophied or become wholly stereotyped. And we must be mindful, too, that
narratives exist in a web-like complex; advancing one can summon up others far
different from those predicted or intended, as Rachel Carson and her acolytes
learned. On that note, I close this section with an appropriate admonishment from
Robert Penn Warren’s All the King’s Men:
The world is all of one piece. . . . [T]he world is like an enormous spider web
and if you touch it, however lightly, at any point, the vibration ripples to the
remotest perimeter and the drowsy spider feels the tingle and is drowsy no
more but springs out to fling the gossamer coils about you who have touched
the web and then inject the black, numbing poison under your hide. It does
not matter whether or not you meant to brush the web of things. Your happy
foot or your gay wing may have brushed it ever so lightly, but what happens
always happens and there is the spider, bearded black and with his great
faceted eyes glittering like mirrors in the sun, or like God’s eye, and the
fangs dripping.151
150 Id. at 430.





In the last chapter, we observed how narratives interact with one another and
with legal institutions to influence legislation. Now, we’ll move out onto a broader
plane to consider the similar—but not fully congruent—question of how narratives
figure in common-law decisions. This will allow us to examine the process by
which narratives can actually become (not just influence) legal rules. This process
of narrative institutionalization is complicated, but we can tease out at least some of
the knots by looking both at specific case-law examples and at useful theoretical
accounts from inside and outside the law. As a launching point, it may prove helpful
to consider one of the most common ways in which legal philosophers account for
the application of law: the “normative syllogism,” the major premise of which is a
universal and normative rule of law, the minor allegations or findings of fact.1
1. Narrative and the Normative Syllogism
In his Law, Fact and Narrative Coherence, Bernard Jackson offers a
narrativisitic account of law that challenges the notion that legal decision-making
and justification can properly proceed via deductive reasoning.2 The thrust of
Jackson’s argument is two-fold. First, he asserts a “strong” objection to the
traditional view based on a structuralist linguistic argument that reference is merely
a pragmatic truth-claim. For example, a witness’s testimony does not actually
“refer” to past events; rather, that testimony is a present, rhetorical construct
1 See, e.g., Neil MacCormick, Notes on Narrativity and the Normative
Syllogism, 4 INT’L J. SEMIOTICS L. 163, 168-69 (1991).
2 See BERNARD S. JACKSON, LAW, FACT AND NARRATIVE COHERENCE 37-60
(1988).
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designed to convince others that it corresponds to “what really happened.”
Testimonial evidence is therefore never more than an unverifiable claim to truth.
Jackson recognizes that this represents “a highly skeptical epistemology,” and he
appears to offer it as little more than a provocative throw-away.
Second, he asserts a “weak” objection that does not entail wholesale
acceptance of the radical conclusions (e.g., rejection of any correspondence theory
of truth) inherent in the “strong” objection. The weak objection turns not on the
relationship between present testimony and past events but between what a legislator
has pronounced and facts that are subsequently adjudicated. His essential point is
that there is an inevitable mismatch between the facts adjudicated and the law
applied. This is so, he argues, because laws nowadays are expressed in universal
and abstract terms that do not refer to particular cases; rather, they do no more than
tie abstract legal conditions to specified legal consequences. Thus, according to
Jackson, there is a fatal flaw in the traditional mode of legal reasoning because the
major premise cannot be said to “refer” to the facts in the minor premise, for the
simple reason that the major premise exists first in time.
As Neil MacCormick has effectively demonstrated, this criticism is
misplaced, for the following reason. Jackson takes as his working example the
classical textbook case of Socrates and blasphemy:
All persons who blaspheme the gods are liable to be executed;
Socrates has blasphemed the gods;
Therefore Socrates is liable to be executed.3
3 Id. at 37.
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The problem, as Jackson sees it, is that the major premise, as a universal, does not
refer to any particular case, yet the minor one does. How then, can the former
authorize a conclusion as to the latter without risking violence to the Rule of Law, in
particular its insistence on prospectivity?4 MacCormick concedes that there is a
problem here, but he identifies it as one of “sense,” not “reference.”5 Thus, in the
adjudicative context, the Rule of Law is upheld so long as the dictate of the major
premise and the facts of the case at hand are used in the same sense. This presents,
then, not an irresolvable problem of reference, but a mandate to interpret the
standards set forth in the major premise and to classify the facts set forth in the
minor premise in a manner that ensures that an adverse conclusion arises only if the
general and the particular are used in the same sense.6 To return to Jackson’s
example, Socrates is liable to be executed only if his particular conduct
(“blasphemed the gods”) qualifies as an instance of the general conduct proscribed
(“blasphemed the gods”), with the operative phrase, “blasphemed the gods,” used in
the same sense in each premise.
Despite this problem in Jackson’s criticism of the normative syllogism, his
predicate assumptions involving the narrative roots of law—whether expressed in
4 Jackson’s concern here is with one of the eight requirements of the Rule of
Law as enunciated by Lon Fuller. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39
(rev. ed. 1969) (“Certainly there can be no rational ground for asserting that a man
can have a moral obligation to obey a legal rule . . . that came into existence only
after he had acted.”).
5 NEIL MACCORMICK, RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW: A THEORY OF
LEGAL REASONING 57-59 (2005) [hereinafter RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW].
6 For a thorough discussion of classification/categorization, see ANTHONY G.
AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 17-109 (2000).
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legislation or in common-law rules—are well taken and signal a path along which
we may discover how narratives become institutionalized as laws. In especial, we
may learn a great deal from what Jackson tells us about the narrative form of rules:
In almost any collection of ancient or medieval laws, the predominant form
of expression we find is that commonly called by legal historians the
“casuistic” form—the conditional sentence in which the protasis expresses a
hypothetical situation (the conditioning facts), while the apodosis states the
conditioned consequences. . . . The following verse from the bible is typical:
“If a thief is found breaking in, and is struck so that he dies, there should be
no blood guilt for him . . ..” . . . The assumption is often made that the
origin of the pattern reflects actual adjudication: a case of this kind actually
came up for decision, and as a result a rule was stated applying to everyone.7
Jackson expresses some doubt about this final proposition—at least as a universal—
but for our purposes it doesn’t matter whether a narrative embedded in a rule is
adjudicative, literary, or of some other stripe. For the question that we want to
answer turns not the origin of law-producing narratives, but rather on how narratives
come to produce laws at all.
2. The Narrative Nudge
We can look first to Justice Holmes, who understood that logic and narrative
are not simply labels for competing paradigms: they are instead complementary
facets of a single enterprise. In The Common Law, he noted a “paradox” inherent in
the development of the law that remains worthy of consideration:
In form its growth is logical. The official theory is that each new decision
follows syllogistically from existing precedents. But just as the clavicle in
the cat only tells of the existence of some creature to which a collar-bone
7 JACKSON, supra note 2, at 97-98. Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner
make a similar point in arguing that each category of common-law writ is essentially
a plot précis: “the very writs that defined causes of action at common law (quare
clausum fregit and so forth) were rather like plot summaries of the founding
narratives of various myth-like genres.” AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 6, at
112.
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was useful, precedents survive in law long after the use they once served is at
an end and the reason for them has been forgotten. . . . On the other hand, in
substance the growth of the law is legislative. And this in a deeper sense
than that what the courts declare to have always been the law is in fact new.
It is legislative in its grounds. . . . Every important principle which is
developed by litigation is in fact and at bottom the result of more or less
definitely understood views of public policy; most generally, to be sure,
under our practice and our traditions, the unconscious result of instinctive
preferences and inarticulate convictions, but none the less traceable to views
of public policy in the last analysis.8
By locating legal developments in “public policy” and in “adopting new principles
from life,” Holmes in some sense anticipates Jackson’s narrative theory of rule
formation and emendation. For what are life-principles if not compact expressions
of life-stories? A couple of specific examples, followed by a more general
discussion suggested by Zenon Bankowski and Martha Nussbaum’s readings of
Antigone, should help us close this loop.
The appellate opinions in the famed case of Hynes v. New York Central
Railway Company are instructive. At the intermediate appellate level, the court
began its opinion with a brief description of the case as an “action . . . for alleged
negligence, in causing the death of plaintiff’s intestate, by being struck by electric
wires which fell from a cross-arm of a pole maintained by defendant along its
railroad . . .,” followed by a rote statement of facts:
Decedent, a boy 16 years old, with two other boys, had swum across this
ship canal from the Manhattan bank on July 8, 1916. He had climbed upon
defendant’s wooden-faced bulkhead, and finally walked out on a springboard
projecting over the water. It was a plank 2” x 12” spiked down on the
bulkhead, from which it ran back about 4 feet, so that the shore end was let
into the soil. About 11 feet overhung the water. Its front end was about 3
feet above high tide. As Decedent was about to dive from the end, the wires
8 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881), excerpted in
STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 731 (2d ed. 1989).
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came down. One struck him; others, falling on the plank, broke it off at the
bulkhead; deceased was thrown into the water and died. The front of the
plank protruded beyond defendant’s boundary line from 3 to 6 feet. Who
had manually placed this springboard did not appear. It had been there about
three years. Employees of defendant and others had used it. On the land side
defendant had maintained a fence along its right of way. Warnings that it
was not a thoroughfare had also been posted along the railroad track, near
this waterfront.9
From this pedestrian factual recitation, Putnam, J. quickly disposes of the case by
agreeing with the trial court’s holding that
The plank was part of defendant’s property, and was so annexed as to
become part of the realty. Decedent’s entry upon defendant’s close from the
waters of the ship canal was an unlawful intrusion. On this plank, he was
still a trespasser—even when he stepped outward across defendant’s
technical boundary line and stood near the outer end, over the waters of the
ship canal.10
As justification for this conclusion, Putnam, J. offers a series of rules
designed to defeat the argument that the plank—or at least the part upon which
Hynes was standing when struck by the wires—was not actually part of the
railroad’s property because it extended out over the property line. This series
includes (1) the ancient rule that tree branches overhanging a property line belong to
the owner of the tree, (2) the rule that the owner of a wharf or pier that runs out
beyond the proper exterior line has a good right against trespassers, and (3) the rule
that possession—even without title—is good against a trespasser.11 As a
consequence of these rules, Hynes was a trespasser and, therefore, the railroad owed
him no duty of care upon which to predicate a negligence claim.
9 Hynes v. New York Cent. R. Co., 176 N.Y.S. 795, 795 (N.Y. App. Div.
1919).
10 Id. at 796.
11 Id. at 796-97.
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This holding is deeply dissatisfying, principally because there is a
misalignment of what Jackson calls “narrative frameworks.”12 In other words, one
intuitively knows that the rule about tree branches arose from facts very different
from those presented in Hynes (most often, to hazard a guess, having to do with
neighbors fighting over the ownership of fruit on branches hanging over a property
line). On subsequent appeal, Justice Cardozo recognized that blindness to the
narratives in which abstract rules are grounded can work an injustice no less than a
refusal to hear the full narrative offered at trial. Accordingly, Cardozo begins his
opinion with a very different narrative, one putting life to the abstractions of the
lower-court opinion (notice, e.g., in the following excerpt that the “plaintiff’s
intestate” becomes “a lad of 16,” the “plank” becomes a “springboard,” the
“deceased . . . struck and thrown into the water” becomes a “diver . . . flung . . . from
the shattered board and plunged . . . to his death.”):
On July 8, 1916, Harvey Hynes, a lad of 16, swam with two companions
from the Manhattan to the Bronx side of the Harlem River, or United States
Ship Canal, a navigable stream. Along the Bronx side of the river was the
right of way of the defendant, the New York Central Railroad, which
operated its trains at that point by high-tension wires, strung on poles and
cross-arms. Projecting from the defendant’s bulkhead above the waters of
the river was a plank or springboard, from which boys of the neighborhood
used to dive. One end of the board had been placed under a rock on the
defendant’s land, and nails had been driven at its point of contact with the
bulkhead. Measured from this point of contact the length behind was 5 feet;
the length in front 11. The bulkhead itself was about 3 1/2 feet back of the
pier line as located by the government. From this it follows that for 7 1/2
feet the springboard was beyond the line of the defendant’s property and
above the public waterway. Its height measured from the stream was 3 feet at
the bulkhead, and 5 feet at its outermost extremity. For more than five years
swimmers had used it as a diving board without protest or obstruction.
12 JACKSON, supra note 2, at 116.
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On this day Hynes and his companions climbed on top of the bulkhead,
intending to leap into the water. One of them made the plunge in safety.
Hynes followed to the front of the springboard, and stood poised for his dive.
At that moment a cross-arm with electric wires fell from the defendant’s
pole. The wires struck the diver, flung him from the shattered board, and
plunged him to his death below.13
Once Cardozo completes the factual picture, he turns to matters of logic, first
by showing the absurdity of the lower court’s decision to draw an outcome-
determinative distinction between a boy standing on the end of the springboard and
one standing directly beneath it in the water:
The defendant was under a duty to use reasonable care that bathers
swimming or standing in the water should not be electrocuted by wires
falling from its right of way. But to bathers diving from the springboard,
there was no duty, we are told, unless the injury was the product of mere
willfulness or wantonness--no duty of active vigilance to safeguard the
impending structure. Without wrong to them, cross-arms might be left to rot;
wires highly charged with electricity might sweep them from their stand and
bury them in the subjacent waters. In climbing on the board, they became
trespassers and outlaws. . . . Rights and duties in systems of living law are
not built upon such quicksands.14
But Cardozo does not end with this reductio ad absurdum. He constructs yet
another argument, this one buttressed with a pair of hypothetical mini-narratives,
one revealing a logical gaff in the lower court’s opinion, the other revealing the
absence of a causal connection between the facts proven (viz., Hynes was killed by
the railroad’s improperly maintained wires) and the defense offered (viz., because
Hynes was standing on the plank, he was a trespasser to whom the railroad owed no
duty of care):
Bathers in the Harlem River on the day of this disaster were in the enjoyment
of a public highway, entitled to reasonable protection against destruction by
13 Hynes v. New York Cent. R. Co., 231 N.Y. 229, 230-32 (N.Y. 1921).
14 Id. at 232-33.
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the defendant’s wires. . . . A plane of private right had been interposed
between the river and the air, but public ownership was unchanged in the
space below it and above. . . . Duties are thus supposed to arise and to be
extinguished in alternate zones or strata. Two boys walking in the country or
swimming in a river stop to rest for a moment along the side of the road or
the margin of the stream. One of them throws himself beneath the
overhanging branches of a tree. The other perches himself on a bough a foot
or so above the ground. Both are killed by falling wires. The defendant
would have us say that there is a remedy for the representatives of one and
none for the representatives of the other. We may be permitted to distrust the
logic that leads to such conclusions.
There will hardly be denial that a cause of action would have arisen if the
wires had fallen on an aeroplane proceeding above the river, though the
location of the impact could be identified as the space above the springboard.
The most that the defendant can fairly ask is exemption from liability where
the use of the fixture is itself the efficient peril. That would be the situation,
for example, if the weight of the boy upon the board had caused it to break
and thereby throw him into the river. There is no such causal connection
here between his position and his injuries.15
Cardozo concludes with a brief discussion of the limits of rules in hard
cases.16 Although he does not use the phrase “hard cases,” I think he is concerned
with both senses of the phrase as we currently use it (i.e., the older usage that refers
to cases in which application of a legal standard would lead to particular hardship on
a losing party and the Dworkian usage that refers to cases posing particular
difficulties of interpretation).17 And this concern intersects with that of Jackson and
Holmes, in that it exhorts judges to recall the animating force—the narratives—that
gave birth to particular laws and to be keenly attuned to changes in public narratives.
In Hynes, the narrative roots of rules are of critical importance in two respects: in
15 Id. at 234-35.
16 Of course, Cardozo’s decision remains something of a “gut” (rather than
tightly reasoned) reaction to the facts of the case. Judge Posner has criticized
Cardozo on this count. RICHARD POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 53
(1990) (stating that Cardozo gives “no reason” for the Hynes decision).
17 See RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 5, at 49-52.
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the selection of the rule of decision (is the tree-branch doctrine really pertinent?) and
in the adaptation or extension of existing rules to fit a new situation (has the public
narrative that valorizes property rights above all shifted?):
There are times when there is little trouble in marking off the field of
exemption and immunity from that of liability and duty. Here structures and
ways are so united and commingled, superimposed upon each other, that the
fields are brought together. In such circumstances, there is little help in
pursuing general maxims to ultimate conclusions. They have been framed
alio intuitu. They must be reformulated and readapted to meet exceptional
conditions. Rules appropriate to spheres which are conceived of as separate
and distinct cannot both be enforced when the spheres become concentric.
There must then be readjustment or collision.18
3. When Narratives Clash
What Cardozo has identified here is the dilemma posed when narratives
clash, a subject that both Zenon Bankowski and Martha Nussbaum have treated
effectively in the context of Antigone.19 To dress the stage, I offer a brief summary
of the play’s plot. The play begins in mediis rebus. Oedipus’s sons, Eteocles and
Polynices, had agreed to rule Thebes by turns. Eteocles breaches the agreement and
remains in power. Polynices flees to Argos and there raises a force with which he
attacks Thebes. In the ensuing battle, both brothers are killed. Creon, the brothers’
uncle, reluctantly takes the throne. His first official act is to deny funeral rites to
Polynices, on the ground that he is an enemy of the city. But Antigone, the brothers’
sister, disregards this decree in favor of what she sees as a superior family
obligation. Creon sentences her to death by entombment, even though she is
18 Id. at 235-36.
19 ZENON BANKOWSKI, LIVING LAWFULLY: LOVE IN LAW AND LAW IN LOVE
28-43 (2001); MARTHA NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND
ETHICS IN GREEK TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 51-82 (1986).
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betrothed to Creon’s son, Haemon. The blind prophet Tiresias ultimately convinces
Creon of his folly, but it is too late: Antigone has already hanged herself, Haemon
has committed suicide upon finding her dead, and Euridice, Haemon’s mother and
Creon’s wife, then kills herself as well.
In law and literature courses, Antigone is typically read as a dramatization of
the systemic clash of two legal regimes: positive law and natural law. As
Bankowski notes, Nussbaum’s reading differs from the traditional readings in that
she does not view Antigone as an unalloyed heroine or the conflict simply as one
between different orders of laws. Thus, in Nussbaum’s telling—as with that of
Hegel, to which she is in part reacting—Antigone is also flawed. In his earlier
reading, Hegel had cast the drama as a dialectical struggle between the family and
state, with Creon standing for the state, Antigone for the family. Under this view,
each is bound to the other, right in his or her own terms but wrong in those of the
other’s system.20
Both Creon and Antigone clearly articulate what each sees as a cardinal
virtue. Creon believes that concern for the civic well being is paramount:
And whoever places a friend
above the good of his own country, he is nothing:
I have no use for him. Zeus my witness,
Zeus who sees all things, always—
I could never stand by silent, watching destruction
march against our city, putting safety to rout,
nor could I ever make that man a friend of mine
who menaces our country. Remember this:
our country is our safety.
Only while she voyages true on course
Can we establish friendships, truer than blood itself.
Such are my standards. They make our city great.
20 BANKOWSKI, supra note 19, at 29.
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Closely akin to them I have proclaimed,
just now, the following decree to our people
concerning the two sons of Oedipus.
Eteocles, who died fighting for Thebes,
excelling all in arms: he shall be buried,
crowned with a hero’s honors, the cups we pour
to soak the earth and reach the famous dead.
But as for his blood brother, Polynices,
who returned from exile, home to his father-city
and the gods of his race, consumed with one desire—
to burn them roof to roots—who thirsted to drink
his kinsmen’s blood and sell the rest to slavery:
that man—a proclamation has forbidden the city
to dignify him with burial, mourn him at all.
No, he must be left unburied, his corpse
carrion for the birds and dogs to tear,
an obscenity for the citizens to behold!
These are my principles. Never at my hands
will the traitor be honored above the patriot.
But whoever proves his loyalty to the state—
I’ll prize that man in death as well as life.21
Creon is well aware of the evaluative terms with which fifth-century
Athenians staked out the world of praxis: good/bad, pious/impious, just/unjust,
friend/foe and the like. According to Nussbaum, this terminology would have been
familiar to and employed by the spectators of the play. Moreover, the spectators
would have understood that these terms can conflict with one another (friendship
may require one to be unjust) and even a single virtue may place different demands
in different contexts (justice of the city may conflict with justice of the dead).22 One
would expect, therefore, the play to open with Creon suspended in an irresolvable
21 SOPHOCLES, ANTIGONE, in THE THREE THEBAN PLAYS (Robert Fagles
trans., Penguin Classics 1984), at ll. 203-35.
22 I’ll turn more directly in the next chapter to the question of how members
of particular groups interpret what they see, hear, or read.
85
tension between his duties as ruler and as relative. But Creon appears to have no
conflict at all, no painful tension and deliberation. How is this, Bankowski asks?
The answer lies in the passage I just quoted: all virtues are subordinated to the
welfare of the city. Thus what is good, pious and just is that which serves the
welfare of the city.
Though to our eyes Antigone makes morally superior choices, she is not
wholly blameless. Her views are as one-sided and narrow as Creon’s:
It wasn’t Zeus, not in the least,
Who made this proclamation—not to me.
Nor did that Justice, dwelling with the gods
beneath the earth, ordain such laws for men.
Nor did I think your edict had such force
that you, a mere mortal, could override the gods,
the great unwritten, unshakable traditions.
They are alive, not just today or yesterday:
they live forever, from the first of time,
and no one knows when they first saw the light.
These laws—I was not about to break them,
not out of fear of some man’s wounded pride,
and face of the retribution of the gods.
Die I must, I’ve known it all my life—
your death-sentence ringing in my ears.
And if I am to die before my time
I consider that a gain. Who on earth,
alive in the midst of so much grief as I,
could fail to find his death a rich reward?
So for me, at least, to meet this doom of yours
is precious little pain. But if I had allowed
my own mother’s son to rot, an unburied corpse—
that would have been an agony! This is nothing.
And if my present actions strike you as foolish,
let’s just say I’ve been accused of folly
by a fool.23
At bottom, Antigone is as guilty as Creon of what Nussbaum calls “ruthless
simplification.” She, too, selects only those facts that produce the outcomes she
23 Id. at ll. 499-525.
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desires under the rules she valorizes. To hear her talk, as Bankowski observes, we
would not know that there had been a war, caused by one of her brothers. All we
know is that her brother has been desecrated and that cannot stand as a matter of
family.
What does all this mean for the law generally and for our discussion in
particular? First, I would suggest that we are presented with more than a simple
clash of legal systems. It is, rather, a clash of narratives (when Antigone refers to
“the great unwritten, unshakeable traditions” she is—as Somers has taught us—
using a phrase that is synonymous with “public narratives”) born of overweening,
false piety. This uber-piety leads to legal formalisms that result in disastrous
consequences. Second, and more important, Creon and Antigone offer up what
prove to be impenetrable ontological narratives. The problem here is that—because
he is the sole arbiter of the law—Creon’s ontological narrative is the law (and in
some sense the only public narrative, or at least the only one capable of receiving
official sanction). But for positive law to be more than a matter of taste, bias or
whim, it must be permeable enough to allow the interpenetration of other narratives.
We will return to this issue in greater detail when we more fully take up the question
of how narratives become institutionalized in ways congenial to democracy. For
now, though, it is enough to recognize the mischief that arises when a hermetic
ontological narrative is coterminous with law. That is, in the public sphere, a
dominant narrative consistent with the Rule of Law must bear receptors that allow
the addition of new narrative material. It must, in Bankowski’s terms, “bring[] the
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outside in.”24 For example, in the case of Antigone, if Antigone’s narrative could
have even slightly injected itself into Creon’s, perhaps both could have been
satisfied by allowing Polynices to be buried, but beyond the city walls.25
4. Changes in Narrative, Changes in Law
Although legal narratives often directly clash (as in Antigone), there are
many cases in which the intersections are much more oblique and multifarious—
messy even. In substantial part, this is because common laws are made via a process
that is somewhat like that by which literature is made and very much like that by
which history (in the sense of historical writing) is made. Depending on one’s
24 Zenon Bankowski, Legal Reasoning from the Inside Out, in STRESSING
LEGAL DECISIONS 27-46 (Tadeusz Biernat et al. eds., 2003). In this piece,
Bankowski discusses, among other things, Nussbaum’s recent work on narrative in
legal proceedings. Nussbaum has argued that current death-penalty cases
insufficiently account for defendants’ overall life-narratives. See Martha Nussbaum,
Equity and Mercy, in SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1999). Interestingly, Robin West
has made the (somewhat) opposite (but not inconsistent) point—namely, that too
much narrative appears in death-penalty cases at the U.S. Supreme Court level
because they often recite grisly, yet legally irrelevant, details of crimes tacitly to
justify affirmance of death-penalty convictions. See ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE,
AUTHORITY, & LAW 428-39 (1993). In any event, the Supreme Court acknowledges
that both logic and narrative are essential threads in the adjudicative fabric:
In sum, the accepted rule that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case free
from any defendant’s option to stipulate the evidence away rests on good
sense. A syllogism is not a story, and a naked proposition in a courtroom
may be no match for the robust evidence that would be used to prove it.
People who hear a story interrupted by gaps of abstraction may be puzzled at
the missing chapters, and jurors asked to rest a momentous decision on the
story’s truth can feel put upon at being asked to take responsibility knowing
that more could be said than they have heard. A convincing tale can be told
with economy, but when economy becomes a break in the natural sequence
of narrative evidence, an assurance that the missing link is really there is
never more than second best.
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 189 (1997).
25 NUSSBAUM, supra note 19, at 55.
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orientation that perhaps is or is not a bold statement, but it is one that I think I can in
the main defend. To push us down this avenue, let’s pick up with one of the themes
with which we ended the last chapter: the growing (some times grudging)
institutional receptiveness to feminine narratives throughout the Twentieth Century.
Two of the largest struggles of that period involved pro-business, laissez-faire
capitalist narratives, on the one hand, and anti-feminist, paternalistic narratives on
the other. The two crossed from time to time, often to weird effect. For instance, in
Lochner v. New York, the United States Supreme Court struck down a state statute
providing that no employee in a bakery could work more than sixty hours in one
week or ten hours in one day.26 The reason? The statute interfered with “the
freedom of master and employee to contract with each other . . ..”27 Three years
later, the same court was asked to pass on the constitutionality of another state law
limiting to ten the number of hours per day that a woman could work in a laundry.28
Same result? Of course not. And why not? To protect women from the rapacious
instincts of men and to insure the continued well-being of the entire human race!
That woman’s physical structure and the performance of maternal functions
place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious. This is
especially true when the burdens of motherhood are upon her. Even when
they are not, by abundant testimony of the medical fraternity, continuance for
a long time on her feet at work, repeating this from day to day, tends to
injurious effects upon the body, and, as healthy mothers are essential to
vigorous offspring, the physical wellbeing of woman becomes an object of
public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the
race. Still again, history discloses the fact that woman has always been
dependent upon man. He established his control at the outset by superior
26 25 S. Ct. 539 (1905).
27 Id. at 546.
28 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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physical strength, and this control in various forms, with diminishing
intensity, has continued to the present. . . . It is impossible to close one’s
eyes to the fact that she still looks to her brother, and depends upon him.
Even though all restrictions on political, personal, and contractual rights
were taken away, and she stood, so far as statutes are concerned, upon an
absolutely equal plane with him, it would still be true that she is so
constituted that she will rest upon and look to him for protection; that her
physical structure and a proper discharge of her maternal functions -- having
in view not merely her own health, but the wellbeing of the race -- justify
legislation to protect her from the greed, as well as the passion, of man. . . .
The two sexes differ in structure of body, in the functions to be performed by
each, in the amount of physical strength, in the capacity for long-continued
labor, particularly when done standing, the influence of vigorous health upon
the future wellbeing of the race, the self-reliance which enables one to assert
full rights, and in the capacity to maintain the struggle for subsistence. This
difference justifies a difference in legislation, and upholds that which is
designed to compensate for some of the burdens which rest upon her.29
We’ll see how the paternalistic narrative that underlies Muller began to be erased
over time, but first, a word or two on a few assumptions that I’ll make regarding trial
practice and fact-finding may prove helpful.
In the United States, most crimes are defined by state statute, many of which
are simply codifications of the common law. This is especially so with statutes
pertaining to acts that have been considered crimes throughout history—e.g.,
murder, as opposed to, say, wire fraud or internet gambling. Thus, a person charged
with a particular crime comes to trial under the terms of an indictment that identifies
the acts allegedly committed and the statute(s) allegedly violated. Statutes also
broadly lay out available defenses, as well as the elements necessary to prove each
defense. At trial, both the prosecution and defense offer testimonial and physical
evidence in support of or in opposition to the competing positions. At the close of
29 Id. at 421-23.
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evidence, the judge instructs the jury as to the law, and the jury retires to deliberate,
weigh evidence, and (unless deadlocked) make a determination of guilt or non-guilt.
Plainly, this architecture offers many outcroppings upon which the various
participants may hang narratives, a fact that has been well-enough documented by
others and that I will not belabor here.30 Suffice it to say that all the actors at a trial
have a story to tell—even the judge, who does so through rulings on the
admissibility of evidence and in the selection and ordering of the jury charge. What
is important for our purposes is how a jury processes the various competing
narratives, constructs its own, and arrives at a decision that (at least in important
cases) is subject to endorsement, qualification, or rejection by courts of appeal and
that feeds back into the body of rules upon which it was based.
To illuminate and contextualize these points, we can refer to a couple of
cases that are representative in several key respects. In State v. Hundley, the Kansas
Supreme Court was presented with a homicide conviction involving a defendant
who had failed in her effort to mount a defense based on proof that she suffered
from what is now generally referred to as “battered person syndrome.”31 There was
no factual dispute that the married life of Carl and Betty Hundley had been
tumultuous. Throughout their ten-year marriage, Carl regularly abused Betty. The
Court reported that “[h]e had knocked out several of her teeth, broken her nose at
least five times, and threatened to cut her eyeballs out and her head off. Carl had
30 For a useful compendium of various approaches to law and narrative, see
LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW (Peter Brooks & Paul
Gewirtz eds., 1996).
31 693 P.2d 475 (Kan. 1985).
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kicked Betty down the stairs on numerous occasions and had repeatedly broken her
ribs.”32
Betty, finally having enough, moved into a motel in Topeka, Kansas. This
did not, however, break Carl’s pattern of harassment, which culminated in the
incident giving rise to his death:
On January 13, 1983, the day of the shooting, Betty had seen Carl early in
the day, at which time Carl told Betty he was going to come over and kill
her. That night she heard a thumping on her motel door while she was in the
bathroom. By the time Betty got out of the bathroom Carl had broken the
door lock and entered the room. His entry was followed by violence [, which
the Court recounts in graphic detail]. . . . Even after that, Carl continued to
threaten Betty. She was sobbing and afraid. He pounded a beer bottle on the
night stand and threw a dollar bill toward the window, demanding she get
him some cigarettes. Betty testified Carl had hit her with beer bottles many
times in the past. Therefore, feeling threatened by the beer bottle, she went
to her purse, pulled out the gun and demanded Carl leave. When he saw the
gun, Carl laughed tauntingly and said, “You are dead, bitch, now!” As he
reached for the beer bottle, Betty shut her eyes and fired her gun. She fired it
again and again. There were five spent shells in the gun when it was seized.
At the time of the shooting the deceased had his back to Betty and was
paying attention to the beer bottle. She was not physically blocked from
going to the door.33
The Court emphasized that none of the facts were in dispute; the only issue on
appeal was whether the trial court improperly instructed the jury as to the elements
of self-defense. To facilitate our discussion of the Court’s analysis of the facts as
given, a brief aside regarding jury instructions is warranted.
Kansas, like most states, has developed “pattern” jury instructions, which are
to be used verbatim, absent unusual circumstances:
We highly encourage courts to follow the language found in the Pattern
Instructions for Kansas (PIK) unless the facts of the case dictate otherwise.
32 Id. at 475.
33 Id. at 476.
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The uniform use of the PIK instruction language is a highly desirable goal, a
goal which takes very little effort to effectuate. Use of the PIK instruction
language helps to protect the rights of criminal defendants in our courts and
significantly reduces the number of criminal appeals and issues raised in
appeals of criminal cases.34
The motivations behind this rule are at least two: first, uniform instructions assure a
measure of invariance across judging subjects and second, they make statutes (more)
intelligible to lay juries. They are, thus, definitive statements of the law for most
cases, and their practical authority is greater than the statutes from which they derive
because they provide the sole standard against which jury members are to measure a
defendant’s conduct.35
One of the most frequent criticisms of pattern jury instructions is that “they
are too abstract,” by which these critics mean that “[b]ecause they are written
generally to apply in all cases, it can be argued that that they do not apply effectively
to the facts of any case in particular.”36 Cast in these terms, we see that this is an
instantiation of a larger theoretical debate: viz., whether legal decisions can be
34 State v. Scott, 21 P.3d 516 (Kan. 2001). In Kansas, a Syllabus point is a
statement of law prepared by the Justice delivering the opinion and is often cited as
such.
35 Judges typically decline to elaborate on the law once the jury is charged.
The privileged status of instructions is underscored when a trial judge declines to
answer inquiries from a jury other than with a directive to review the instructions.
See State v. Lawrence, 135 P.3d 1211 (Kan. 2006).
36 Susie Cho, Capital Confusion: The Effect of Jury Instructions on the
Decision to Impose Death, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 532, 549 (1994) (also
noting that “[d]rafters of standard instructions do not rely on a specific set of facts,
and courts use those instructions in all cases involving the issue which they cover”);
see also Lawrence J. Severance et al., Toward Criminal Jury Instructions That
Jurors Can Understand, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198, 201 (1984).
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justified by reference to universal criteria.37 I don’t propose to resolve this debate,
but I think I can show that a narrative account of jury instructions can deflect some
particularist attacks on the universalist position.
The crowning feature of the Rule of Law is its rules of law. Indeed, as
Jeremy Waldron puts it, “we should not describe a system of governance as a system
of law unless it does the sort of thing that the Rule of Law celebrates—for example,
unless it regulates and controls state power and resolves disputes among individuals
and firms (and between individuals and firms and the state) using clear, general,
stable norms, promulgated in advance so that they can be used as a basis on which
individuals and firms can figure out what they owe to one another and to the state.”38
In addition to this predictive benefit, clear, general, and stable norms bring regularity
to adjudicative processes by providing yardsticks against which to measure
particular conduct and to justify consequent remedies.39 This is so because, as Neil
MacCormick submits, “[t]here is . . . no justification without universalization;
motivation needs no universalization; but explanation requires generalization. For
particular facts—or particular motives—to be justifying reasons they have to be
37 See, e.g., THE UNIVERSAL AND THE PARTICULAR IN LEGAL REASONING
(Zenon Bankowski & James MacLean eds., 2006); RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF
LAW, supra note 5, at 78-100.
38 Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law 12-13 (NYU Law Sch.
Colloquium in Legal, Political & Social Philosophy, Paper No. 2, 2006), available
at http://www.law.nyu.edu/clppt/program2006/readings/Concept%20and%20
Rule%20of%20Law%20WALDRON.pdf.
39 Cf. Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, 93 L. Q. REV. 195 (1977)
(“There cannot be institutions of any kind unless there are general rules setting them
up. A particular norm can authorize adjudication in a particular dispute, but no
number of particular norms can set up an institution.”).
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subsumable under a relevant principle of action universally stated, even if the
universal is acknowledged to be defeasible.”40 Against the universalist flow,
particularists assert that—although rules may deliver formal justice—substantive
justice can never be insured without overriding attention to the facts of each case.
But is it fair to assume that cases—even difficult cases that present problems of
classification or novelty—suffer under a system of universal rules?41 I think not, as
revealed by an examination of how legal rules are applied in the jury system.
If we assume that juries attend to their instructions, and there is evidence that
they try to, then they engage in a process akin to that of the normative syllogism that
we have previously discussed.42 In other words, jury members take the rule
embedded in each instruction, evaluate the evidence presented, and engage in a
matching process to determine whether that evidence squares with the rule (to some
appropriate standard like “beyond a reasonable doubt”). In Hundley, the question
40 RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 5, at 99.
41 The trick is to hold the particular and the universal in our gaze at the same
time. It will not do to focus solely on the universal and evaluate justice only at that
level. Justice cannot be assured if “micro counterexamples do not tell.” ROBERT
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 205 (1974).
42 The real problem with jury instructions is not that jurors do not try to apply
them but that they often don’t understand them. For this reason, judges,
practitioners and scholars have devoted considerable effort over the past few
decades to developing comprehensible jury instructions. See Cho, supra note 36, at
551-52 (“Researchers who have conducted experiments to test juror comprehension
have found that psycholinguistic principles can be applied to jury instructions to
eliminate confusing language, simplify meaning, and present instructions clearly and
logically.”); Severance, supra note 36, at 233 (“Our findings demonstrate that
simplified language and organized presentations of legal concepts can effectively
help jurors, particularly when coupled with the opportunity to discuss and deliberate.
Proper attention to devising jury instructions that are meaningful to lay people, as
well as legally accurate, can accomplish the important task of informing jurors of the
relevant legal concepts.”).
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was not whether Betty’s conduct matched the elements of some type of homicide;
rather, the issue was whether all the facts and circumstances matched the rule
allowing exceptions for self-defense, and, more important, whether the rule—as
embodied in the jury instruction—required modification to incorporate Betty
Hundley’s situation, her narrative, if you will.
In Betty’s case, the trial court had used the then-standard PIK instruction on
self-defense, which read:
The defendant has claimed his conduct was justified as (self-defense) (the
defense of another person).
A person is justified in the use of force against an aggressor when and to the
extent it appears to him and he reasonably believes that such conduct is
necessary to defend himself or another against such aggressor’s immediate
use of unlawful force. Such justification requires both a belief on the part of
defendant and the existence of facts that would persuade a reasonable person
to that belief.43
On appeal, Betty’s counsel argued that the use of the word “immediate” in the PIK
instruction (rather than “imminent,” as stated in the statute) prevented the jury from
considering (even though it had been copiously presented at trial) the evidence
concerning the long-term violence that Carl visited on Betty. For the Court, then,
the question became “what instruction should accompany this evidence in order to
charge the jury with the proper manner in which such evidence should be
considered?”44 In other words, the Court wanted to insure that Betty’s status as a
43 693 P.2d at 477. The statutory source of the instruction was KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-3211, which stated: “A person is justified in the use of force against an
aggressor when and to the extent it appears to him and he reasonably believes that
such conduct is necessary to defend himself or another against such aggressor’s
imminent use of unlawful force.”
44 Id.
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battered woman figured into the self-defense equation. And to do so, it undertook a
somewhat strained analysis of the difference between “immediate” and
“imminent”:45
Thus, the question is whether the instruction allows the jury to consider “all
the evidence” or whether the use of the word “immediate” rather than
“imminent” precludes the jury’s consideration of the prior abuse.
“Immediate” is defined in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
(1961): “Occurring, acting or accomplished without loss of time.” p. 1129.
“Imminent” is defined as: “Ready to take place ... or impending.” p. 1130.
Therefore, the time limitations in the use of the word “immediate” are much
stricter than those with the use of the word “imminent.”46
45 “The PIK committee explained ‘immediate’ was inserted in the self-
defense instruction for ‘imminent’ because it is a ‘better understood term.’ PIK
Crim.2d 54.17, Comment.” 693 P.2d at 478. This makes good sense. It is
implausible that the jury made the fine distinction that the majority opinion posits.
This was not, after all, a case in which the defendant was not allowed to put on
evidence in support of a self-defense claim. Indeed, the jury seems to have largely
credited her story in declining to convict her of the charged offense (second-degree
murder) and choosing instead to convict her of a lesser-included offense
(involuntary manslaughter).
46 Id. at 478. In dissent, Justice McFarland, the only woman on the Court,
conceded that there is a “fine” distinction between “imminent” and “immediate” and
that there are situations in which that distinction might control. But she did not
believe that Betty Hundley’s story constituted such a case because Betty was in
neither imminent nor immediate danger. Justice McFarland sought to demonstrate
this by juxtaposing two hypotheticals, one an alternative version of how Betty’s
story could have played out:
Probably it would be better to utilize the statutory term “imminent” rather
than “immediate” in a self-defense instruction. In a factual situation
involving matters of seconds the distinction could be significant and the use
of “immediate” could constitute reversible error. An example of such
situation would be two men arguing in the middle of a parking lot. One man
sees the other reach for the door of his automobile while stating he is going
to kill him and he knows the man has a gun or a knife therein. The danger in
such circumstances may be imminent but not immediate. But the facts
before us do not show imminent or immediate danger of harm.
There were only two persons in the motel room. One admits killing the
other. The only version of what transpired is that of the defendant herein.
Taking this as true, the deceased told the defendant to leave the premises,
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Despite the appeal to semantics, the Court quickly showed its hand: Betty’s
ontological narrative coincided with a dark narrative that had remained hidden
beneath social convention for centuries:47
The issue is dramatized by the nature of this case. This is a textbook case of
the battered wife, which is psychologically similar to hostage and prisoner of
war cases. Betty Hundley had survived her husband’s brutal beatings for ten
years. Her bones had been broken, her teeth knocked out and repeated
bruises inflicted, but she did not leave him. She called the police
occasionally but would continue to stay with Carl Hundley. The mystery, as
in all battered wife cases, is why she remained after the beatings. The
answer to that question can only be gleaned from the compiled case histories
of this malady. It is not a new phenomenon, having been recognized and
justified since Old Testament times. It goes largely unreported, but is well
documented. It is extremely widespread, estimated to affect between four
and forty million women.48
giving her money to buy cigarettes. The deceased then sat on the bed in his
shorts, not even looking in defendant’s direction. The defendant reached for
her purse by the door, took a gun therefrom and fired five shots at the
deceased. The parties were in a motel room in a busy part of the city of
Topeka in the early evening hours. They were not in some remote area
where help would be difficult to obtain. At the very least, defendant would
have had a five minute head start on the defendant [sic, “deceased”] had she
failed to return with the cigarettes. I fail to see how, in this factual situation,
it could be reversible error to use “immediate” rather than “imminent” in the
self-defense instruction as it would not have altered the outcome.
Id. at 470.
47 The Court specifically located the underlying problem as one rooted in
historical prejudice:
Wife beating is steeped in the concept of marital privacy, and the belief
wives are the personal property of the husband. In Blackstone’s
Commentaries the theory of coverture was advanced, making punishment for
mistreatment of a wife impossible since husband and wife were considered





From this historical synopsis, the Court generally concluded that “[b]attered women
are terror-stricken people whose mental state is distorted and bears a marked
resemblance to that of a hostage or a prisoner of war. . . . They become disturbed
persons from the torture.”49 And from this general conclusion, coupled with the
specific facts of the case, the Court reasoned (1) that the objective component of the
self-defense instruction should comprehend “how a reasonably prudent battered wife
would perceive Carl’s demeanor” and (2) that “‘immediate’ in the instruction on
self-defense places undue emphasis on the immediate action of the deceased, and
obliterates the nature of the buildup of terror and fear which had been systematically
created over a long period of time.”50 This latter point remains something of a non
sequitur (and freights a single word with a weighty narrative), but that simply
underscores how generative the alignment of public and personal narratives proved
to be in the case. In any event, the case had immediate—and unintended—
consequences, once Betty Hundley’s narrative had been absorbed into the PIK
instructions and, thereby, was passed onto future juries.
In the wake of Hundley, courts began to give broad, “battered-woman” self-
defense instructions, juries began to acquit defendants, and the Kansas Supreme
Court found no errors in those acquittals.51 This all changed with the arrival of the
first “burning-bed” case (i.e., a case in which an abused spouse kills her husband
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Although the State may not appeal an acquittal, Kansas law permits the
State to reserve questions for appeal, but only if those questions are of state-wide
interest and essential to the administration of criminal justice. State v. Martin, 658
P.2d 1024, 1024 (1983).
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while he is sleeping) at the Kansas Supreme Court. That case, State v. Stewart,
presented background facts not unlike those presented in Hundley: a marriage
troubled from the outset, a cruel, unpredictable, and physically abusive husband,
attempted flights by the battered wife, . . . and a gun.52 At trial, the court gave the
jury a standard self-defense instruction (duly modified to reflect the Hundley holding
that imminence rather than immediacy was the proper standard for judging temporal
proximity), but he also added what we might call a Hundley tag: “You must
determine, from the viewpoint of the defendant’s mental state, whether the
defendant’s belief in the need to defend herself was reasonable in light of her
subjective impressions and the facts and circumstances known to her.”53
The Court was thus faced with two related questions: first, whether a person
in Stewart’s shoes should be entitled to a self-defense instruction at all and, second,
whether the Hundley tag was an appropriate statement of the law of self defense. It
answered these questions by turn, holding first that
In order to instruct a jury on self-defense, there must be some showing of an
imminent threat or a confrontational circumstance involving an overt act by
an aggressor. There is no exception to this requirement where the defendant
has suffered long-term domestic abuse and the victim is the abuser. In such
cases, the issue is not whether the defendant believes homicide is the solution
52 763 P.2d 572 (1988).
53 Id. at 579. “This addition was apparently encouraged by the following
language in State v. Hodges, 716 P.2d 563 (1986):
Where the battered woman syndrome is an issue in the case, the standard for
reasonableness concerning an accused’s belief in asserting self-defense is not
an objective, but a subjective standard. The jury must determine, from the
viewpoint of defendant’s mental state, whether defendant’s belief in the need
to defend herself was reasonable.”
Id.
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to past or future problems with the batterer, but rather whether circumstances
surrounding the killing were sufficient to create a reasonable belief in the
defendant that the use of deadly force was necessary.54
Given this holding, it was probably superfluous to consider the form and content of
the self-defense instruction that the jury considered, but the Court did so anyway,
apparently to emphasize two key points: viz., that “battered woman’s syndrome” is
not in itself a defense to murder (rather, evidence of the syndrome may be
introduced in support of a defense of self-defense) and that the defense of self-
defense has both objective and subjective elements:
We first use a subjective standard to determine whether the defendant
sincerely and honestly believed it necessary to kill in order to defend. We
then use an objective standard to determine whether defendant’s belief was
reasonable--specifically, whether a reasonable person in defendant’s
circumstances would have perceived self-defense as necessary. In State v.
Hundley . . . , we stated that, in cases involving battered spouses, “[t]he
objective test is how a reasonably prudent battered wife would perceive [the
aggressor’s] demeanor.”55
This turn to objectivity (a subject that we will consider in greater detail near
the end of the next chapter) is troublesome, in no less than two respects. First,
notions of objective reasonableness depend on notions of common sense. But as
Hundley, Stewart, and a host of other cases make clear, there is no “common sense”
when it comes to battered women—they exist in a condition outside the ordinary
juror’s ability to know. Justice Herd (the author of the Hundley opinion) explicitly
makes that point in dissenting from the Stewart majority.56 Second, by removing a
54 Id. at 577; see also id., Syl. § 4.
55 Id. at 579.
56 763 P. 2d at 582 (Herd, J., dissenting) (citations omitted):
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whole category of cases from the province of the jury, the Court effectively cut off
(for now) the quasi-public part of the rule-building process upon which the
democratic growth (again, more on that in the next chapter) of the American
common-law depends—namely, the testing of narratives in front of judges and
juries.
As Hundley and Stewart show, legal rules develop through an accretive
process, slowly absorbing and deflecting narratives on a case-by-case basis. But is
the influence of individual narratives ephemeral? Or do they become formally
institutionalized? They do, at least with respect to pattern jury charges. We can
plainly see this in the current version of the PIK pertaining to self defense:
PIK 54.17 Use of Force in Defense of a Person
The defendant has claimed his conduct was justified as self defense. A
person is justified in the use of force against an aggressor when and to the
extent it appears to him and he reasonably believes that such conduct is
necessary to defend himself against such aggressor’s imminent use of
unlawful force. Such justification requires both a belief on the part of
defendant and the existence of facts that would persuade a reasonable person
to that belief.
. . .
The majority implies its decision is necessary to keep the battered woman
syndrome from operating as a defense in and of itself. It has always been
clear the syndrome is not a defense itself. Evidence of the syndrome is
admissible only because of its relevance to the issue of self-defense. The
majority of jurisdictions have held it beyond the ordinary jury’s
understanding why a battered woman may feel she cannot escape, and have
held evidence of the battered woman syndrome proper to explain it. The
expert testimony explains how people react to circumstances in which the
average juror has not been involved. It assists the jury in evaluating the
sincerity of the defendant’s belief she was in imminent danger requiring self-
defense and whether she was in fact in imminent danger.
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Comments
In State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. 461, the Court disapproved PIK 2d 54.17 in
the use of “immediate” in lieu of the statutory term “imminent.” The Court
held it to be reversible error to use the work (sic) immediate in the self-
defense instruction in that it places undue emphasis on the immediate action
of the aggressor whereas the nature of the buildup of terror and fear which
has been going on over a period of time, particularly in battered spouse
instances, may be most relevant. The word imminent would describe this
defense more accurately, as the definition implies impending or near at hand,
rather than immediate.
The existence of the battered woman syndrome in and of itself does not
operate as a defense to murder. In order to instruct a jury on self-defense,
there must be some showing of an imminent threat or a confrontational
circumstances (sic) involving an overt act by an aggressor. State v. Stewart,
243 Kan. 639.57
Both Betty Hundley and Peggy Stewart’s stories are fossilized—along with
thousands of others—in the present rule of self-defense. Theirs are noteworthy only
because we can still see them in the sediment, like the occasional leaf that is
apparent between layers of limestone.58 Others are mere traces, but their influence is
still vital, even as they are buried deeper each day with a fresh layer of narratives,
some compelling, some less so, some not at all.
Thus conceived, jury instructions are a representation of two things: the state
of the law and a collage of a multitude of individual narratives as they have been
institutionalized. They are of course not permanent in either respect and can never
be more than “stabilized for now.”59 But they nonetheless stand at important
57 Pattern Instructions in Kansas, 3d.
58 This process is not unique to jury instructions. Indeed, that’s how the
common law has always worked. It’s just that we forget that, for example, “The
Rule in Shelley’s Case” or “The Rule in Spencer’s Case” grew out of stories.
59 Amy Devitt, Integrating Rhetorical and Literary Theories of Genre, 62 C.
ENG. 696, 710 (2000) (quoting Catherine F. Schryer with respect to genre stability).
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theoretical crossroad—namely, a place where normative and narrative coherence
meet. This is important because one could plausibly posit that these types of
coherence are different in an exclusive sort of way: i.e., a proper system of norms
must be coherent in a snapshot sort of way (synchronically); a narrative must be
coherent in a storybook sort of way (diachronically).60 As Neil MacCormick
suggests, however, “this picture . . . ignores the way in which legal doctrines and
norms themselves develop through time.”61 As a general example of this temporal
development, MacCormick cites to the feminist critique of self-defense doctrines in
the context of domestic violence—in other words, the sort of situation that Hundley
and Stewart so concretely represent. To amplify this theme, we can think of the
current iteration of a jury instruction—and indeed of any legal rule—as the most-
complete-to-date version of what Ronald Dworkin has referred to as a “chain novel.”
Dworkin’s analogy has not gone unchallenged, but it is nonetheless illuminating in
many respects germane to our present discussion, and we therefore need to consider
it.
5. Law’s Constraints: Generic or Precedential?
In Law’s Empire, Dworkin develops an extended metaphor likening the
development of the law to a multi-author serial novel—i.e., one in which each
60 I have found it useful to think of coherence in two ways. The first, and
more familiar, is that of a chain. The problem with that metaphor is that a story may
be said to fail if any link breaks or doesn’t fit. I think a logician must have first
coined the trope, for as we all know, storytellers spin yarns, not chains. Anyway,
yarn does not depend on the integrity of any single strand. Mosaics and tapestries
are also appropriately analogous, I think, in that they can lose pieces or threads and
still convey a message.
61 RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 5, at 233.
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chapter is authored by a different person.62 The metaphor is imperfect63—most
obviously because the novel is a relatively closed-ended form and the law is an
open-ended one64—but in the main it captures a salient feature of the law: viz., that
it develops through a series of sequential narratives, most of which are told by and
feature different actors. This narrative aspect is not the one most often discussed (at
least not directly) in the back-and-forth as to whether the metaphor is actually
functional or beside the point. Instead, the debate usually centers on whether the
metaphor is descriptive of the constraining power of precedent. This question seems
62 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 228-38 (1986).
63 As a native Kansan, I would have offered the World’s Largest Ball of
Twine (to which farmers have been adding segments for over 50 years) as more apt:
http://skyways.lib.ks.us/towns/Cawker/twine.html. But alas, I was not the first
author to enter on the scene.
64 Poststructuralists would deny that the novel is a closed form because it
remains open to interpretation. See, e.g., TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN
INTRODUCTION 138 (1983) (arguing that the shift from structuralism to post-
structuralism is a movement from seeing “the poem or novel as a closed entity,
equipped with definite meanings which it is the critic’s task to decipher, to seeing it
as irreducibly plural, an endless play of signifiers which can never be finally nailed
down to a single centre, essence or meaning”). For our purposes, I mean only that a
novel has left its author’s hands.
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irresolvable at present65—at least to any reasonable degree of certainty—but I
believe that the metaphor has a greater utility, one with which both chain and anti-
chain commentators might agree. But before presenting that position, we must first
sketch out Dworkin’s thesis and that of his most ardent critic (on this point), Stanley
Fish.
“All those who have studied the law have at least an intuitive notion of
precedent or stare decisis.”66 This intuition is easy to articulate in the abstract: when
a court has held that a principle of law is applicable to a certain set of facts, it will
adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where the facts are
substantially the same.67 But this definition is devilishly difficult to apply in
concrete instances because determining whether facts are “substantially the same” is
not always an easy task. And although there is widespread disagreement as to when
and why courts should treat like cases alike, there is, nonetheless, general agreement
that courts should treat them alike absent unusual circumstances. That is, I think
that most would agree that “objectivity” is a cardinal virtue of the Rule of Law and
that any rational account of objectivity demands that judgments be invariant across
65 See, e.g., Stefanie A. Linquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing
Dworkin’s Chain Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1156-57 (2005) (finding only limited support for chain-novel theory and concluding
that Dworkin’s “thesis does not describe fully the operation of U.S. law”).
66 Id. at 1158.
67 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1443 (8th ed. 2004) (definition of stare
decisis).
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judging subjects.68 The rub comes when precedent is the tool employed to insure
invariance. Some argue that precedent is simply a mask behind which judicial
manipulation takes place.69 But others quite persuasively point to the predictability
of outcome—and attendant systemic stability—that comes with “coherence in
interpretation of particular provisions over many cases.”70 Were the situation
otherwise, a legal system “would be a sham if the law were subject to varying
interpretation from case to case, for it would only be nominally the same law that
applied to different cases with essentially similar features.”71
Dworkin casts his chain-novel hypothesis in the foreground of the historical
debates over the efficacy and desirability of a jurisprudence built on stare decisis.
And his mission is, as Linquist and Cross have noted, both normative and
descriptive.72 As a description, Dworkin offers the metaphor to show how precedent
constrains judges. Here’s how Dworkin’s ideal chain novel is produced: a group of
68 See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, INVARIANCES: THE STRUCTURE OF THE
OBJECTIVE WORLD 75-114 (2001); Gerald Postema, Objectivity Fit for Law, in
OBJECTIVITY IN LAW AND MORALS 99, 108 (Brian Leiter ed., 2001).
69 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (Scalia, dissenting) (“I
do not myself believe in rigid adherence to stare decisis in constitutional cases; but I
do believe that we should be consistent rather than manipulative in invoking the
doctrine. Today’s opinions in support of reversal do not bother to distinguish–or
indeed, even bother to mention–the paean to stare decisis coauthored by three
Members of today’s majority in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.”).
70 Zenon Bankowski et al., Rationales for Precedent, in INTERPRETING
PRECEDENTS 481, 487 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1997); see
also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992)
(“Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”).
71 Id. at 488; see also id. at 487 (linking predictability to the Rule of Law by
suggesting that it is “definitive for the idea of a rational legal discourse”).
72 Linquist & Cross, supra note 65, at 1167.
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coauthors agree each to write a separate chapter of a work. They draw lots to
determine the order of writing, after which the
lowest number writes the opening chapter of a novel, which he or she then
sends to the next number who adds a chapter, with the understanding that he
is adding a chapter to that novel rather than beginning a new one, and then
sends the two chapters to the next number, and so on. Now every novelist
but the first has the dual responsibilities of interpreting and creating because
each must read all that has gone before in order to establish, in the
interpretivist sense, what the novel so far created is. He or she must
determine what the characters are “really” like; what motives in fact guide
them; what the point or theme of the developing novel is; how far some
literary device or figure, consciously or unconsciously used, contributes to
these, and whether it should be extended or refined or trimmed or dropped in
order to send the novel further in one direction rather than another.73
This conceit is apt, in Dworkin’s view, because it is analogous to the
development of the common law. Thus, just as the novelists become increasingly
constrained as the plot thickens (because each new chapter must “fit” with its
predecessors in terms of plot, character and style), common-law judges become
constrained by the build-up of precedent:
Deciding hard cases at law is rather like this strange literary exercise. The
similarity is most evident when judges consider and decide common-law
cases; that is, when no statute figures centrally in the legal issue, and the
argument turns on which rules or principles of law “underlie” the related
decisions of other judges in the past. Each judge is then like a novelist in the
chain. He or she must read through what other judges in the past have
written not simply to discover what these judges have said, or their state of
mind when they said it, but to reach an opinion about what these judges have
collectively done, in the way that each of our novelists formed an opinion
about the collective novel so far written. Any judge forced to decide a
lawsuit will find, if he looks in the appropriate books, records of many
arguably similar cases decided over decades or even centuries past by many
73 Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in the Law and
in Literary Criticism, 9 CRITICAL INQUIRY 201, 202 (1982) (quoting Ronald
Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 9 CRITICAL INQUIRY 179, 192-93 (1982)); see also
DWORKIN, supra note 62, at 229 (“[A] group of novelists writes a novel, seriatim;
each novelist in the chain interprets the chapters he has been given in order to write
a new chapter, which is then added to what the next novelist receives, and so on.”).
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other judges of different styles and judicial and political philosophies, in
periods of different orthodoxies of procedure and judicial convention. Each
judge must regard himself, in deciding the new case before him, as a partner
in a complex chain enterprise of which these innumerable decisions,
structures, conventions, and practices are the history; it is his job to continue
that history into the future through what he does on the day. He must
interpret what has gone before because he has a responsibility to advance the
enterprise in hand rather than strike out in some new direction of his own.74
Fish chides Dworkin for missing the point. That is, although Fish agrees that
textual interpretation is always constrained, he vigorously dissents from Dworkin’s
location of precedent as the source of interpretive restraints. Instead, Fish identifies
(without using the term) what rhetoricians call “genre constraints” as the actual
dampers on full interpretive license. Thus, whereas Dworkin posits that successive
writers become increasingly constrained by the text already produced, Fish argues
that the first author is already constrained by the genre in which he or she has chosen
to write:75
[Dworkin’s] idea is that the first author is free because he is not obliged “to
read all that has gone before” and therefore doesn’t have to decide what the
characters are “really” like, what motives guide them, and so on. But in fact
the first author has surrendered his freedom . . . as soon as he commits
himself to writing a novel, for he makes his decision under the same
constraints that rule the decisions of his collaborators. He must decide, for
example, how to begin the novel, but the decision is not “free” because the
very notion “beginning a novel” exists only in the context of a set of
practices that at once enables and limits the act of beginning. . . . He is free
to begin whatever kind of novel he decides to write, but he is constrained by
the finite (although not unchanging) possibilities that are subsumed in the
notions “kind of novel” and “beginning a novel.”76
74 Id. at 205-06 (quoting Dworkin).
75 Id. at 203.
76 Id. What Fish has in mind here, I think, is the notion that different literary
modes carry with them different sets of conventions. For example, in Ian Watt’s
famous study of the early development of the realistic novel, he catalogues the
shared expectations of both readers and writers of realistic novels:
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Fish goes on to assert that not only is the first novelist generically
constrained but that the subsequent novelists are generically free. Indeed, the “last
author is as free . . . as is the first.”77 This seems counterintuitive because one would
“think that the more information one has (the more history) the more directed will be
one’s interpretation.”78 But Fish slips this knot (or at least tries to do so) by arguing
that all information always comes in interpreted form and that, therefore,
information/history cannot act as a check on interpretation.79 For support, Fish
resorts to a hypothetical debate among the serial novelists as to the specific sub-
genre to which they will contribute: where one sees a straightforward piece of
realism, another sees a social satire, and yet another sees a comedy of manners. He
The narrative method whereby the novel embodies [a] circumstantial view of
life may be called its formal realism; formal, because the term realism does
not here refer to any special literary doctrine or purpose, but only to a set of
narrative procedures which are so commonly found together in the novel,
and so rarely in other literary genres, that they may be regarded as typical of
the form itself. Formal realism, in fact, is the narrative embodiment of a
premise that Defoe and Richardson accepted very literally, but which is
implicit in the novel form in general: the premise, or primary convention,
that the novel is a full and authentic report of human experience, and is
therefore under an obligation to satisfy its reader with such details of the
story as the individuality of the of the actors concerned, the particulars of the
times and places of their actions, details which are presented through a more
largely referential use of language than is common in other literary forms.
Ian Watt, Realism and the Novel Form, excerpted in LAW AND LITERATURE 463, 464
(Lenora Ledwon ed., 1996).
77 Fish, supra note 73, at 204.
78 Id.
79 This seems wrong to me, or at least an overstatement. Although I agree
that information comes in interpreted form, interpretation also comes in light of
other interpretations. Absent misreading of what has come before, this additional
context should indeed guide (or constrain) future interpretations, if they are to be
coherent.
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is thus able to pin Dworkin with the weight of his own argument: “If Dworkin’s
argument is to hold, that is, if the decisions he talks about are to be constrained, in a
strong sense, by an already-in-place text, it must be possible to settle this
disagreement by appealing to that text. But it is precisely because the text appears
differently in the light of different assumptions as to what is its mode that there is a
disagreement in the first place.”80
To some extent, Dworkin is the author of his own misfortune here. This is
so because he deploys his metaphor as a description of how judges should resolve
hard cases, which—by definition it would seem—arise against an unsettled
historical record or extraordinary facts. The very reason that cases are “hard” is that
(1) the body of law to which a judge should refer is either so ambiguous or so vague
on a particular point as to leave resolution of the exact legal question presented open
to debate or (2) the factual scenario presents problems of classification and
categorization (e.g., a matter of first impression). Put in novelistic terms, hard cases
are hard because the novel is not yet coherent—it is unfinished.81 So just as no
rational writer could come to pen the last chapter of The Grapes of Wrath thinking
that the novel is a comedy of manners, no rational judge could come to an ordinary
80 Id. at 204.
81 Derrida’s notion of “supplement”—which carries the sense of both
“addition to” and “substitution for”—helps explain this relationship. See JACQUES
DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 144-52 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., 1976).
If, for example, I pull a volume of the Federal Digest off the shelf, I have in my hand
a “complete” statement of the law on a particular subject. But every so often, the
publisher puts out a new edition (and every year puts out a new pocket part) that
updates the cases previously digested and adds new ones. Each new edition thus
“adds to” and “substitutes for” its predecessor in a never-to-be-completed cycle. See
Jack M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 758-
59 (1987).
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slip-and-fall case thinking that “duty” is not an element of a negligence claim. The
point here is that none of Fish’s objections holds true in run-of-the-mill cases, in
which the “novel” is essentially complete and subject to only occasional revisions or
glosses.82 Typically, a lengthy series of cases covering a wide distribution of facts
has already established legal rules (and their constituent elements that must be pled
and proven) against which the facts of a particular case can be assessed. A judge has
little latitude in this situation, and it matters not at all whether the reason is styled a
genre restraint or precedential restraint.83
82 Novelists occasionally revise their work after publication. The New York
edition of Henry James’ novels is an example. Those novels are in most respects the
same as their predecessors—they are still recognizable as the same works—but they
are different (and by most accounts hardly improved). The same is true of black-
letter law: judges no longer need to add substantive chapters; at most, they edit a
bit, add a footnote here and there, or—occasionally—slap on an afterward. There is
not, of course, a bright line between actual novelizing and mere editing, but we
know that the legal novel is essentially finished once courts begin to quote settled
precedent, with no further pretense of pronouncement. But when times change,
there’s always room for a sequel.
83 I actually think Fish overstates the power of genre constraints, in one
important respect. He uses as an example a judge who deems a defendant guilty of a
crime for no reason other than that the defendant has red hair. This is not “striking
out in a new direction,” according to Fish. Rather, this person “would simply not be
acting as a judge because he could give no reasons for his decision that would be
seen as reasons by competent members of the legal community.” Fish, supra note
73, at 206. The problem here is that there is no line to be drawn between “bad”
decisions made within the legal genre and “extrajudicial” decisions made without it.
To return to the analogy to fiction, literary history is replete with examples—from
A. Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes detective series to Aaron Spelling’s Dallas
television series—in which characters have been killed off in one episode only to
reappear later in the series. And this happens within sub-genres that are ostensibly
in a “realistic” vein. Are the implausible contrivances that bring the dead back to
the page or screen generic breaches or merely bad realism? I don’t think one could
construct a test that would satisfy all members of the interpretive community any
more than one could devise a rubric for separating “bad” or “stupid” or “wrong”
judicial decisions from those that Fish would identify as extrajudicial.
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6. Novelizing Law
What gets lost in the Dworkin-Fish debate is the aptness of Dworkin’s
metaphor to how common-law rules are built through narrative accretion over time.
We have seen this process at work in self-defense jury-instruction cases, but it may
be useful to catch a novel-building exercise in mid-flow. I’ve chosen a simple
example—one with a fairly circumscribed universe of case law available—for the
sake of brevity; nonetheless, the principle at work holds across the board.
In the United States, many of the individual states have a “savings statute”
that preserves a plaintiff’s right in certain circumstances to commence a lawsuit that
would otherwise be time barred under an applicable statute of limitations.
Generally, these statutes allow a plaintiff to file a lawsuit outside the limitations
period if (1) he had previously commenced the suit within the limitations period and
(2) that suit had been dismissed for reasons other than the merits. Kansas adopted
such a statute in 1868; Oklahoma did so when it adopted the Kansas code of civil
procedure, of which the Kansas savings statute was a part, shortly after achieving
statehood in 1907.84 Each state’s version of the statute has been recodified and
slightly amended over the years, but both largely maintain their original character.85
84 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-518; 12 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 100; see
generally Lepak v. McClain, 844 P.2d 852 (1992) (Opala, J., concurring)
(discussing issues relating to Oklahoma statutes adopted from Kansas).
85 The current versions of the statutes read as follows:
If any action be commenced within due time, and the plaintiff fail in such
action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited for the same shall
have expired, the plaintiff, or, if the plaintiff die, and the cause of action
survive, his or her representatives may commence a new action within six (6)
months after such failure. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-518.
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Fairly early on in the last century, courts began to face an unanticipated
(probably) scenario—viz., one in which a plaintiff timely filed a suit in state “A,”
had it dismissed for some non-substantive reason (like lack of personal jurisdiction
or improper venue), and then refiled the suit in state “B” after the statute of
limitations had run but within the period allowed under state B’s savings statute.
This presents the question whether a state’s savings statute should apply to a case
first filed in another state.
Oklahoma was the first of the two states to take up the question, holding in
Herron v. Miller that Oklahoma’s statute would not “save” a case that was first filed
in another jurisdiction.86 The very next year, Kansas, in Jackson v. Prairie Oil &
Gas, approved—in dictum—of the rule announced in Herron.87 There the matter
rested for decades as a matter of little controversy; indeed, the Herron rule squared
with “the general rule among older cases” across the country.88 This began to
change after mid-century, though, as the American national narrative shifted from
one based on rural roots (Jefferson’s nation of small farmers) to widespread
migration brought on by increasing industrialization. Thus, by the 1980s, courts
were divided on the issue, and with increasing frequency they were finding “no
If any action is commenced within due time, and a judgment thereon for the
plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fail in such action otherwise than upon
the merits, the plaintiff, or, if he should die, and the cause of action survive,
his representatives may commence a new action within one (1) year after the
reversal or failure although the time limit for commencing the action shall
have expired before the new action is filed. 12 OKLA. STAT., tit. 12, § 100.
86 220 P. 59 (Okla. 1923).
87 222 P. 1114 (Kan. 1924).
88 Prince v. Leesona Corp., Inc., 720 F.2d 1166, 1168 (10th Cir. 1983).
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significant policy to be furthered by interpreting the statute to exclude actions filed
outside” the forum state.89 In short, a developing sense that there was a fundamental
interstate right of access to the courts came to outweigh outmoded parochial
concerns.90
As between Oklahoma and Kansas, Oklahoma was the first state to revisit
the Herron rule. But with not even a nod to changing times, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court simply announced—with a citation to Herron—that “[w]e adhere to the rule
that the provisions of this section accrue only to actions filed within the State of
Oklahoma.”91 The Oklahoma Supreme Court continues to acknowledge this
precedent.92 The Kansas Supreme Court, on the other hand, has still not firmly
resolved the issue, although it has signaled that it will adopt the modern view when
called upon to do so. In the relevant case, Goldsmith v. Learjet, Inc.,93 the Court
noted as background for a related issue that the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit already had predicted that the Kansas Supreme Court would
89 Allen v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 656 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1981).
90 Id. at 422-23.
91 Morris v. Wise, 293 P.2d 547, 550 (Okla. 1955).
92 Grider v. USX Corp., 847 P.2d 779, 788 n.7 (Okla. 1993) (Opala, J.,
concurring) (“Morris holds § 100 uninvocable to save an action which was
originally brought in federal district court in Texas and was later recommenced in an
Oklahoma state court.”).
93 917 P.2d 810 (Kan. 1996) (discussing with apparent approval the position
that the trend against applying savings statutes to cases first filed in other
jurisdictions had “reversed.”).
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extend the benefit of the Kansas savings statute to cases first filed in another state,94
a holding that United States District Courts in Kansas have since followed.95
What we have, then, are two independent systems that have started from the
same point and yet have created “novels” that stand in direct opposition. Kansas
was able to move more quickly to bring its law into phase with the modern cultural
narrative because it was not freighted with unequivocal precedent. Oklahoma has
found itself constrained by previous chapters even though other courts have
criticized its rulings and have themselves moved in the opposite direction.96 This is
not to say that Oklahoma is stuck with a novel that everyone hates. Plot twists—
even reversals—are just as permitted within the legal genre as in the novelistic
genre, so long as those twists make sense at that point in the chain. In fact, at least
one Oklahoma Supreme Court justice has obliquely suggested that it is time write a
new chapter.97 He did this in two ways: first, by indicating that Oklahoma’s rule
had been strongly criticized and, second, by focusing attention on Morris, not
94 Prince v. Leesona Corp., 720 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1983).
95 Harnett v. Parris, 1995 WL 55036 at *6 (D. Kan.) (“This court is bound to
follow the Tenth Circuit’s decision” in Prince.). By way of full disclosure, I was
one of counsel in Harnett, a case with its own interesting narrative twists. The case
involved a number of racing greyhounds allegedly stolen from Harnett, an Irish
citizen, by a once prominent (but by then imprisoned) former Oklahoma legislator,
Parris, and others through the use of forged registration documents. For details of
the alleged scheme, see Harnett v. Parris, 925 F. Supp. 1496 (D. Kan. 1996). But I
digress . . .
96 See, e.g., Bockweg v. Anderson, 402 S.E.2d 672, 633 (1991).
97 Grider v. USX Corp., 847 P.2d 779, 788 n.7 (Okla. 1993) (Opala, J.,
concurring) (“The teaching of Morris came under severe criticism . . . for affording
out-of-state dismissals dehors the merits a different treatment from that which is
accorded in-state federal-court dismissals.”).
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Herron. This second point raises an interesting back-narrative that makes it all the
more likely that Morris will one day be overruled. For that opinion was authored by
Justice Nelson Corn, who was at the epicenter of a major Oklahoma Supreme Court
scandal in the early 1960s. Justice Corn was convicted and imprisoned for evading
federal income tax on bribes that he had taken while sitting on the Supreme Court in
the late 1950s (i.e., at about the time that Morris was decided).98 And as all
Oklahoma practitioners and jurists know, every case from that period bears the trace
of the scandal; consequently, each lacks the persuasive force that would otherwise
be its due.99
7. Resisting Narratives: Keeping the Outside Out
There is probably no great dispute that law is a conservative institution. The
cases that we have just reviewed exemplify that. But in the context of our
examination of how narratives can influence the law, what does this mean? One
could simply posit that legal institutions will react more slowly to shifts in public
narratives and move on, but that seems unsatisfactory. On the other hand,
attempting to trace the ebb and flow of particular narratives across a range of social
institutions is an exercise in history far beyond our present scope. There is a middle
course, however, one that reveals traces of clashing narratives in the form of
98 See http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,841846.00.html.
99 This is an example of an interpretive community having a
subcommunity—one whose members are aware of important context not even
inferable by someone outside that subcommunity. This is to say that a lawyer sitting
in a library in New York would be unlikely to discover that Oklahoma authority
from the late 1950s is tainted, absent resort to non-legal materials. Plainly, the
normal resources used for evaluating the subsequent history of a case (e.g.,
Shepard’s or KeyCite) would raise no cautionary flags.
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particular linguistic features and, more important, the speed with which various
institutions bow to forces that represent a newly dominant narrative. What we
find—consistent with our hypothesis—is that legal institutions prove more resistant
to shifting narratives than do other institutions.
The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries were a period of great change in
the relations between Scotland and England, marked on one end with relative
independence between the parties and on the other with a relative unification. And
although the period was punctuated with moments of great upheaval, the larger arc
traces a gradual shift in political influence from Edinburgh to London. This is not to
say that the Scottish national narrative was stamped out—it remains quite strong
today—but the English current plainly overwhelmed certain Scottish institutions.
One measure of Scottish institutional resilience can be found at the level of
language, an area capably investigated by Amy Devitt in her language-based study
of the period from 1520 to 1659.100
Devitt’s methodology is one tied to genre, which she elsewhere describes as
“a nexus between an individual’s actions and a socially defined context.”101 With
respect to her study of Scotland, she thus looks at particular types of writing
associated with particular social contexts to see whether, to what extent, and how
100 AMY DEVITT, STANDARDIZING WRITTEN ENGLISH: DIFFUSION IN THE
CASE OF SCOTLAND, 1520-1659 (1989) [hereinafter STANDARDIZING WRITTEN
ENGLISH].
101 AMY DEVITT, WRITING GENRES 31 (2004).
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rapidly standard Anglo-English forms superseded traditional Scots-English forms.102
What she finds is that there was wide variation in the rate and depth of anglicization
across contexts. Of particular interest are the variations between the genres
associated with the two major institutions that she studies: viz., Church and State.
Of signal importance is her observation that religious treatises anglicized quickly
and almost completely, whereas public records (mostly legal documents) did so
slowly and only partially. The explanation for these divergent phenomena is found
in the institutional settings that gave rise to the generic writings under examination.
Religious treatises became rapidly anglicized for a number of reasons: they
were directed to (and intended to persuade) both English and Scottish readers, they
102 Devitt evaluated five different English forms in five different genres in
twenty-year tranches over the period in question. Specifically, she looked at how
quickly certain Anglo-English forms replaced Scots-English forms:
“-ing” replacing “-and” as the inflection marking the present
participle;
“no/not” replacing “na/nocht” as the negative particle;
indefinite article “a” before consonants and “an” before vowels
replacing “ane” in all environments;
“-ed” replacing “-it” as the inflection marking the past tense; and
“wh-” replacing “quh-” in the spelling of relative pronouns.
As genres, she examined
religious treatises;
official correspondence;
private records (mostly diaries);
private correspondence; and
national public records (e.g., records of the Scots Privy Council).
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were aimed at a general audience, they were meant to be kept rather than discarded
(i.e., they were more like books than newspapers), and they were expositions of a
version of the Bible that was written in Anglo-English (a translation of the Geneva
Bible). One might therefore expect public records to take a similar standardization
turn, given that they, too, were highly formal, addressed a serious subject matter
(legal affairs) and were intended for a general audience and for posterity. But, as
Devitt shows, this was not the case:
A fuller understanding of the situation offers a fuller understanding of the
records’ resistance. Anglo-English may have been becoming the new
standard for the Scots, but Scots-English had been the standard for centuries.
. . . The writers had no obligation to persuade their readers, but they did
have an obligation to preserve the proceedings of the government. In
addition to encouraging linguistic conservatism, the situation may have
encouraged linguistic nationalism. These public records were, after all,
national records: their purpose was to record the activities of groups which
represented Scotland. As these groups were increasingly undermined by the
political unification of Scotland and England, the perhaps unconscious
nationalism of the authors, who were writing documents to preserve Scottish
laws and actions, might have expressed itself quite readily in use of the
Scottish language, in conformity with the Scots-English Standard.103
Devitt goes on to posit that the public-records genre, which was largely legal
in nature, itself afforded a degree of immunity to the otherwise pervasive influence
of Anglo-English:104
103 STANDARDIZING WRITTEN ENGLISH, supra note 100, at 65.
104 The specific records that Devitt examined were:
Ancient criminal trials;
Records of the Convention of the Royal Burghs;
Register of the Privy Council;
Trials for witchcraft; and
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[T]he genre itself was so well established as to have served as a constraint on
writers of the genre, to have strengthened intertextuality. The Acts of the
Privy Council and other national records had been written for centuries,
though not always preserved. They constituted a long-standing and highly
traditional genre. [A] genre can become a part of the situation itself if that
genre becomes so conventionalized that certain formal characteristics are
expected of all instances of the genre, whether appropriate or not. The
national records had become so conventionalized. Long before Anglo-
English became prestigious, the Scottish records had not only adopted the
Scots-English language standard, but also developed their own expected
style, full of established formats and traditional phrases . . .. The established
convention of the genre thus constrained any change in the genre, including a
change in usage. This effect of the tradition reveals itself especially in the
traditional phrases, the stock phrases which seem to have maintained Scots-
English forms even more strongly than the rest of the genre.105
All this accords with Fish’s account of the constraints inherent in the
common-law genre, and I think it in good part accounts for the lag that we often
sense in legal developments. But I don’t want to stop right there because I believe
that a swerve back into narrative can help us develop a more comprehensive
explanation of how law builds upon itself. That is not really the stretch that it might
seem at first blush, once we recall that narrative is itself a genre (or perhaps even a
sort of meta-genre). In any event, I hope to show—by analogy to Devitt’s linguistic
data and arguments—that narratology offers a compelling institutional account of
how and why legal systems react more slowly to shifts in public and metanarratives
than do institutions of popular culture.
For sociologists and social historians, “[i]t is a commonplace in the study of
nationalism that the construction of national identity inevitably relies on the creation
Selected justiciary cases.
Id. at 78 (Appendix II).
105 Id. at 65-66.
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and use of narratives—part history, part myth—that imbue nations and nationalist
projects with coherence and purpose.”106 If this is so (and I think it is), how then can
we use this fact to explain institutional resistance to incoherent influences of the sort
that we just observed in Devitt’s study? For explanation, we should first turn to the
specifics of the Scottish nationalism that Devitt notes and that others have explored
across a broader historical topography, especially in the context of legal institutions.
Nineteenth Century Scotland provides an interesting case study because of
its complicated narrative relationship with England. Many have likened this to a
colonial relationship, but one with an almost defining twist: the colonization was
effected via cultural leveling, not military conquest. And this came as something as
a surprise, given that the 1707 Act of Union ostensibly reserved to the Scots
sufficient autonomy within key cultural institutions to remain separate from but to
gain equality with their southern neighbors:
Had they not carefully set aside a space for difference and thus for equality
rather than subservience within the Union by retaining their own law and
religion? But by the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Scots began to
realize that the London parliament was encroaching on their legal and
religious sovereignty. As N.T. Phillipson writes: “it became increasingly
clear . . . that assimilation was not something which could be sought in [the
Scots’] own time and on their own terms. . . . Assimilation was a force for
change which rendered existing institutions inefficient or even redundant.”
He continues: “lawyers [began] to think of assimilation in rather broad
terms, as something capable of damaging the whole quality of national life.”
The Scots, indeed, began to realize that through subtle encroachment upon
and erasure of their Scottish difference, they had come to occupy a decidedly
secondary, if not irrelevant position in the Union.107
106 Jonathan Hearn, Narrative, Agency, and Mood: On the Social
Construction of National History in Scotland, 44 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 745,
745 (2002).
107 Caroline McCracken-Flesher, Thinking Nationally/Writing Colonially?
Scott, Stevenson and England, 24 NOVEL 296, 296-97 (1991) (quoting N.T.
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This cultural erosion did not go unnoticed, but it accelerated at a time when
Scotland began to enjoy the economic fruits of the Union—i.e., at a time when
Scotland came to be written into England’s narrative of economic prosperity. This,
coupled with the theme of constitutional evolution, fused to form what Hearn and
the Scottish historian Michael Fry have identified as the classic “whig” narrative.
“In this narrative, constitutionalism, democracy, and economic ‘improvement’—in
other words, all things good—seemed to flow from England to Scotland and the
empire, to the rest of the world. It is in many of its essentials the antecedent of
modernization theory in the twentieth century.”108 Hearn goes on to trace various
iterations of and engraftments on the whig narrative up to the present, including a
turn towards a decidedly Marxist vocabulary after the 1970s (e.g., adoption of Franz
Fanon’s anti-colonial voice). But his main point—one shared by other
commentators as well—is that both individual Scots and Scottish institutions have
found themselves trapped between clashing public narratives: the economic-whig
narrative and nationalistic-Scots narrative.
McCracken-Flesher believes—a sentiment with which I concur—that Walter
Scott offers a particularly good example of the national confusions that have plagued
Scots ever since the border marked by the Tweed began to erode practically, if not
jurisdictionally.109 In fact, Scott’s ontological narrative may fairly be said to embody
Phillipson, Nationalism and Ideology, in GOVERNMENT AND NATIONALISM IN
SCOTLAND 177 (J.N. Wolfe ed., 1969)).
108 Hearn, supra note 106, at 753; see also Michael Fry, The Whig
Interpretation of Scottish History, in THE MANUFACTURE OF SCOTTISH HISTORY 72-
89 (Ian Donnachie & Christopher Whatley eds., 1992).
109 McCracken-Flesher, supra note 107, at 298.
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the narrative clash to which I just adverted. On the one hand, Scott’s writing
brought him both regard in and a substantial livelihood from the English market.
But on the other hand, Scott’s novels are infused with distinctly Scottish historical
subject matter, and—even more important for our discussion—Scott was both a
practicing lawyer and an official in the legal system at a time when it came under
siege from the English parliament. McCracken-Flesher reports that “[d]uring 1806-
7, when Scott was Clerk to the Court of Session, Westminster started to impinge on
its powers. And Scott actively, if hopelessly, resisted English incursions on Scottish
law.”110 I will return in a moment to McCracken-Flesher’s choice of the adverb
“hopelessly” and focus on what she means by “actively.” One of Scott’s
biographers, J.G. Lockhart, recounts that after a debate on proposed legislation in
the Faculty of Advocates, Scott
Made a speech much longer than any he had ever before delivered in that
assembly. . . . [I]t had a flow of energy of eloquence for which those who
knew him best had been quite unprepared. When the meeting broke up . . .
his reforming friends . . . complimented him on the rhetorical powers he had
been displaying, and would willingly have treated the subject-matter of the
discussion playfully. But his feelings had been moved to an extent far
beyond their appreciation: he exclaimed, “no, no—’t is no laughing matter;
little by little, whatever your wishes may be, you will destroy and
undermine, until nothing of what makes Scotland Scotland shall remain.”
And so saying, he turned round to conceal his agitation—but not until Mr.
Jeffrey saw tears gushing down his cheek—resting his head until he
recovered himself on the wall of the Mound.111
Returning to the word “hopelessly,” we may now ask whether that label is
apt. Even if we concede that individual acts of resistance like Scott’s often prove
110 Id.
111 McCracken-Flesher, supra note 107, at 298-99 (quoting J. G. LOCKHART,
MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE OF SIR WALTER SCOTT, BART. 223-24 (Houghton Mifflin
1901)).
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futile (but I wouldn’t go so far as to say that they always do), what about the
inherent power of legal institutions to resist incongruent extrasystemic narratives?
In Devitt’s linguistic study we saw this at work vis-à-vis language; now we may ask
whether this holds for matters of substance. For proof, we can look to certain
aspects of Scots law.
As noted above, it is well known that a condition of the Act of Union
between England and Scotland was that the Scottish educational, legal, and religious
systems would remain separate. And although the economic pressures represented
by the whig narrative have diminished the practical import of this separation, that is
not so across the full range of Scots law. For as Lindsay Farmer has illustrated,
The criminal law . . . has succeeded in remaining resolutely independent
from its English neighbor. The more serious offences are still to be found in
the common law not statute. There has been stubborn resistance to the idea
of codifying the substantive law. The system has its own courts, rules of
procedure and evidence, and even punishment. And, perhaps most
significantly of all, unlike the civil law it is completely self-contained, there
being no appeal to the House of Lords on criminal questions. This
independence has not occurred accidentally but is rather the result of specific
and deliberate resistance . . ..112
Farmer locates the source of this resistance, at least in significant part, in the
Scottish national narrative of independence, of difference from England. For
support, Farmer turns to Baron Hume, who explained in the introduction to his
Commentaries on the Law of Scotland Respecting Crimes that he was motivated to
write by “the desire of rescuing the law of my native country from that state of
declension in the esteem of some part of the public, into which, of late years, it
112 Lindsay Farmer, “The Genius of our Law . . .”: Criminal Law and the
Scottish Legal Tradition, 55 MOD. L. REV. 25, 25 (1992).
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seems to have been falling.”113 As Farmer further demonstrates and wryly
concludes,
The cause of this falling esteem is clearly identified as “those multiplied
references to the criminal law of England.” He proceeds to devote some
pages to an enumeration of the Scottish system, although as a firm supporter
of political union he points out that this is not intended to disparage the
English system. There is a slightly provocative edge to his declaration that
he regards the English system as “liberal and enlightened” due to the “much
greater number of dissolute and profligate people” and “the greater
progress . . . of every sort of corruption.” The English courts, in other words,
get more practice!114
Farmer conducts his discussion in the context of what is often thought (but
nearly as often disputed) as the defining characteristic of the Scottish criminal
system: viz., the power of the High Court to declare acts criminal. As one court put
it nearly 200 years ago, “[t]he genius of our law rests on a principle diametrically
opposite to that of England; the Courts of criminal jurisdiction being authorized to
punish crimes without positive enactment.”115 Farmer is concerned—using the
declaratory power of the High Court as a fundamental example—to show that
Scottish criminal law rests on an “invented tradition,” an “imaginary past.”116 For
our purposes, it is immaterial whether the High Court does or should have
declaratory power or whether Scottish lawyers have deluded themselves into basing
their traditional beliefs and practices on fiction rather than fact. What is material,
however, is that statements articulating differences between English and Scottish
113 Id. at 32 (quoting Baron Hume, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
SCOTLAND RESPECTING CRIMES 12-13 (B. Bell ed., 4th ed. 1844)).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 26.
116 Id. at 42.
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law “represent part of a successful attempt to assert national identity through
institutions such as law in the century following the Union with England. The very
tangible economic benefits of the Union could be obtained, but some sense of
Scottishness preserved.”117 And although Farmer decries aspects of this conservative
nationalism and its consequences, he nonetheless concedes the sustaining power of
nationalistic public narratives once they set up behind institutional walls.118
None of this is unique to Scotland. I would argue that all legal institutions
tend to preserve existing public narratives and to adopt new ones only slowly. This
temporal lag has the salutary benefit of reducing legal volatility, but it also leads to
decisions that appear quaint or even downright silly. As an example we can
examine how the law has dealt with one of the most potent metanarratives of last
117 Id. at 33-34.
118 In particular, Farmer points to the work of Lord Cooper and Professor T.
B. Smith, which he capsules as follows:
The story of development since 1800 is that the effect of the Union has been
felt as the smaller Scottish system has come under the assimilating influence
of the English. Criminal law alone has resisted this intrusion, largely due to
the institutional separation from the House of Lords, but also because the
“native genius” of the Scots gave rise to a system of sufficient flexibility to
make legislative intervention unnecessary in the face of social change. It
thereby avoided the harshness and confusion that was the hallmark of the
English criminal law in the early nineteenth century. As the High Court has
developed and renewed its own precedents, the English system has come to
benefit through the statutory adoption of concepts developed in Scotland. . . .
The implications of this nationalism start to become clear when we set this
thesis beside the familiar concern, shared by Cooper and Smith, that the
profusion of statute law threatens to undermine the principles of the common
law. Here the threat is not only statute law but United Kingdom statute law.
What is being threatened is an idea of Scotland and Scottish identity—the
native genius of our law.
Id. at 34.
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couple of hundred years—namely, the popular belief that “scientific” evidence is
evidence of truth. “The idea that scientific inquiry is objective is unquestionably
among the ruling ideas of our epoch, and it represents science as not serving the
interests of a particular class, but a purely general interest in the understanding of
nature. Indeed, the idea of scientific objectivity has often been invoked on behalf of
the claim that the attitude of modern science is ‘the only rational, universally valid’
one.”119
In the early 1940s, the silent film star Charlie Chaplin found himself
embroiled in a paternity suit.120 Following commencement of the suit (and prior to
birth of the child), Chaplin and the soon-to-be mother, Joan Berry, entered into a
stipulation (agreed to by the child’s guardian ad litem and approved by the superior
court) under which Chaplin agreed to pay Berry’s pre- and post-natal medical
expenses and attorney’s fees and Berry agreed
[that she would] voluntarily submit said child after its birth to medical tests
for the purpose of determining its paternity and that she would make herself
and said child available at all times so that said tests could be made by
competent medical experts; . . . that one physician shall be named by
defendant, one by the guardian ad litem, and the two so chosen shall select a
third “who shall be especially skilled in such matters, who shall make a
blood test or other tests accepted by medical science for the purpose of
proving and establishing paternity . . ..”121
The parties further agreed that if two of the three physicians determined that Chaplin
was not the father, then plaintiff’s attorneys would dismiss the suit or—upon
119 Peter Railton, Marx and the Objectivity of Science, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE 763 (Richard Boyd et al. eds., 1991).
120 See Berry v. Chaplin, 169 P.2d 442 (Cal. App. 1946).
121 Id. at 445-46.
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presentation of a proper medical report from the two physicians—the court would
dismiss the case with prejudice.
In keeping with what I think of as the Burns rule of contract (“The best-laid
schemes o’ mice an’ men / Gang aft a-gley”), all three physicians concluded that
Chaplin was not the father, but plaintiff’s counsel refused to dismiss the case and
two judges presiding over later stages of the matter declined to enforce the parties’
stipulation.122 The case then proceeded to trial, at which Joan Berry put on wholly
circumstantial evidence of her child’s paternity:
She testified that she and defendant had had four acts of sexual intercourse at
or about the date when, in the ordinary course of nature, the child must have
been begotten. . . . Her testimony was corroborated by defendant’s butler as
to the fact that she arrived at defendant’s home on the evening of December
23d and remained there until some time in the afternoon of December 24th,
occupying either defendant’s room or a room connected therewith by a
bathroom, and that defendant was present in the room during at least a
portion of the night of the 23d and in the morning of the 24th.123
Against this evidence, Chaplin offered considerable counter-circumstantial
evidence, some of which offered other candidates for fatherhood, some of which
tended to undermine Berry’s credibility. But his principal argument was scientific:
namely, that the blood tests proved that he was not the father:
The qualifications, competency, and integrity of the physicians designated to
make the blood tests are not questioned. After the tests were completed they
made a report reading as follows:
122 On appeal, the Court agreed with the decision of the lower court not to
enforce the stipulation. In a nutshell, the Court found that the parties had no power
to enter into the stipulation and the judge had no power to approve it, absent
evidence that the stipulation was fair and reasonable and in the best interests of the
child. The Court also found that the parties were improperly attempting to
manipulate the judicial system by agreeing as to the force that particular evidence
was to carry. Id. at 446-48.
123 Id. at 449.
129
Examination of the bloods of Charles Chaplin, Joan Berry and Carol
Ann Berry give the following results.
Group Type
Charles Chaplin O MN
Joan Berry A N
Carol Ann Berry B N
Conclusion reached as the result of these blood grouping tests is that
in accordance with the well accepted laws of heredity, the man,
Charles Chaplin, cannot be the father of the child, Carol Ann Berry.
The law of heredity which applies here is “The agglutiongens A and
B cannot appear in the blood of a child unless present in the blood of
one or both parents.”
Two of the physicians testified at the trial that the report truly represented
their findings from the tests made. They and one other physician testified
that by reason of said tests defendant was not and could not have been the
father of [Carol Ann]. The report and the evidence of the physicians were
not controverted by any scientific evidence . . . .124
Despite this uncontroverted scientific evidence, the jury determined that
Chaplin was the father of Carol Ann Berry. On appeal, the Court conceded “the
immutability of the scientific law of blood grouping,” but held (based on an
unfortunate precedent) that blood-test evidence is merely “expert opinion” and that
“[t]he law makes no distinction between expert evidence and that of any other
character.”125 Thus, the jury was entitled to valorize Joan Berry’s circumstantial
proof over the unrebutted scientific proof. In a concurring opinion, Justice McComb
124 Id. at 450-51 (emphasis supplied). Although no scientific evidence was
offered to rebut the blood-group evidence, the trial court did allow a cruder form of
hereditary testing: it made Chaplin stand in front of the jury next to Joan Berry with
the baby cradled in her arms so that the jury could compare features. Chaplin
unsuccessfully advanced this as a point of error on appeal, the Court holding that the
salacious testimony presented at trial would have disabused the jury of any
inclination to envision a Madonna and Child. Id. at 452. This begs the real question
presented: i.e., whether lay phenotyping is a proper rebuttal to professional
genotyping.
125 Id. at 451.
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pointedly remarked how out of step the majority opinion was with the scientific
metanarrative—and indeed the metanarrative of Modernity itself—that had already
come to dominate other corners of public discourse:
It is possible that in view of the advances made in the medical profession
since the decision by the Supreme Court in the Arais case, the present court
may see fit to review the rule announced in the previous decision and
establish a rule of jurisprudence on this subject consonant with the principle
uniformly recognized without question by the medical profession of the
United States and Europe. . . .
Ascertainment of the factual truth in the adjudication of any controversy is a
consummation devoutly to be wished. Time was when the courts could rely
only upon human testimony. But modern science brought new aids. The
microscope, electricity, X-ray, psychology, psychiatry, chemistry and many
other scientific means and instrumentalities have revised the judicial
guessing game of the past into an institution approaching accuracy in
portraying the truth as to the actual fact where, in the pursuit of which,
scientific devices may be applied. The chemical tests for learning the
presence of poisons in the blood stream, application of the Roentgen ray in
defining the fracture of a bone, the use of the microscope in acquiring exact
knowledge of the authorship of documents, or the presence of bacteria or the
prevalence of white corpuscles—all argue eloquently for a reliance upon
scientific devices for ascertaining the truth. If the courts do not utilize these
unimpeachable methods for acquiring accurate knowledge of the pertinent
facts they will neglect the employment of available, potent agencies which
serve to avoid miscarriages of justice.
In the case at bar a widely accepted scientific method of determining
parentage was applied. Its result were definite. To reject the new and certain
for the old and uncertain does not tend to promote improvement in the
administration of justice.126
126 Id. at 453. Interestingly, one of the leading evidentiary authorities of the
time had already moved to the position that negative blood-type evidence (or at least
unchallenged negative blood-type evidence) should inferentially resolve the issue of
paternity. See JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 1 EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §
165b (3d ed. 1940) (“But at this point comes into play the great discovery of science
(emerging after many years of patient research by numerous scientists, but now
accepted as correct by all) viz. that no particular gene A, B, or O, will appear in the
progeny unless it was present in one of the parents. This universal negative truth of
heredity is the basis of the inferences to be examined later.”).
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This conservative tendency in the law—i.e., this resistance to shifting higher-
order narratives—does not, of course, mean that law is unresponsive to cultural
change. It just means that there is a cycle that must be completed before changes
can occur. First, a sufficient number of individual narratives must through their
collective weight effect a change in higher-order narratives. By this I mean that a
public narrative or metanarrative on a particular subject must absorb enough
individual narratives to change the direction of the story. Sometimes this amounts to
the wholesale displacement of a dominant narrative. By the time of Berry v.
Chaplin, metanarrative change had already happened: Western culture had already
seized on the idea of science as truth. But that wasn’t enough, because law’s tipping
point is higher than that of cultural narratives—i.e., the law’s rate of narrative
absorption is lower than that of the culture at large. So there is a second, critical,
step in legal evolution—viz., more individual narratives must work their way
through the legal system before rules change.127 To cast this in evidentiary terms,
cultural narratives change on a “preponderance” standard, whereas laws change on
something higher—perhaps “clear and convincing” or “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
We can see this process at work over time in any set of thematically related cases.
Cases based on racial relations provide a particularly good example.
127 As it turned out, Berry v. Chaplin was on the tipping point: the California
legislature acted fairly quickly to give conclusive weight to undisputed blood-test
evidence of nonpaternity. See Dodd v. Henkel, 84 Ca3d 604, 609 (Cal.App. 1978)
(“[T]he California statutes authorizing a determination of nonpaternity based upon
undisputed findings of the ‘experts’ were enacted in the wake of considerable
criticism of the holding . . . followed in the celebrated case of Berry v. Chaplin.”).
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8. Absorbing Narratives: Letting the Outside In
Slavery was legally institutionalized—albeit obliquely and euphemistically
(the word “slave” and its cognates appear nowhere)—in the United States
Constitution.128 This does not mean, however, that there was a clear consensus—an
unambiguous public narrative, if you will—about the morality or practical
desirability of slavery. In fact, much evidence suggests that the Constitution’s
drafters were so divided on the subject that that they could do little more than agree
to disagree and await the emergence of a dominant view:
The framers [dealt] with slavery by seeking, so far as possible, to take it out
of the national political arena. They were unable in 1787 to settle the issue,
one way or the other. They could not establish straightforward
Constitutional guarantees against emancipation, as the South Carolinians
desired, because many Northerners, and perhaps some Southerners, would
not permit it. Nor could they give Congress power to regulate slavery in any
way, much less abolish it, because Southerners refused to yield control over
the institution. Realizing that it was utterly beyond their power to fashion a
national consensus on slavery, or to “govern” the issue in the absence of one,
they had contented themselves with measures aimed at preventing friction
over slavery between the states and sections. Thus, when it was decided to
tie representation to population, it became necessary to set a date when the
slave trade could be terminated, because of the relationship it now bore to the
balance of political forces in the union. And when Pierce Butler raised the
question of escaped slaves, the Convention was willing to oblige, because
most Northerners were as reluctant for blacks to flee north as Southern slave
owners were to lose their property. The fugitive-slave clause, like the slave-
trade clause, was intended to remove a potential sore point between the
states. . . .
128 Three Constitutional provisions recognize—and therefore arguably
legitimize—slavery. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3, directs that the apportionment of
legislators and direct taxes among the several states be “determined by adding to the
whole Number of free Persons, . . . three fifths of all other Persons.” Art. 1, § 9,
prohibits Congress from outlawing the slave trade (the “Migration or Importation of
. . . Persons”) before 1808. Art. 4, § 2, cl. 3—the fugitive-slave clause—holds that a
slave (“a Person held to Service or Labour”) escaping from one state to another
“shall be delivered up” on claim of his or her owner.
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There is no evidence that any framer thought the Constitution contained
power to abolish slavery. They all knew how deep the Southerners felt, and
however much some of them may have regretted the hold that slavery had on
the South, they were all fully sympathetic with the determination of the Deep
Southerners to resist abolition in the present circumstances. . . . But there
was no guarantee that powers of emancipation were forever denied to the
federal government. The evidence there is permits the conclusion that the
future, with respect to possible public action against slavery, was left open
on purpose. [The] framers, as of 1787, agreed unanimously to place the
institution of slavery, as it existed within the South, not “in the course of
ultimate extinction,” as Lincoln argued, but beyond national regulation.129
Given the equivocal public stance towards slavery that we find institutionalized in
the Constitution, it is thus not surprising that we see developments in the public
narrative over time. We can trace these developments through case law, a forum in
which shifting racial narratives have been regularly tested.
By the mid-Nineteenth Century, pressures from the North-South sectional
conflict began to mount as the United States began to expand westward, which
raised the question whether slavery would be allowed to expand along with it.
Various political solutions had failed to ease these pressures, and public sentiment
increasingly leaned in favor of “leaving it to the Supreme Court.”130 The Court—
which was the only major branch of government that had not tried its hand at
resolving the conflict—itself came to accept the view that it could simply command
away the growing sectional rift.131 This belief proved profoundly, devastatingly
wrong.
129 GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 436-37 (1986)
(quoting Robinson, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1765-1820
209, 210, 244-46 (1971)).
130 Id. at 440 (quoting D. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS
SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 192-94, 206-08 (1978)).
131 Id.
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The Court entered the slavery fray in Dred Scott v. Sanford, which has
proved to be one of the most vilified decisions in Supreme Court history. The
decision is wrong on many levels, but for our purposes the Court’s narrative
blunders are the most instructive. The case arose from the intersection of Dred
Scott’s personal narrative and the larger public narrative that had yet to explain a
nation divided both literally and philosophically over slavery. Dred Scott, who had
admittedly once been a slave, brought a trespass suit in federal court against John
Sanford. He claimed that the federal court had “diversity” jurisdiction over the suit
because he was a citizen of Missouri and Sanford was a citizen of New York.132 In
the early 1830s Scott’s former owner took him from Missouri to Illinois, where they
resided for two years, then on to Minnesota, which was at that time part of the
Louisiana Territory. Within about four years, they returned to Missouri and Scott
was sold to Sanford as a slave. During this period, slavery was legal in Missouri,
but prohibited in Illinois by state law and in the Louisiana Territory by the Missouri
Compromise.133 Scott asserted that he became free by virtue of his residence in two
states in which slavery was banned. Sanford countered that even if Scott were free,
that did not make him a “citizen” of Missouri and, therefore, the federal court had no
jurisdiction to hear Scott’s case. Moreover, merely residing in a free state or
territory could not emancipate a slave in derogation of his or her owner’s property
rights upon returning to a slave-permitting state.
132 The United States Constitution enumerates the categories of cases over
which federal courts have jurisdiction. One of those categories is “Controversies . . .
between Citizens of different States.” U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2.
133 Act of March 6, 1820, 3 Stat. 545.
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As we have seen, America was born in a state of narrative suspension,
dangling between a commitment to social equality and the looming paradox of
slavery. Chief Justice Roger Taney’s majority opinion in Dred Scott misrepresents
this past, claiming universality for a public narrative in which blacks figured only as
members of a “subordinate and inferior class of beings”:
It is difficult at this day to realize the state of public opinion in relation to
that unfortunate race, which prevailed in the civilized and enlightened
portions of the world at the time of the Declaration of Independence, and
when the Constitution of the United States was framed and adopted. But the
public history of every European nation displays it in a manner too plain to
be mistaken.
They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an
inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in
social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which
the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and
lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and sold, and
treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit
could be made by it. This opinion was at that time fixed and universal in the
civilized portion of the white race. It was regarded as an axiom in morals as
well as in politics, which no one thought of disputing, or supposed to be open
to dispute; and men in every grade and position in society daily and
habitually acted upon it in their private pursuits, as well as in matters of
public concern, without doubting for a moment the correctness of this
opinion.134
In dissent, Justice McLean demonstrated that Justice’s Taney’s majority
opinion rested on a false premise because slavery was not a universally recognized
institution—even at the time that Constitution was adopted:
There is no nation in Europe which considers itself bound to return to his
master a fugitive slave, under the civil law or the law of nations. On the
contrary, the slave is held to be free where there is no treaty obligation, or
compact in some other form, to return him to his master. The Roman law
did not allow freedom to be sold. An ambassador or any other public
functionary could not take a slave to France, Spain, or any other country of
Europe, without emancipating him. A number of slaves escaped from a
134 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857).
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Florida plantation, and were received on board of ship by Admiral Cochrane;
by the King’s Bench, they were held to be free. . . .
The state of slavery is deemed to be a mere municipal regulation, founded
upon and limited to the range of the territorial laws. This was fully
recognised in Somersett’s case, (Lafft’s Rep., 1; 20 Howell’s State Trials,
79,) which was decided before the American Revolution. . . .
No case in England appears to have been more thoroughly examined than
that of Somersett. . . .
In giving the opinion of the court, Lord Mansfield said:
The state of slavery is of such a nature that it is incapable of being
introduced on any reasons, moral or political, but only by positive
law, which preserves its force long after the reasons, occasion, and
time itself, from whence it was created, is erased from the memory; it
is of a nature that nothing can be suffered to support it but positive
law.135
This eviscerates Taney’s only serious attempt at justification—viz., the “originalist”
appeal to the meaning of the Constitution when adopted. Thus unmasked, we see
Taney’s opinion as nothing more than a raw and unanchored exercise of power, one
consciously declining to endorse the ever-strengthening narrative of America as a
land of freedom. And I choose the word “consciously” quite deliberately. For
Taney acknowledges that public opinion has changed, even though he is not going to
be the one to act on it: “It is not the province of the court to decide upon the justice
or injustice, the policy or impolicy of these laws. The decision of that question
belonged to the political or law-making power; to those who formed the sovereignty
and framed the Constitution.”136
A civil war, three Constitutional Amendments, and a host of enabling acts
later, there was no longer doubt that blacks were legal persons entitled to the full
135 Id. at 534-35.
136 Id. at 405.
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range of Constitutional protections.137 But what that range entailed was a different
matter. Plessy v. Ferguson, which was decided nearly forty years after Dred Scott,
showed how the narrative of difference had not been erased and could still trump the
grand public narrative of America as a bastion of freedom and equality.138 In 1890,
Louisiana passed a statute requiring railroads to provide “equal but separate
accommodations for the white and colored races.” Criminal liability attached to a
passenger of one race using the facilities intended for the other race. Plessy, who
claimed to be seven-eighths white, was prosecuted for refusing to leave a “white”
passenger car. The gravamen of Plessy’s suit was that Louisiana’s legislation could
not be justified under even a minimal “reasonableness” standard.139 But the majority
disagreed, holding that anything negative about the law came not from the law itself
but from the defective construction that blacks placed on it!
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in
the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the
137 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. XIII (abolishing slavery), XIV (conferring
citizenship on all persons born or naturalized in the United States) and XV
(conferring the right to vote on all citizens, without regard to race, color, or previous
condition of servitude).
138 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
139 See id. at 549-50:
[I]t is also suggested by the learned counsel for the plaintiff in error that the
same argument that will justify the state legislature in requiring railways to
provide separate accommodations for the two races will also authorize them
to require separate cars to be provided for people whose hair is of a certain
color, or who are aliens, or who belong to certain nationalities, or to enact
laws requiring colored people to walk upon one side of the street, and white
people upon the other, or requiring white men’s houses to be painted white,
and colored men’s black, or their vehicles or business signs to be of different
colors, upon the theory that one side of the street is as good as the other, or
that a house or vehicle of one color is as good as one of another color.
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colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of
anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put
that construction upon it. The argument necessarily assumes that if, as has
been more than once the case, and is not unlikely to be so again, the colored
race should become the dominant power in the state legislature, and should
enact a law in precisely similar terms, it would thereby relegate the white
race to an inferior position. We imagine that the white race, at least, would
not acquiesce in this assumption. The argument also assumes that social
prejudices may be overcome by legislation, and that equal rights cannot be
secured to the negro except by an enforced commingling of the two races.
We cannot accept this proposition. If the two races are to meet upon terms
of social equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual
appreciation of each other’s merits, and a voluntary consent of
individuals. . . . Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts, or to
abolish distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so
can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situation. If the
civil and political rights of both races be equal, one cannot be inferior to the
other civilly or politically. If one race be inferior to the other socially, the
constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane.140
In dissent, Justice Harlan pounced on the sophistry underlying the majority’s
pronouncements, as well as the sharp disconnect between those pronouncements and
the notions of liberty and equality that animated the adoption of the Civil War
Amendments:
It was said in argument that the statute of Louisiana does not discriminate
against either race, but prescribes a rule applicable alike to white and colored
citizens. But this argument does not meet the difficulty. Every one knows
that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose, not so much to
exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude
colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons. . . .
But in view of the constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country
no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our
constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The
humblest is the peer of the most powerful.141
140 Id. at 551-52.
141 Id. at 557, 559.
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Going further, he presciently observed that Plessy would stand to feed narratives of
“race hatred” and give government sanction to “more or less brutal and irritating”
encroachments upon “the admitted rights of colored citizens.” This would in turn,
he argued, “create and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these races” because
it rests “on the ground that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that they
cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white citizens . . ..”142 Thus,
states must be debarred from attempts to turn back the pages of history to the
antebellum period when the national narrative accepted not just social inequality but
slavery itself:
The sure guaranty of the peace and security of each race is the clear, distinct,
unconditional recognition by our governments, national and state, of every
right that inheres in civil freedom, and of the equality before the law of all
citizens of the United States, without regard to race. State enactments
regulating the enjoyment of civil rights upon the basis of race, and cunningly
devised to defeat legitimate results of the war, under the pretense of
recognizing equality of rights, can have no other result than to render
permanent peace impossible, and to keep alive a conflict of races, the
continuance of which must do harm to all concerned.143
It took another fifty-plus years for the Supreme Court to undo the separate-
but-equal mischief wrought by Plessy and its progeny. That happened in Brown v.
Board of Education of Topeka, a case in which the plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of state laws permitting schools segregated by race.144 That case is
important because it (mostly) closes the narrative loop opened in Dred Scott and
refashioned in Plessy, but in our context it is more important how the Court did so
142 Id. at 560.
143 Id. at 560-61.
144 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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than why. To recall the majority opinions in the two earlier cases, the justices there
took flat-footed, monolithic positions about what the respective framers had in mind
when they drafted the Constitution and the Civil War Amendments. Justice Warren,
writing for a unanimous Court, started from the premise that the historical record
surrounding adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was generally “inconclusive”
and—because of a developing public narrative concerning the importance of public
education—largely irrelevant:
The most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly
intended them to remove all legal distinctions among “all persons born or
naturalized in the United States.” Their opponents, just as certainly, were
antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments and wished
them to have the most limited effect. What others in Congress and the state
legislatures had in mind cannot be determined with any degree of
certainty. . . . An additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the
Amendment’s history, with respect to segregated schools, is the status of
public education at that time. . . . Education of Negroes was almost
nonexistent, and practically all of the race were illiterate. . . . Today,
education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. . . . It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to
his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Such considerations apply with added force to children in grade and high
schools. To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status
in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone.145
For support, the Court turned not to the particular narratives of the individual
plaintiffs, but to a growing body of sociological evidence, especially that growing
out of the work of Kenneth Clark.146 This tacitly signals, I think, that the Court
145 Id. at 489-94.
146 Id. at 494 n.11. The Court also cited a similarly generalized finding by
one of the Kansas courts below:
141
accepted that the public racial narrative had tipped decidedly in favor of
Constitutional standards that would support broad social equality for blacks.147 In
other words, the national race-narrative had been revised—even reconstructed—in a
way that ultimately leveraged the Plessy-era legal narrative into sync with the
evolved public narrative.148
9. What Law Can Learn from Literature (and History)
Now that we have seen the process of narrative evolution at work within the
law, it behooves us to explain it. As I mentioned before, legal narratives are not
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental
effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the
sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually
interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of
inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the
sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and
mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the
benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.
147 None of this means that Brown put matters of race to rest in the United
States. Even today, race bedevils the courts and many social institutions. Most
recently, the debate has moved into the arena of affirmative action and onto topics
like, for instance, whether educational institutions can grant preferences to members
of minority groups that have been historically underrepresented in those institutions.
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (in approving a preferential
admission system at the University of Michigan Law School, the Court (somewhat
wistfully) opined that race-based preferences would not be necessary in another
generation: “We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no
longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”).
148 To put this in the terminology of legal theory, the ideal of racial equality
had hardened into what Dworkin calls an “interpretive” fact. See Dworkin’s
discussion of Edmund Cahn’s position in Ronald Dworkin, Social Sciences and
Constitutional Rights—The Consequences of Uncertainty, 6. J. L. EDUC. 3, 5 (1977):
We don’t need evidence for the proposition that segregation is an insult to
the Black community—we know it; we know it the way that a cold causes
snuffles. It is not that we don’t need to know it nor that there isn’t something
there to know. There is a fact of the matter, namely that segregation is an
insult, but we need no evidence for that fact—we just know it. It’s an
interpretive fact.
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different in kind from other types of narratives; to the degree that they are different,
it is only because they are made according to a particular set of conventions. Ian
Watt has made this point in examining the contours of the “realistic” novel:
Here, however we are concerned with a much more limited conception, with
the extent to which the analogy with philosophical realism helps to isolate
and define the distinctive narrative mode of the novel. This, it has been
suggested, is the sum of literary techniques whereby the novel’s imitation of
human life follows the procedures adopted by philosophical realism in its
attempt to ascertain and report the truth. These procedures are by no means
confined to philosophy: they tend, in fact, to be followed whenever the
relation to reality of any report of an event is being investigated. The novel’s
mode of imitating reality may therefore be equally well summarised in terms
of the procedures of another group of specialists in epistemology, the jury in
a court of law. Their expectations, and those of the novel reader coincide in
many ways: both want to know ‘all the particulars’ of a given case—the time
and place of the occurrence: both must be satisfied as to the identities of the
parties concerned, and will refuse to accept evidence about anyone called Sir
Toby Belch or Mr. Badman—still less about a Chloe who has no surname
and is ‘common as the air’; and they also expect the witnesses to tell the
story ‘in his own words’. The jury, in fact, takes the ‘circumstantial view of
life’, which T.H. Green found to be the characteristic outlook of the novel.149
Now whether particular narrative conventions actually serve the ends of truth is a
topic that we must defer for a moment. But for now, suffice it to sat that Watt sees it
as an open question: “Formal realism is, of course, like the rules of evidence, only a
convention; and there is no reason why the report on human life which is presented
by it should be in fact any truer than those presented through the very different
conventions of other literary genres.”150
To get us closer to the question of “truth” and what that might mean when
we speak of legal narratives, Paul Veyne’s description of how history is
(re)constructed seems an apt analogy. In his view,
149 Watt, supra note 76, at 463-64.
150 Id. at 464.
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History is an account of events: all else flows from that. Since it is a direct
account, it does not revive, any more than the novel does. The actual
experience, as it comes from the hands of the historian, is not that of the
actors; it is a narration, so it can eliminate certain erroneous problems. Like
the novel, history sorts, simplifies, organizes, fits a century into a page. This
synthesis of the account is not less spontaneous than that of our memory
when we call to mind the last ten years through which we have lived. To
speculate on the interval that always separates the actual experience and the
recollection of the event would simply bring us to see that Waterloo was not
the same thing for a veteran of the Old Guard and for a field marshal; that the
battle can be related in the first or third person; that it can be spoken of as a
battle, as an English victory, or as a French defeat; that from the start one can
drop a hint of the outcome or appear to discover it. These speculations can
produce amusing experiments in aesthetics; to the historian, they are the
discovery of a limit.151
Not only is history a synthesis and condensation, it is driven by perspective: it is
never unmediated “fact.” And this is so even for direct actors, whose memories and
perceptions are never more than partial and are subject to distortion, even delusion:
That limit is that in no case is what historians call an event grasped directly
and fully; it is always grasped incompletely and laterally, through documents
or statements, let us say through tekmeria, traces, impressions. Even if I am
a contemporary and a witness of Waterloo, even if I am the principal actor
and Napoleon in person, I shall have only a perspective of what historians
will call the event of Waterloo; I shall be able to leave to posterity only my
statement, which, if it reaches them, they will call an impression. Even if I
were Bismarck deciding to send the Ems dispatch, my own interpretation of
the event would perhaps not be the same as that of my friends, my confessor,
my regular historian, and my psychoanalyst, who may have their own
version of my decision and think they know better than I do what it was I
wanted. In essence, history is knowledge through documents. Thus,
historical narration goes beyond all documents, since none of them can be
the event; it is not a documentary photomontage, and does show the past
“live, as if you were there.”152
In law, this means that we must attend closely to how narratives are
constructed. In even a simple case—a minor fender-bender at an intersection—we




can never “know” whether the traffic light was red or green when the cars crashed.
The best we can do is to fashion a narrative reconstruction of the event, one that
sorts, sifts and synthesizes the competing narratives offered by the actors and
witnesses, along with physical evidence and any accompanying expert testimony
interpreting that evidence. In difficult cases, this involves both choosing among
competing narratives and building a coherent adjudicative narrative from among
narrative fragments—i.e., a narrative that will stand to justify the ultimate decision
in a case. For instruction and for an extended rumination on what it means to find
“facts,” we now turn to Robert Browning’s The Ring and the Book.153
In June of 1860, Robert Browning bought an “old yellow book” at a flea
market in Florence. This book was actually a collection of legal materials (briefs,
letters, and the like) pertaining to a late-Seventeenth-Century trial of an Arentine
nobleman/ churchman for the murder of his young wife and her parents. Over the
next few years, Browning fashioned this raw material—through a process that that
warrants closer examination—into the twelve dramatic monologues (by nine
different speakers) that collectively constitute his monumental poem.
The basic story behind The Ring and the Book is fairly simple. In 1693
Guido Franceschini, a nobleman who had had a disappointing career in the Church,
married a thirteen-year-old girl, Francesca Pompilia, who had been raised in Rome
by her ostensible parents (more on that in a minute), a couple named Comparini
(Pietro and Violante). After the marriage, which was unhappy from the start, the
Comparini visited Guido’s palace in Arezzo, which they found much poorer than
153 ROBERT BROWNING, THE RING AND THE BOOK (Richard D. Altick &
Thomas J. Collins eds., Broadview Literary Texts 2001) (1868-69).
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expected. Because Guido had misrepresented his financial condition at the time of
the marriage, they brought suit against him in Rome for the return of Pompilia’s
dowry. As grounds, the Comparini argued that Pompilia was really the daughter of
a prostitute, from whom Violante had purchased the infant Pompilia to satisfy a
condition precedent (having a child) to the vesting of an inheritance. As a result of
this suit, the marriage deteriorated further and Guido became intolerable. Pompilia
sought relief from local authorities, to no avail, and she eventually made an escape
with the help of a young canon, Giuseppe Caponsacchi. Guido gave chase and
overtook the fleeing couple about fifteen miles from Rome, at Castelnuovo. The
couple were subsequently tried at Rome; Caponsacchi was banished to Civita
Vecchia for three years; Pompilia was sent to a convent. But because Pompilia was
pregnant, she was soon returned to the Comparini. Several months later, she gave
birth to a boy, Gaetano. Shortly after Gaetano’s birth, Guido and four henchmen
gained entrance to the Comparini’s home by claiming to bear a message from
Caponsacchi and then murdered the Comparini and left Pompilia for dead with
twenty-two stab wounds, from which she died four days later. Guido and his
cohorts were captured, charged with murder, and tried.
In the criminal trial, Guido did not claim that he had not committed the acts
charged; rather, he argued that a husband should be allowed to kill his adulterous
wife and those who aided her. Guido’s justification defense thus called upon the
court to pass on the relationship between Pompilia and Caponsacchi (which was
never fully resolved in the earlier proceeding), as well as the conduct and
motivations of everyone involved. Ultimately, the court decided against Guido and
condemned him to death by beheading. But Guido, who held minor orders in the
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Church, appealed to Pope Innocent XII to set aside his sentence under canon law.
The Pope declined to intervene; Guido was executed on February 22, 1698. Quickly
thereafter, the court ruled Pompilia innocent and declared Gaetano the legal heir to
her property.
When we look at specifics in a minute, we will see that Browning took this
basic set of facts, passed them through the lens of his own imagination, and
projected them into a work of art. Book I, whose narrator is something of a stand-in
for Browning, is a general introduction. In Book II, “Half-Rome,” the speaker is an
older man with his own matrimonial difficulties; he takes up Guido’s cause. The
speaker in Book III, “The Other Half-Rome,” is a young man, with obvious
sympathies for Pompilia. The narrator of Book IV, “Tertium Quid,” strives for a
neutral tone and to balance the arguments put forth by the two speakers immediately
preceding him. Book V, Guido’s first of two monologues, comes close on the heels
of the murder. He is speaking to his judges and defends himself though a series of
thinly disguised appeals to shared values and experiences. The narration of Book
VI, which Caponsacchi delivers, is full of grief for Pompilia, hatred for Guido and
scorn for the judges, who—after all—had treated the earlier proceeding with
juvenile humor. Book VII is “Pompilia,” a deathbed confession in which she
struggles to make sense of all that has happened to her. Books VIII and IX belong
to the two lawyers, Dominus Hyacinthus de Arcangelis and Juris Doctor Johannes-
Baptista Bottinius, the former representing Guido, and the latter prosecuting him.
After the relatively lighthearted interlude of the two lawyers, the Pope takes center
stage and renders a damning judgment on Guido. In Book XI, Guido is given a
chance to say his last words. He appears in a form much different from that of his
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previous monologue, this time showing not solicitousness but unvarnished bitterness
and hatred. Book XII, “The Book and the Ring,” closes the cycle of narratives with
the reappearance of the speaker from Book I. Its closing observations about the
relationship between “facts” and “meaning” are critical to an understanding of the
work as whole and—indeed—all narrative reconstruction: “So write a book shall
mean, beyond the facts, / Suffice the eye and save the soul beside.”154
A full-blown explication of this enormous work would capsize us, so we
must content ourselves with an examination of just a few key “facts” that we can
assess from multiple perspectives. In Book I, the narrator alerts us to the
fundamental—yet unstable—relationship between fact and narrative. He finds the
“old yellow Book,” which he characterizes as “pure crude fact,” and becomes so
transfixed by it that in the time it took to walk home from the market he “had
mastered the contents, knew the whole truth.”155 From the outset, though, we know
that Browning is up to something more than merely “reporting” the “facts.” For he
describes to us the work of the goldsmith, who blends gold (fact) with an alloy
(artistic imagination) to make the gold workable, then removes the alloy to reveal a
finished ring (the work of art):
The trick is, the artificer melts up wax
With honey, so to speak; he mingles gold
With gold’s alloy, and, duly tempering both,
Effects a manageable mass, then works:
But his work ended, once the thing a ring,
Oh, there’s repristination! Just a spirt
O’ the proper fiery acid o’re its face,
And forth the alloy unfastened flies in flume;
154 Id., bk. XII, ll. 866-67.
155 Id., bk. I, ll. 86, 117.
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While, self-sufficient now, the shape remains,
The rondure brave, the lilied loveliness,
Gold as it was, is, shall be evermore:
Prime nature with an added artistry—
No carat lost, and you have gained a ring.156
This fact-plus-artistry-equals-ring formula that Browning establishes is
worth testing a bit to see how well it generalizes to and explains (if at all) the
formation of the adjudicative narratives that we have been examining so far. Along
the way, we will of necessity need to consider what “facts” are, what “truth” is, and
how those concepts subsist within (and are perhaps only derivable from) a narrative
framework. Browning is at some labor to characterize both his source material as
“fact” and his own work as “truth”—or at least “fact” of a different order. Of the
Old Yellow Book, he says:
Now, as the ingot, ere the ring was forged,
Lay gold, (beseech you, hold that figure fast!)
So, in this book lay absolutely truth,
Fanciless fact, the documents indeed,
Primary lawyer-pleadings for, against,
The aforesaid Five; real summed-up circumstance
Adduced in proof of these on either side,
Put forth and printed, as the practice was . . ..157
Here, Browning facially overstates the purity of the facts set forth in the Old
Yellow Book—after all, the documents making up that compendium were authored,
which necessarily means that “what really happened” has been interpreted—but I
think Browning knows this. His claim is that there are different modes of
interpretation and that the one that he practices may swerve closer to “truth” than
156 Id., bk. I, ll. 18-30.
157 Id., bk. I, ll. 141-48. To similar effect, Browning writes, “This is the
bookful; thus far take the truth, / The untempered gold, the fact untampered with, /
The mere ring-metal ere the ring be made!” Id., bk. I, ll. 364-66.
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others. He stakes this claim by first defending his process against the common
charge of art-as-fiction:
“Do you tell the story, now, in off-hand style,
Straight from the book? Or simply here and there,
(The while you vault it through the loose and large)
Hang to a hint? Or is there book at all,
And don’t you deal in poetry, make-believe,
And the white lies it sounds like?”
Yes and no!
From the book, yes; thence bit by bit I dug
The lingot truth, that memorable day,
Assayed and knew my piecemeal gain was gold,—
Yes; but from something else surpassing that,
Something of mine which, mixed up with the mass,
Made it bear hammer and be firm to file.
Fancy with fact is just one fact the more;
To wit that fancy has informed, transpierced,
Thriddled and so thrown fast the facts else free,
As right through ring and ring runs the djereed
And binds the loose, one bar without break.158
Browning sees his mission as one mimetic on—if somewhat paler by
comparison than—the Creation: “Man . . . / Repeats God’s process in man’s due
degree, / Attaining man’s proportionate result,— / Creates, no, but resuscitates,
perhaps.”159 Thus anticipating Veyne, he sees this process of recuperation as
constituting a truth, one potentially closer to the truth than that revealed in the dry
facts ossified in the pages of the Old Yellow Book. This is so, he argues, because
temporal distance—in the right hands—can manufacture an interpretation richer
than that delivered by the direct observation of the senses, “Which take at best
imperfect cognizance, / Since, how heart moves brain, and how both move hand, /
158 Id., bk. I, ll. 451-68.
159 Id., bk. I, ll. 710, 717-19.
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What mortal ever in entirety saw?”160 This is of course counterintuitive and counter
to trial practice (e.g., the rule against hearsay and the “best evidence” rule), so
Browning pauses to take a gentle satiric swipe at our common pre-
(mis?)conceptions:
Then, since a Trial ensued, a touch o’ the same
To sober us, flustered with frothy talk,
And teach our common sense its helplessness.
For why deal simply with divining-rod,
Scrape where we fancy secret sources flow,
And ignore law, the recognized machine,
Elaborate display of pipe and wheel
Framed to unchoke, pump up and pour apace
Truth till a flowery foam shall wash the world?
The patent truth-extracting process,—ha?161
Although legal fact-finding is not always as painful as a trip to the dentist,
Browning makes a fair point, the same one that Cardozo made when attacking
“mechanical jurisprudence” in the Hynes case. That is, things get lost when we
come to look on the law as a machine, ranging from injustice in an individual case or
a class of cases to the opportunity to explore the subtleties and complexities of
human motivation.162 To guard against this, Browning counsels us to reach beyond a
single-minded approach to interpretation and suggests instead that acts can only be
understood through a multiplicity of perspectives—through the clash of narratives
that we earlier considered through the work of Bankowski and Nussbaum.163 To
160 Id., bk. I, ll. 827-29.
161 Id., bk. I, ll. 1105-14.
162 See id., bk. XII, ll. 76-78 (noting “The inadequacy and inaptitude / Of that
self-same machine, that very law / Man vaunts, devised to dissipate the gloom . . .”).
163 For Browning, it is error to accept any single piece of testimonial evidence
at face value because it is always already infected with bias, blindness, or confusion:
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explore this fully, we would need to explicate the poem line by line, which, as I had
mentioned before, would plainly engulf our discussion. As an alternative, I propose
that we look at two types of fact-finding that take place in the poem: what-facts and
why-facts. As a specific example of the former, we will look at the question of
whether Pompilia sent the letters to Caponsacchi that stand as evidence of an
adulterous affair; of the latter, we will look at Guido’s stated reason for the
murders—i.e., he killed as a matter of honor.
Whether Pompilia could write is one of the dominant issues in the Old
Yellow Book, for the answer to that question potentially eviscerates the most
damaging evidence of an affair between Pompilia and Caponsacchi: the love letters
that Guido claimed to have found when he caught up with the fleeing couple at
Castelnuovo.164 Half-Rome, the pro-Guido narrator of Book II, is the first to take up
the issue of the letters. He believes that “the case was clear” and rendered so by the
“love-letters”:
Mad prose, mad verse, fears, hopes, triumph, despair,
Avowal, disclaimer, plans, dates, names,—was nought
Wanting to prove, if proof consoles at all,
That this had been but the fifth act o’ the piece
Whereof the due proemium, months ago
These playwrights had put forth, and ever since
Matured the middle, added ’neath his nose.165
“who trusts / To human testimony for a fact / Gets this sole fact—himself is proves a
fool . . ..” Id., bk. XII, ll. 601-03. This explains, at least partially, his faith in
narrative interplay.
164 See id., Appendix A, General Note 5 at 771-72.
165 Id., bk. II, ll. 1075-81.
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Nor, for two reasons, is Half-Rome swayed by the assertion that Pompilia was
illiterate and, therefore, could neither have written letters to Caponsacchi nor read
letters received from him. First, he finds it difficult to reconcile Pompilia’s claim to
illiteracy with her admission that she received letters from Caponsacchi. Second, he
finds it equally damning that Caponsacchi admits receiving letters that he believed
to be from Pompilia.166 At a minimum, then, Half-Rome—who by no coincidence
has suspicions about his own wife’s fidelity—concludes that the letters would have
justified Guido in killing the couple on the road to Rome.167
Other Half-Rome, a young man with romantic tendencies, takes Pompilia’s
part. For him, something in the “tale” of a long-standing affair rings false. He, like
Half-Rome, has reasons for thinking the way he does. First, Pompilia has been
consistent in her denials:
For her part,
Pompilia quietly constantly avers
She never penned a letter in her life
Nor to the Canon nor any other man,
Being incompetent to write and read . . ..168
Second, he finds the admitted “romance-book” character of Pomilia’s version of the
story credible because “she avers this with calm mouth / Dying . . .,”169 which
squares with the common belief that statements made upon imminent death are
truthful. (This belief is institutionalized in the rule of evidence that privileges death-
166 Id., bk. II, ll. 1130-60; see also Albert Borowitz, The Ring and the Book
and the Murder, 29 LEGAL STUD. F. 849 (2005) (comparing commentaries on
evidence of Half-Rome and Other Half-Rome).
167 Id., bk. II, ll. 1500-03.
168 Id., bk. III, ll. 907-11.
169 Id., bk. III, ll. 923-25.
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bed statements over ordinary instances of hearsay.) Third, Other Half-Rome sees
Caponsacchi’s admission (when a flat denial would have served him better) of
sending letters to Pompilia as evidence of general veracity. Fourth, and most
important, Other Half-Rome believes that there is unequivocal evidence that Guido
had earlier forged a letter from Pompilia to his brother, so one can safely assume he
acted in conformity with his past conduct and did the same with the letters that he
allegedly “found” at the inn:
The ins and outs o’ the rooms were searched: he found
Or showed for found the abominable prize—
Love-letters from his wife who cannot write,
Love-letters in reply o’ the priest—thank God!—
Who write and confront his character
With this, and prove the false thing forged throughout:
Spitting whereat, he needs must spatter whom
But Guido’s self?—that forged and falsified
One letter called Pompilia’s, past dispute:
Then why not these to make sure still more sure?170
As pure partisans, both Half-Rome and Other Half-Rome construct factual
conclusions from unspecified source material (including, presumably, gossip) to suit
their larger sympathies, pro-Guido and pro-Pompilia. They thus make no reasoned
analysis of all the evidence, perhaps because they stand to bear no real consequences
for overstating their respective cases. By contrast, the prosecutor, Johannes-Baptista
Bottinius (the Fisc), takes care to argue no more than necessary from the (admittedly
equivocal) evidence because he need not take the unreserved position that Pompilia
could not have written the letters to disable Guido’s claim of justification. That is,
he need only show that even if Pompilia did write the letters, she did so with a
motive that was sufficiently pure. Thus, the Fisc first suggests that Guido forged the
170 Id., bk. III, ll. 1308-17.
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letters and planted them on the couple at Castelnuovo and then offers good reason
why the letters were excusable even if she wrote them:
Grant the tale
O’ the husband, which is false, were proved and true
To the letter—or the letters, I should say,
Abominations he professed to find
And fix upon Pompilia and the priest,—
Allow them hers—for even though she could not write, . . .
So she, though hunger after fellowship,
May well have learned, though late, to play the scribe . . ..
Concede she wrote (which were preposterous)
This and the other epistle,—what of it?
Where does the figment touch her candid fame?
Being in peril of her life—“my life,
Not an hour’s purchase,” as the letter runs,—
And having but one stay in this extreme,
Out of the wide world but a single friend—
What could she other than resort to him,
And how with any hope resort but thus? . . .
From all which I deduce—the lady here
Was bound to proffer nothing short of love
To the priest whose service it was to save her. . . .
Licit end
Enough was found in mere escape from death,
To legalize our means illicit else
Of feigned love, false allurement, fancied fact.171
This throws into sharp relief the difference between advocacy and judgment.
The advocate’s job is to cast evidence in the light most favorable to his case and in a
way that satisfies his burden of proof. His goal is thus to present evidence in a way
that enhances the chance that the finder of fact will actually find facts that support
his claim or defeat those of his opponent. The judge (or jury, as the case may be), in
contrast, has a more difficult task: she must consider the full range of evidence,
weigh it, contextualize it, and then narrate it in a way that justifies the ultimate
decision. This does not mean, however, that she can resolve every point of
171 Id., bk. IX, ll. 443-48; 457-58; 473-81; 509-11; 525-28.
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ambiguity or contradiction. The best she can do is to tell the best story possible. In
The Ring and the Book, that role falls to the Pope.
Guido’s case arrives at the office of the Pope with a nearly complete record.
All the principal players have spoken (save Guido for the second time). With
respect to the letters, therefore, Guido, Caponsacchi, and Pompilia have each given
their testimony. To briefly recap: Guido sticks to the story that he had told in the
proceeding leading to Caponsacchi’s three-year banishment and Pompilia’s
confinement: viz., he caught them together at Castelnuovo and found the letters on
them.172 Caponsacchi tells a more nuanced tale. He says that he knew from the start
that the supposed letters from Pompilia were but a “transparent trick” of Guido’s.
He also learned that she was illiterate, that Guido had forged letters in
Caponsacchi’s hand, and that the messenger (“She who brought letters from who
could not write . . ..”) and principal witness in Guido’s favor was a common
prostitute and thus not credible.173 In the main, Pompilia’s deathbed rendition of the
facts coincides with Caponsacchi’s, amplifying and in no way undermining it. If
anything, her plainspoken version underscores the insidious nature of Guido’s
scheme.174
The Pope begins his analysis from the raw evidentiary record, which he finds
deficient in itself (a mere semblance or shadow of fact), but from which the truth is
“evolvable”:
172 Id., bk. V, ll. 1867-77.
173 Id., bk. VI, ll. 528-38; 725-38; 1650-93.
174 Id., bk. VII, ll. 688-710; 1093-1186.
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I have worn through this sombre wintry day,
With winter in my soul beyond the world’s,
Over these dismalest of documents
Which drew night down on me ere eve befell,—
Pleadings and counter-pleadings, figure of fact
Besides fact’s self . . ..
Truth, nowhere, lies yet everywhere in these—
Not absolutely in a portion, yet
Evolvable from the whole: evolved at last
Painfully, held tenaciously by me.175
With respect to the letters, the Pope ultimately deems them forgeries, not because of
any physical evidence but because the idea of an adulterous affair between Pompilia
and Caponsacchi doesn’t hang together with the rest of the evidence—it makes the
story incoherent:
Hence this consummate lie, this love-intrigue,
Unmanly simulation of a sin,
With a place and time and circumstance to suit—
These letters false beyond all forgery—
Not just handwriting and mere authorship,
But false to body and soul they figure forth—
As though the man had cut out shape and shape
From fancies of that other Arentine,
To paste below—incorporate the filth
With Cherub faces on a missal-page!176
If pinning down physical facts (e.g., whether Pompilia wrote any of the
letters) is a daunting task, then reaching conclusions about psychological facts (e.g.,
Guido’s motive) is doubly difficult. Guido’s initial position, which is echoed in the
monologues of Half Rome and Guido’s lawyer, is that the murders were a matter
honoris causa.177 The Pope, however, locates Guido’s motives elsewhere: “All is
175 Id., bk. X, ll. 212-17; 229-32.
176 Id., bk. X, ll. 647-56. The “other Arentine” to which the Pope refers is
Pietro Arentino, a lewd sonneteer of the Sixteenth Century.
177 See, e.g., id., bk. VIII, l. 425.
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the lust for money: to get gold,— / Why, lie, rob, if it must be, murder!”178 In so
recognizing this in Guido, the Pope bars him access to the mitigating cloak of
honorable vengeance:
So plans he,
Always subordinating (note the point!)
Revenge, the manlier sin, to interest
The meaner,—would pluck pang forth, but unclench
No gripe in the act, let fall no money-piece.179
In divining Guido’s animating force and intent—and those of the other
actors, for that matter—the Pope relies on the experience of a lifetime (“eyes
grow[n] sharp by use”), not any particular analytical method. This experience leads
him to “find the truth.”180 As Robert Langbaum explains it, “[t]he Pope does not
weigh argument against argument, fact against fact, but cuts right through the facts
to a sympathetic apprehension of the motives and essential moral qualities behind
the deeds.”181 I don’t disagree with this assessment, but I think we can sharpen it
even further by recontextualizing it within our earlier discussion of particulars and
universals. What the Pope achieves, I submit, is a proper balance between the
particular facts presented in the pleadings and the universal rule to which Guido
seeks resort (justifiable homicide). That is, Guido’s ontological narrative—which
embodies an unbroken pattern of acts driven by greed—is not subsumable under the
then-existing rule justifying homicide in cases of adultery. Neither the physical facts
178 Id., bk. X, ll. 543-44.
179 Id., bk. X, ll. 598-602.
180 Id., bk. X, ll. 1242-44.
181 Robert Langbaum, The Ring and the Book: A Relativist Poem, 71 PMLA
131, 141 (1956).
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(e.g., Guido killed not just Pompilia, but her parents as well; he killed not by himself
or in the heat of passion but after cold reflection and with four hirelings) nor the
psychological facts (e.g., Guido was motivated by avarice) fit within the set of
honor-killing narratives that had been reduced to a universally stated rule.
If there is a single lesson to be learned from The Ring and the Book, it is that
multiple narrative perspectives can aid the search for truth. Some commentators
have suggested that truth can be “induced” from a multiplicity of viewpoints.182 I
would not go quite so far, but I do believe that Browning’s poem shows us that—
given a large enough range of narrative viewpoints—there is something of a
narrative inevitability to the final version of the story (i.e., the findings of fact
supporting a judgment), at least when the author of that version carefully attends to
both particulars and universals.
Over the course of this chapter, we have seen how narratives become rules
and how narratives compete with one another to become or remain institutionalized.
In the next chapter, we will elaborate on this idea of a narrative marketplace and
explore how this marketplace contributes not just to the development of the law but
to laws and institutions congenial to democracy.
182 Id. at 140-41.
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III. Law, Narrative and Democracy
Introduction
In the previous chapters, we explored how narratives influence laws and the
institutions in which they are housed. Now it is time to explore the other half of the
equation that I established at the outset—i.e., how legal systems that are generally
receptive to narratives facilitate the development of democracy. As the following
discussion will show, narrative receptivity is a condition precedent to the
development and maintenance of at least some democratic institutions. And this is
so, I think, because narrative is one of the tools with which complex societies
harmonize the overlapping—sometimes competing—drives of democracy and the
Rule of Law.1 To anchor the line of reasoning to which this conclusion is tied, I
need to explain what I mean by “democracy” and “Rule of Law,” both of which are
disputed terms.2
Democracy, in its most basic formulation, could mean something quite
narrow, something like “majority rule.”3 So conceived, a democracy might have
1 See, e.g., Jose Maria Maravall, The Rule of Law as a Political Weapon, in
DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 261-66 (Maravall and Przeworski eds., 2003)
(demonstrating how “the rule of law and democracy can undermine each other
through politics”).
2 See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY 15, 280
(2004) (discussing various meanings of both terms).
3 See Neil MacCormick, Jurisprudence, Democracy, and the Death of the
Weimar Republic, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1095, 1096 (1999). MacCormick notes the
difficulties inherent in any attempt to define what we popularly think of as a
constitutional democracy. He helpfully precedes this observation with a catalogue
of what a representative democracy is not: a “people’s democracy” of the Chinese
sort, fascism, or military dictatorship. The common thread in the “nots” is that each
of these other forms has tended to result in personal (or at best oligarchical)
dictatorships.
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little to do with the Rule of Law, as we will presently describe it, because all
decisions of a “legal” nature could be made ad hoc, retrospectively, and with wide
variance. But this is not what we have in mind when we think of democracy.
Instead, we have in mind constitutional democracies in which—no matter the
precise form of government—there is a baseline expectation of universal and equal
suffrage, majority rule, and competing political parties, as well as a broad range of
legally enforceable civil rights that inure to the benefit of all members of the society
(not the least of which are members of identifiable minorities). This set of
characteristics—especially with respect to the latter point—begins to define what
Ronald Dworkin calls the “partnership view” of democracy.4 The partnership view
assumes (because it depends on more than unenforceable statements of aspirations)
responsive and accountable institutions, and thus it begins to reveal a nexus between
democracy and law.5 To comprehend this nexus, we must have a common
understanding of the features of the Rule of Law, given that most would agree that
4 RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? PRINCIPLES FOR A
NEW POLITICAL DEBATE 131-47 (2006) (broadly contrasting features of
“majoritarian” and “partnership” views of democracy); see also Ronald Dworkin,
Moral Reading, in LAW AND DEMOCRACY 113 (Tom Campbell & Adrienne Stone
eds., 2003) (distinguishing “majoritarian” from “constitutional” conception of
democracy).
5 NEIL MACCORMICK, RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW: A THEORY OF
LEGAL REASONING 2 (2005) (“Respecting the Rule of Law is of profound political
value in states or confederations of states . . .. To have properly published and
prospective laws, equality of citizens before them, and limitation of official power
with respect to them, are foundations for democratic liberty and essentials for a
stable economy.”).
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“[t]he rule of law is among the essential pillars upon which any high-quality
democracy rests.”6
1. The Rule of Law and Its Limits
“Rule of Law” (like its partial cognates “Rechtsstaat” and “état de droit”)7 in
its most basic articulation means that a state is accountable to and exercises its
power according to law.8 In an often cited definition from the Nineteenth Century,
A. V. Dicey established a three-part test for the rule of law: “the absolute
predominance of regular law, so that the government has no arbitrary authority over
the citizen; the equal subjection of all (including officials) to the ordinary law
administered by the ordinary courts; and the fact that the citizen’s personal freedoms
are formulated and protected by the ordinary law rather than by abstract
constitutional declarations.”9 This, I think, is the conception of the Rule of Law in
6 Guillermo O’Donnell, The Quality of Democracy: Why the Rule of Law
Matters, 15 J. OF DEMOCRACY 32, 33 (2004).
7 The German and French expressions emphasize the link between the “law”
and “state.” See, e.g., JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS at xxxv
(William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992) (“When contrasted with the English
equivalent, “rule of law,” Rechtsstaat—which literally means “law-state”—reveals
the greater emphasis that the German legal tradition places on the state. Depending
on the context, I translate Rechtsstaat either as “rule of law” or “constitutional
state.” I also use “government by law,” as a way to split the difference.”); Marise
Cremona, The European Neighborhood Policy: Legal and Institutional Issues 10
(CDDRL, Working Paper No. 25, 2004), available at http://cddrl.stanford.edu.
8 See O’Donnell, supra note 6, at 33.
9 Cremona, supra note 7, at 10 (citing A. V. DICEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (London 1885)). According to
Cremona, Dicey’s approach is reflected in current EU policy. See id. at 10 (quoting
Council Common Position 98/350/CFSP on human rights, democratic principles, the
rule of law and good governance in Africa OJ 1998 L 158/1: “the rule of law, which
permits citizens to defend their rights and which implies a legislative and judicial
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which Thomas More places his faith in Robert Bolt’s A Man for All Seasons, as this
exchange between More and William Roper illustrates:
MORE The law, Roper, the law. I know what’s legal not what’s right.
And I’ll stick to what’s legal.
ROPER Then you set man’s law above God’s!
MORE No, far below; but let me draw your attention to a fact— I’m
not God. The currents and eddies of right and wrong, which
you find such plain sailing, I can’t navigate. I’m no voyager.
But in the thickets of the law, oh, there I’m a forester. I doubt
if there’s a man alive who could follow me there, thank God.
ROPER [Y]ou’d give the Devil benefit of law!
MORE Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the law
to get after the devil?
ROPER I’d cut down every law in England to do that!
MORE Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned
round on you—where would you hide, Roper, the laws all
being flat? This country’s planted thick with laws from coast
to coast—man’s laws, not God’s—and if you cut them
down—and you’re just the man to do it—d’you really think
you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then?
Yes, I’d give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety’s
sake.
ROPER I have long suspected this; this is the golden calf; the law’s
your god.
MORE Oh, Roper, you’re a fool, God’s my god . . . . But I find him
rather too subtle . . . I don’t know where he is nor what he
wants.10
But the sort of naked faith in legal rules that More espouses (even admitting that a
system of rules is preferable to a Hobbesian state of nature or the whims of a Tudor
power giving full effect to human rights and fundamental freedoms and a fair,
accessible and independent judicial system . . ..”).
10 ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 65-67 (Vintage 1990) (stage
directions and other characters’ interjections omitted).
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monarch) does not go quite far enough to modern eyes. Something is missing, but
it’s not always immediately clear what that something is. A literary counterfactual
should aid us in the task of conceptualizing (at least part of) the problem.
Herman Melville’s Billy Budd, Sailor (An Inside Narrative) well illustrates
that the Rule of Law has limits in a society that strives for more than rote, formal
“justice.”11 The story ultimately teaches that justice cannot be communicated by
rules alone: a receptiveness to fully rounded narratives is equally important. And it
is an insistence on narrative completeness that I would like us to consider more
closely. For it is the rare case indeed that neatly grades from black to white—the
“whole story” is usually much more complicated, as Billy Budd illustrates.
The plot of the novella is straightforward. A twenty-one-year-old sailor,
Billy Budd, is impressed from a merchant ship, the Rights of Man, onto an English
warship, the Bellipotent. Billy is an incarnation of a stock nautical character, the
Handsome Sailor. Wherever he goes, others adore him and are improved just by
making his acquaintance, although his mere presence drives men of a certain type to
an inner fury. As Billy’s superior on the Rights explains to the lieutenant of the
Bellipotent,
Before I shipped that young fellow, my forecastle was a rat-pit of
quarrels. . . . But Billy came; and it was like a Catholic priest striking peace
in an Irish shindy. Not that he preached to them or said or did anything in
particular; but a virtue went out of him, sugaring the sour ones. They took to
him like hornets to treacle; all but the buffer of the gang, the big shaggy
chap with the fire-red whiskers [who is finally won over after Billy gives him
“a terrible drubbing”].12
11 HERMAN MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD AND OTHER STORIES (Penguin Classics
1986) (1924).
12 Id. at 295.
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This pattern repeats itself on the Bellipotent, where Billy is generally beloved, save
by Claggart, the malevolent master-at-arms.
Billy’s involuntary enlistment into the Bellipotent came in the summer of
1797, just weeks after the infamous Nore and Spithead mutinies and at a time when
fears that the French Revolution would spread to Great Britain still lingered. “To
the British Empire the Nore Mutiny was what a strike in the fire brigade would be to
London threatened by general arson.”13 Accordingly, British navel officers were on
heightened alert for signs of discontent amongst members of their crews. It was this
sensitivity to revolt that Claggart was able to exploit, as we shall soon see. But first,
it will be helpful to detour for a word or two on the dramatis personae.
Much of the novella is cloaked in allegory, albeit undermined in some
respects by ambiguity. Billy is presented as a Christ and Adam figure, but an
invisible defect mars his perfection: under stress, he is unable to speak. Claggart,
on the other hand, is more or less flatly portrayed as evil (though looking “like a
man of high quality”), variously described as “the direct reverse of a saint,”
“depraved,” a “madman,” and “the scorpion for which the Creator alone is
responsible.” The ship’s captain, Edward Fairfax Vere, whose name suggests truth,
is, even more than Billy, of a divided nature. He is a “sailor of distinction even in a
time prolific of renowned seamen” but he oscillates between “a certain dreaminess
of mood” and the rigorous nature of a “martinet.” It is the gap between Claggart’s
“antipathy spontaneous and profound” and Vere’s “queer streak of the pedantic” in
which Billy soon finds himself ensnared.
13 Id. at 303.
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After surreptitiously visiting various minor plagues on Billy via his
subordinates, Claggart ups the ante and accuses Billy of conspiring to mutiny. Vere
is unimpressed with Claggart’s tale, finding it in sharp discord with his own
impression of Billy and Claggart himself lacking in credibility. Vere thus
determines to investigate the issue in as private a manner as possible and summons
Billy to his cabin to confront Claggart and his accusation. Billy, upon hearing
Claggart out, is—in keeping with his vocal defect—dumbstruck. Vere, sensing the
nature of Billy’s difficulty, attempts to sooth him and encourages him to take his
time in responding:
Contrary to the effect intended, these words so fatherly in tone, doubtless
touching Billy’s heart to the quick, prompted yet more violent efforts at
utterance—efforts soon ending for the time in confirming the paralysis, and
bringing to his a face an expression which was as a crucifixion to behold.
The next instant, quick as the flame from a discharged cannon at night, his
right arm shot out, and Claggart dropped to the deck.14
The single blow kills Claggart; within seconds his body is like “a dead snake.” Vere
immediately summons the ship’s surgeon, who confirms that Claggart is dead, and
then sends the surgeon to inform the ship’s other senior officers (with a “charge . . .
to keep the matter to themselves”) of the death and of his intent to call a drumhead
court.
From the outset of the story, we have been preconditioned to know that
“justice” on a warship will be different from justice in other contexts. When Billy
departs the merchant ship for the Bellipotent, he cries out (without irony on his part,
but otherwise dripping it), “And good-bye to you too, old Rights-of-Man.”15 Now
14 Id. at 350.
15 Id. at 297.
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whether this justice should be delivered swiftly and in secret is another matter, as the
surgeon and other officers conclude. “As to the drumhead court, it struck the
surgeon as impolitic, if nothing more. The thing to do, he thought, was to place
Billy Budd in confinement, and in a way dictated by usage, and postpone further
action in so extraordinary a case to such time as they should rejoin the squadron, and
then refer it to the admiral.”16 Vere thinks otherwise, “[f]eeling that unless quick
action was taken on it, the deed of [Billy], so soon as it should be known on the gun
decks, would tend to awaken any slumbering embers of the Nore among the crew, a
sense of the urgency of the case overruled in Captain Vere every other
consideration.”17
Vere thus immediately calls the drumhead court, knowing full well that the
martial code under which Billy is to be judged supplants ordinary notions of blame
and responsibility:
In a legal view the apparent victim of the tragedy was he who had sought to
victimize a man blameless; and the indisputable deed of the latter, navally
regarded, constituted the most heinous of military crimes. Yet more. The
essential right and wrong involved in the matter, the clearer that might be, so
much the worse for the responsibility of a loyal sea commander, inasmuch as
he was not authorized to determine the matter on that primitive basis.18
Given this framework, the only facts relevant to Billy’s trial are those directly tied to
Billy’s act of striking Claggart. On this point, there is no dispute: Vere “concisely
narrated all that had led up to the catastrophe,” and Billy confirms the accuracy of
Vere’s account: “Captain Vere tells the truth. It is just as Captain Vere says, but it
16 Id. at 352.
17 Id. at 355.
18 Id. at 354.
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is not as the master-at-arms said.” Answering further, Billy states that he had no
intent to harm Claggart:
No, there was no malice between us. I never bore malice against the master-
at-arms. I am sorry that he is dead. I did not mean to kill him. Could I have
used my tongue I would not have struck him. But he foully lied to my face
and in presence of my captain, and I had to say something, and I could only
say it with a blow, God help me!19
To this Vere responds, “I believe you, my man.”
But Billy’s moral justification in killing Claggart is not a legal justification
in this context. For as Vere counsels the members of the court, “Quite aside from
any conceivable motive actuating the master-at-arms, and irrespective of the
provocation to the blow, a martial court must needs in the present case confine its
attention to the blow’s consequence, which consequence justly is to be deemed not
otherwise than as the striker’s deed.”20 Vere understands, nonetheless, that this rule
runs counter to “natural justice,” which would not permit the “summary and
shameful death [of] a fellow creature innocent before God, and whom we feel to be
so . . ..”21 And Vere even concedes that Billy’s plea that he “proposed neither
mutiny nor homicide” would elsewhere prove a good defense: “before a court less
arbitrary and more merciful than a martial one, that plea would largely extenuate.
At the Last Assizes it shall acquit.”22 Why not here?
The answer is twofold—part interpretive, part narrative. First, mitigation of
Billy’s penalty in the face of a clear rule would lead to interpretation by the crew,
19 Id. at 357.
20 Id. at 358.
21 Id. at 361.
22 Id. at 363.
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which could perhaps foment mutiny and thereby undermine the very purpose of the
code. Hence, Vere feels an institutional compulsion to block interpretation of
Billy’s story beyond the level of act-and-consequence.23 Second, as Vere explains to
the other officers, the Mutiny Act “resembles in spirit the thing from which it
derives—War.” By this he means, I think, that warfare and its adjuncts are carried
out under a public narrative very different from the ones that order general civil
society:
[I]n receiving our commissions we in the most important regards ceased to
be natural free agents. When war is declared are we the commissioned
fighters previously consulted? We fight at command. If our judgments
approve the war, that is but coincidence. So in other particulars. So now.24
This martial narrative commands complete hegemony. Because it is hermetic, it
does not allow other narratives—public or private—to infect it. In practice, this
means that martial judges must leave their interpretative predilections at the bench.
23 This is of course only possible in the short run because legal narratives
often escape that container and assume a non-legal shape. One way of thinking
about this phenomenon is by recalling Robert Ferguson’s concept of a publication
continuum—i.e., that although a criminal case may begin with an indictment, it may
end with any manner of publication, things like newspaper reports, historical
accounts or even fictionalizations. See Robert A. Ferguson, Untold Stories in the
Law, in LAW’S STORIES 84, 84 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996). These
subsequent publications are manifestations of how different groups have interpreted
legal narratives (to make sense to them). For example, Billy Budd doesn’t end with
Billy’s death. There is a report in “a naval chronicle of the time” that shoehorns
Billy’s story into the British maritime narrative and thereby applauds Claggart as a
hero and condemns Billy as a villain. MELVILLE, supra note 11, at 382-83. The
sailor class, on the contrary, “instinctively felt that Billy was a sort of man as
incapable of mutiny as of willful murder.” They thus carry slivers of the spar from
which he was hung as if they were from the True Cross, and they celebrate his end
in a ballad, “Billy in the Darbies.” Id. at 383-84. For an interesting discussion of
the multiple endings (a natural result of what Melville called the “ragged edges” of
truth) of Billy Budd, see BARBARA JOHNSON, The Execution of Billy Budd, in THE
CRITICAL DIFFERENCE 79 (1980).
24 MELVILLE, supra note 11, at 362.
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In other words, the judge’s interpretation of the facts is irrelevant to the extent that it
extends beyond the narrowest sphere: narrative completeness is no virtue in this
context.
In narrative terms, Billy Budd is about the consequences of individual and
systemic narrative failure. Billy is a failed narrator (he can’t tell his story); the
system of martial law makes judges into failed narratees (they can’t listen). We find
all this disquieting, above all—perhaps—because it cuts off what we see as an
essential characteristic of judging and, therefore, of justice. I’m thinking here of
what Zenon Bankowski and others have referred to as “attention,” which requires,
among other things, listening before judging.25 Put differently, I think we expect
justice to consist of law and narrative in somewhat equal measures.26 When we find
the balance lacking, we get the same sense of dissatisfaction that we feel when we
25 See Zenon Bankowski, In the Judgment Space, in THE UNIVERSAL AND THE
PARTICULAR IN LEGAL REASONING 25, 33-35 (Zenon Bankowski & James MacLean
eds., 2006).
26 Vere’s strict application of the law in Billy’s case is not a one-off; rather, it
is consistent with his larger world-view, which is itself founded on an absolute faith
in the power of rules:
With mankind, he would say, forms, measured forms, are everything; and
this is the import couched in the story of Orpheus with his lyre spellbinding
the wild denizens of the wood. And this he once applied to the disruption of
forms going on across the Channel and the consequences thereof.
MELVILLE, supra note 11, at 380. On this count, Vere veers close to the quasi-
Hobbesian position of Shakespeare’s Angelo in Measure for Measure:
We must not make a scarecrow of the law,
Setting it up to fear the birds of prey,
And let it keep one shape, till custom make it
Their perch and not their terror.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE act 2, sc. 1, ll. 1-4.
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consider the fate of Billy. Of course the circumstances are neither so extreme nor
the consequences so dire in the quotidian world, but if we attend closely to cases that
strike us “unfair,” or “unreasonable,” or “unjust,” I think we will very often find a
judgment that was made without due consideration for “the whole story.”27
2. Toward a Democratic Rule of Law
As Billy Budd exemplifies, laws and institutions that faithfully execute those
laws are not alone sufficient to insure a society that we would consider just, fair, or
democratic. And this is so beyond the military context within which Melville places
his narrative. For as Guillermo O’Donnell posits (drawing examples from Latin
American countries), “an act that is formally according to law may nonetheless
entail the application of a rule that is invidiously discriminatory or violates basic
rights.”28 Indeed, totalitarian regimes often pay rough homage to some cramped
vision of the Rule of Law.29 These types of deficiencies in the narrow Dicey
articulation of the Rule of Law have called others to offer further definitional
refinements, a task attempted by several notable theorists, including Lon Fuller,
Joseph Raz, and—more recently—Neil MacCormick. Fuller, in his characteristic
fashion, casts his criteria in the form of a parable, “The Problem of the Grudge
27 Cf. MACCORMICK, supra note 5, at 31 (emphasizing the “dynamic aspect”
of the Rule of Law, which is “illustrated by the rights of the defence, and the
importance of letting everything that is arguable be argued”).
28 O’Donnell, supra note 6, at 34.
29 But as Colleen Murphy skillfully illustrates, totalitarian governments aren’t
really living up to even modest standards. For instance, the use of terror in
repressive regimes is effective because it is so arbitrary. And that violates the
fundamental prohibition against arbitrary authority over citizens. See Colleen
Murphy, Lon Fuller and the Moral Value of the Rule of Law, 24 L. & PHILOSOPHY
239, 252-54 (2005).
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Informer.”30 In this hypothetical narrative, a dictatorship has been overthrown.
Under that regime, there was a legal system, but it encouraged the use of state power
to settle old scores. Now, there is an appetite among the liberated citizenry to
dispense a bit of vigilante justice against the “grudge informers.” Fuller leaves it to
the reader to determine how to handle the problem: viz., how presently to treat acts
that were legal under a displaced regime. To blunt the force of an inclination to
sanction punishment in these circumstances, Fuller offers the tale of King Rex,
whose “laws” were waylaid along eight different routes:
The first and most obvious lies in a failure to achieve rules at all, so that
every issue must be decided on an ad hoc basis. The other routes are: (2) a
failure to publicize, or at least to make available to the affected party, the
rules he is expected to observe; (3) the abuse of retroactive legislation, which
cannot itself guide action, but undercuts the integrity of rules prospective in
effect, since it puts them under the threat of retrospective change; (4) a
failure to make rules understandable; (5) the enactment of contradictory rules
or (6) rules that require conduct beyond the powers of the affected party; (7)
introducing such frequent changes in the rules that the subject cannot orient
his action by them; and, finally, (8) a failure to achieve congruence between
the rules as announced and their actual administration.31
Most commentators—including Fuller himself—have recast this list of “don’ts” into
a list of “dos,” which holds that laws must be general, promulgated, prospective,
understandable, consistent, performable, continuous, and congruently administered.
Fuller’s set of eight is not universally accepted, of course. Raz, for instance,
places as much emphasis on the architecture of the state that interprets and applies
laws as on the laws themselves:
1. All laws should be prospective, open, and clear; 2. Laws should be
relatively stable; 3. The making of particular laws . . . must be guided by
30 LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969).
31 Id. at 39.
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open, stable, clear, and general rules; 4. The independence of the judiciary
must be guaranteed; 5. The principles of natural justice must be observed
(i.e., open and fair hearing and absence of bias); 6. The courts should have
review powers . . . to ensure conformity to the rule of law; 7. The courts
should be easily accessible; 8. The discretion of crime preventing agencies
should not be allowed to pervert the law.32
This emphasis on state actors and institutions takes us closer to what we
would expect from a legal system in a democratic regime, but we have still not
closed the circle. What remains to consider is how we conceptualize a democratic
Rule of Law.33 MacCormick gets to the nub of the matter (i.e., to the Billy Budd
problem) when he suggests that:
If the Rule of Law is to be actually a protection against arbitrary intervention
in people’s lives, it seems clear that it is not in practice enough to demand
that the operative facts did on some occasion actually happen or obtain. It is
necessary that some specific and challengeable accusation or averment of
relevant facts be made to the individual threatened with action. This in turn
must be supported by evidence in an open proceeding in which the party
charged may contest each item of evidence both one at a time and in the
cumulative effect of the totality of items adduced, and may offer relevant
counter-evidence as she/he chooses. Moreover, it must also be possible to
challenge the relevancy of the legal accusation or claim. Such a challenge is
to the effect that, whatever may be the facts of the matter, the legal materials
32 Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, 93 L. Q. REV. 195, 196 (1977).
33 O’Donnell conceives the rule of law as “the legally based rule of a
democratic state.” He goes on to propose that
[T]his entails that there exists a legal system that is itself democratic, in three
senses: 1) It upholds the political rights, freedoms, and guarantees of a
democratic regime; 2) it upholds the civil rights of the whole population; and
3) it establishes networks of responsibility and accountability which entail
that all public and private agents, including the highest state officials, are
subject to appropriate, legally established controls on the lawfulness of their
acts.
O’Donnell, supra note 6, at 36. I do not at all disagree with this assessment, but I
am more interested in the process by which these ends come to be realized than how
they are framed. Hence, the swerve into Habermas.
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that supposedly warrant the assertion of a rule governing the case do not
warrant it at all in the alleged, or the actually proven, state of the facts.34
If we take this as a challenge, how do we answer it? In other words, how do we
craft a system that respects the Rule of Law yet adequately responds to our
democratic sensibilities?
There are many points of entry into this inquiry, perhaps none more
convenient than Jürgen Habermas’ “discourse theory” of law and democracy—a
concept set forth in his Between Facts and Norms. His argument is difficult to
capsule, but we know that Habermas links the informal sources of democracy with
the formal decision-making institutions that any complex society needs for the Rule
of Law to flourish. In this scheme, the constitutional state is the mechanism that
converts the citizenry’s democratic desires into legitimate administrative activity:
law “represents . . . the medium for transforming communicative power into
administrative power.” This perspective helps us account for the various principles
and institutions of the constitutional state, “such as the separation of powers,
majority rule, statutory controls on administration, and so forth.”35
Habermas also carefully links the Rule of Law to the democratic process. In
his view, “laws are legitimate if (1) they are agreed to in a fair and open
participatory process, (2) citizens agree to each law in the sense of continued
cooperation, and (3) this process makes the public deliberation of the majority the
34 MACCORMICK, supra note 5, at 25-26.
35 William Rehg, Habermas’ Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy: An
Overview of the Argument, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRITICAL THEORY 166, 181
(David M. Rasmussen ed., 1996).
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source of sovereign power.”36 Laws so conceived preserve democracy by resisting
the twin bureaucratic urges to totalize and to decide increasing numbers of issues
outside the public sphere.37 This makes sense as an abstraction and partially
explains the formation of statutory law, but one may ask how these standards apply
to a system that is not wholly code driven and, even then, how individual wills
figure in the “participatory process.”38 In other words, how do citizens participate in
a democracy other than by casting a ballot every few years? In a discussion of
constitutional provisions born of revolution, Habermas marks a trail that should
seem familiar to us:
As we have seen, by generalizing and abstracting from the adjudication of
cases, legal theory gains distance without giving up the participant
perspective as such. By contrast, the objectifying gaze of the historian
focuses on the social contexts in which the law, as a system of action, is
embedded—and from which the implicit background assumptions of
adjudication and contemporary legal doctrine are nourished. . . . In some
prominent places, the text of the law itself reveals these implicit diagnoses of
the times, for example, in the “bill of rights” section of constitutions that
have emerged from political upheavals or revolutions. In contrast to the
professionally formulated or developed law of legal scholars, even the style
and wording of these declarations display an emphatic statement of will from
36 Id.; see also, Michel Rosenfeld, Review: Law as Discourse: Bridging the
Gap between Democracy and Rights, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1163, 1175 (1995) (“[T]he
proceduralist paradigm of law animated by the discourse principle, is, above all,
elegantly simple. Starting from a picture of equal ‘consociates’ under law as
autonomous and as reciprocally recognizant of each other’s dignity, Habermas
postulates that these consociates would have to regard as legitimate any laws of
which they were both the authors and the addressees.”).
37 Id.
38 Although Habermas is principally concerned with legislation, he “does
acknowledge the need for interpretation in the course of the ‘discourse of
application,’ as he terms the basic function of the judiciary, and he accepts the
propriety of the pressure to achieve internal legal coherence in the process of
applying norms.” Tom Campbell, Legal Positivism and Deliberative Democracy, in
LAW AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 4, at 342.
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citizens who are reacting to concrete experiences of repression and
humiliation. Most articles in a bill of rights resonate with a suffered injustice
that is negated word for word, as it were.39
In speaking of “concrete experiences” and so forth, I think Habermas is
allowing that the “discourse” that is central to his conception of law and democracy
may take a narrative shape. And in certain key respects, I would go so far as to say
that this is often the case. For examples, we can circle back around to certain of the
Fuller-Raz-MacCormick criteria, and place them within the context of what we have
learned from Habermas, O’Donnell and others about democratic institutions.
Specifically, I have in mind the common emphasis on access to and administration
of the legal system, not just laws themselves. That is, laws are by themselves
insufficient to establish either the Rule of Law or democracy: in addition, courts,
legislatures and administrative agencies must be accessible—and in a meaningful
way.
For contrast to the ideal, we can look to Franz Kafka’s short story “Before
the Law,” which is something of a parable of the antiseptic, unresponsive law of the
early modern bureaucratic state.40 The story is very brief: a man from the country
comes seeking entry to the law, but a gatekeeper bars him entrance. After the
gatekeeper tells him that “it is possible” that he will one day be admitted, the man
decides to wait by the side of the gate, not wishing to challenge the fierce gatekeeper
39 HABERMAS, supra note 7, at 388-89.
40 FRANZ KAFKA, Before the Law, in THE PENAL COLONY: STORIES AND
SHORT PIECES 148, 148-150 (Willa and Edwin Muir trans., Schocken 1961) (1919).
Although Kafka separately published the story, it also appears in a slightly different
form near the end of his unfinished novel, The Trial. For an interesting take on the
democratic aspects of the story, see Rachel Potter, Waiting at the Entrance to the
Law: Modernism, Gender, and Democracy, 14 TEXTUAL PRACTICE 253 (2000).
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or the increasingly powerful gatekeepers to be found at subsequent steps inside. He
waits “for days and years,” spending everything he brought with him in the vain
attempt to gain entrance. Finally, he grows weak with age and asks the gatekeeper
one last question: “Everyone strives to reach the Law,” says the man, “so how does
it happen that for all these many years no one but myself has ever begged for
admittance?” The gatekeeper sees that the man is already dying and, to reach his
diminishing sense of hearing, he shouts at him, “No one else could ever be admitted
here, since this gate was made only for you. I am now going to shut it.”
This image of the law can be read in a number of ways, from the fairly literal
to the highly metaphorical. For instance, the infinite regress of gatekeepers could
represent the law’s maddening procedural hurdles, the man’s status as a “country-
man” could say something about the status before the law of outsiders in general,
or—more interestingly—the seeming impenetrability of the law could stand for the
need to mediate it, to interpret it. I’ll say more on this latter point in a minute, but
for now I would like to focus on the literal fact that the man from the country never
got to tell his story (whatever it was—Kafka doesn’t say). And that—the ability to
hear, adjudicate and legislate from narratives—is a hallmark of all truly democratic
regimes, as even proponents of “minimalist” democracy (like Judge Posner) would
likely concede.41 It thus remains for us to identify—and begin to map the features
of—institutions whose democratic missions are facilitated by narrative interaction.
41 See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY 109
(2004) (“[P]eople’s interests, preferences, and opinions influence governments,
certainly, through the electoral process and otherwise.”).
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A modern constitutional democracy is a system of dizzying complexity.
Within such a system, law—as Habermas would have it—has come to play a central
role for no reason other than that older, simpler orders have been overwhelmed. As
Michel Rosenfeld explains,
Habermas conceives of law functionally, as filling gaps “in social orders
whose integrative capacities are overtaxed.” In our increasingly complex
societies, the common cultural traditions, beliefs, practices and normative
assumptions, which emerge from what Habermas calls the “lifeworld” of a
historically situated social group, can no longer furnish comprehensive
normative justification for all the existing modes of social interaction. At the
same time, such interactions are increasingly mediated through largely
autonomous systems, like the market economy and the administrative
bureaucracy of the state, which largely escape control by social actors who
depend on them. . . . Under these circumstances, Habermas maintains that
law is the only legitimate means for society-wide normative integration, a
“hinge between system and lifeworld.”42
What this implies is that the health of a democracy depends on more or less
continuous acts of mediation, balancing, and adjustment. Absent these acts, a
disjunction develops between system and lifeworld, and the system becomes a
Kafkaesque edifice unto itself. How, then, does a viable democracy maintain a
proper system/lifeworld flow through law?
3. The Jury as a Structural Safeguard of Democracy
As we have already seen, both low-order and high-order narratives—when
they align—can create new laws (recall The Jungle and the Meat Inspection Act) or
reconfigure old ones (recall Hundley and the law of self-defense). Is there a
democratic angle to this process? I think there is—or at least there can be. But first,
we must state the problem that narrative solves. In a representative democracy like
that of the U.S., individual citizens play virtually no direct role in government other
42 Rosenfeld, supra note 36, at 1172.
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than to exercise (or mostly not) the right to vote. High offices tend to be held by
members of a highly educated political elite (the last four Presidents have been
graduates of Columbia, Harvard and/or Yale), a situation exacerbated by a system of
campaign finance that favors the entrenched elites. As Posner puts it, American
political figures “are by no means ordinary men and women but instead belong to an
elite of intelligence, cunning, connections, charisma, and other attributes that enable
them to present themselves to the public plausibly as ‘the best.’”43 If we juxtapose
this with Posner’s discussion of the “elite” conception of democracy, which views
the American electorate as “ignorant and apathetic,” then what is there in the system
to brake a slide to oligarchy?44 The answer: a legal system receptive to the
narratives of even the “ignorant and apathetic.”
In the United States, courts serve at least two important and related
democratic functions: (1) insuring the legal rights and liberties of ordinary citizens,
oppressed minorities, and others and (2) making the other branches of government
“horizontally” accountable for their acts.45 Federal courts enjoy a large degree of
independence from the other branches of government, given the life tenure of judges
and the wide range of powers granted under Article III of the Constitution.46 Many
43 POSNER, supra note 41, at 109. To leave no doubt as to what “other
attributes” might entail, Posner later specifically mentions wealth: “Successful
candidates are not random draws from the public at large. They are smarter, better
educated, more ambitious, and wealthier than the average person.” Id. at 154.
44 Id. at 16.
45 O’Donnell, supra note 6, at 37.
46 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton): “If, then, the courts of
justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against
legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong argument for the
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state-court judges also enjoy a fair amount of insulation from day-to-day political
jostling through lengthy terms and “appointment-and-retention” rather than
“election” systems. This scheme is facially countermajoritarian—and thus in one
sense anti-democratic—but it guards against one of democracy’s greatest pitfalls:
the “tyranny of the majority.” Its net effect, then, is—paradoxically—to preserve
democratic values through nonmajoritarian means.
Although judges are of course drawn from the same pool of elites as other
officials (a problem that we will discuss in a moment), judges can stand against the
tide in ways that elected officials never could. This gives them the freedom to
police and protect core democratic values that executives and legislatures may be
unable or unwilling to police and protect (or, in some cases, may be willing to
infringe).47 We can see this in cases like Brown v. Board of Education. But that
aspect of the courts is not my main concern here. For as I suggested in the last
chapter, the jury system has an institutionalized, democratizing influence on the law,
one that we can now explore more deeply.
permanent tenure of judicial offices, since nothing will contribute so much as this to
that independent spirit in the judges as which must be essential to the faithful
performance of so arduous a duty.”
47 Id.:
The independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution
and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors which the
arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes
disseminate among the people themselves, and which, though they speedily
give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection, have a
tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the
government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community.
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Despite the significant check that an independent judiciary places on its
fellow branches of government, it does nothing to ameliorate the rule-by-elites
phenomenon that is in some ways a natural consequence of the architecture
established in the pre-amendment Constitution. For as Michael Parenti suggests,
Whatever conjectures we might make about the motivations of the Framers,
the more important task is to judge the end product of their efforts. And the
Constitution they fashioned tells us a good deal about their objectives. It was
and still is largely an elitist document, more concerned with the securing of
property interests than with personal liberties.48
The Constitution does not end, however, with the Constitution-proper: the Bill of
Rights was soon appended. And although these amendments do not “democratize”
the federal bench, they do significantly assure broad participation in the legal system
itself. This is so in two respects. First, broad rights to speak were institutionalized.49
These rights assure that—unlike Kafka’s man from the country—all persons have an
opportunity to tell their stories and seek “a redress of grievances.” Second, and even
more important, I think, specific rights to hear and be heard were also
institutionalized, none more important than expansion to civil cases of the right to
trial by jury.50 These rights are amplified in the civil context by prohibitions against
reexamination of jury findings and in the criminal context by the bar against double
jeopardy.51 What this means in practice is that lay juries have enormous power in
48 MICHAEL PARENTI, DEMOCRACY FOR THE FEW 53 (1974).
49 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I (setting out rights to free speech, free
press, and petition).
50 See U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2, cl. 3 (providing for trial by jury in criminal
cases); U.S. CONST. amend. VII (preserving trial by jury in suits at common law).
51 See U.S. CONST. amends. V (no double jeopardy) & VII (no reexamination
of facts tried by jury).
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particular (especially criminal) cases, cases that can in turn have universalizing
consequences. We earlier saw this at work in the Stewart case, in which the appeal’s
only impact was on future cases because Peggy Stewart had been acquitted and
therefore could not be retried, even though the appellate court found that her
acquittal was improper. It now remains for us to consider the broader social
implications of the jury’s institutionalized role in the democratic constitutional
order.52
The notion that juries serve a democratic purpose is not new. Alexander
Hamilton saw trial by jury (at least in criminal cases) as one of few points upon
which there was general agreement amongst the Founders, albeit for slightly
different—but altogether democratic—reasons:
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree in
nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury; or if
there is any difference between them it consists in this: the former regard it
as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very palladium
of free government. For my own part, the more the operation of the
institution has fallen under my observation, the more reason I have
discovered for holding it in high estimation; and it would be altogether
superfluous to examine to what extent it deserves to be esteemed useful or
essential in a representative republic, or how much more merit it may be
entitled to as a defense against the oppressions of an hereditary monarch,
than as a barrier to the tyranny of popular magistrates in a popular
government. Discussions of this kind would be more curious than beneficial,
as all are satisfied of the utility of the institution, and of its friendly aspect to
liberty.53
52 John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Rule of Democracy and Rule of Law,
in DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 1, at 242, 243 (noting that jury
trials are one of the few places “where law and democracy come into close
contact”).
53 THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton).
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By the mid-Nineteenth Century Alexis de Tocqueville could observe that the
American jury system has “political” and “educational” dimensions that may be
more important than the obvious one (viz., deciding individual cases). Indeed, he
believed that the jury system was as “direct and extreme a consequence of the
dogma of the sovereignty of the people as universal suffrage.”54 For support, he
cites instances in which absolute monarchs (Napoleon and the Tudors) destroyed or
weakened the jury system as a means of consolidating their power. Given this
history, Tocqueville asserts that it begs the question to concern oneself with issues
of juror qualification and such because that type of inquiry focuses on the
administrative function of juries and thereby overlooks the jury system’s larger
institutional roles:
When the question is from what elements the list of jurors should be
composed, discussion is limited to the enlightenment and capacities of those
to be chosen, as if one was concerned with a purely judicial institution. But,
in my view, that is really the least important aspect of the matter; the jury is
above all a political institution; it should be regarded as one form of the
sovereignty of the people; when the sovereignty of the people is discarded, it
too should be completely rejected; otherwise it should be made to harmonize
with the other laws establishing that sovereignty. The jury is part of the
nation responsible for the execution of the laws, as the legislature assemblies
are the part with the duty of making them; for society to be governed in a
settled and uniform matter, it is essential that the jury lists should expand or
shrink with the lists of voters. This aspect of the matter, in my opinion,
should always be the lawgivers’ main preoccupation. All the rest is, so to
say, frills.55
No less important than this “political” function is what Tocqueville describes
as the broad participatory function that jury service affords, which inculcates in the
54 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 273 (J.P. Mayer ed.,
George Lawrence trans., Harper 1988) (1835 & 1840).
55 Id. at 273.
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citizenry democratic values, respect for judicial decisions, personal responsibility, a
sense of shared governance, and an equitable turn of mind.56 In short, jury service—
particularly civil jury service—has “a great influence on national character,” even
though Tocqueville is ultimately unsure whether “a jury is useful to the litigants”!57
This “influence” that Tocqueville identifies is but another name for “education.” In
the U.S., “ordinary” citizens have virtually no opportunities to participate directly in
the workings of the government. Jury service is a notable exception, one allowing
an important interface between specialized elites and a cross-section of the citizenry:
“It should be regarded as a free school which is always open and in which each juror
learns his rights, comes into daily contact with the best educated and most-
enlightened members of the upper classes, and is given practical lessons in the law,
lessons which the advocate’s efforts, the judge’s advice, and also the very passions
of the litigants bring within his mental grasp.”58 To this education Tocqueville
attributes as a consequence the “practical intelligence and the political good sense of
the Americans.” Some wags would claim that this is a condition contrary to fact, but
we need not accept it to endorse Tocqueville’s larger point: “The jury is both the
most efficient way of establishing the people’s rule and the most efficient way of
teaching them how to rule.”59
56 Id. at 274.
57 Id. at 274-75.
58 Id. at 275. In light of Tocqueville’s position, query whether current
methods of alternative dispute resolution (e.g., private arbitration) are
antidemocratic because they take place outside the public’s gaze, are effected
without public participation, and (usually) result in no public decision.
59 Id. at 276.
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The idea of the jury as a cauldron into which elites and non-elites are stirred
as part of the democratic recipe is attractive, but it calls for greater scrutiny than
Tocqueville provides. What is missing is a theoretical account of how lay jurors
impact particular cases in ways that impact universal rules in democratic ways. For
that account, I want to return to an issue noted but not discussed in the last chapter:
Stanley Fish’s concept of “interpretive communities.”
4. The Democratic Role of Interpretive Communities
Many theories of interpretation privilege text over reader. Those theories
hold that a text has a single meaning (or at most a finite set of meanings) that is there
for a reader to ferret out. Interpretations that do not accord with this meaning are—
in polite scholarly discourse—labeled “extratextual” or—in less polite discourse, in
descending order—“erroneous,” “lame,” or “stupid.” The apotheosis of literary
interpretation of this mode came packaged in the form of American “New
Criticism,” which called for the “close reading” of texts.60 This phrase, “close
reading,” is pregnant with meaning. It means much more than that a critic should
read a text carefully and completely. In fact, I think the phrase is something of a
misnomer because it implies a methodology built on focus (attending only to the
words on a page) when it operates by a process of exclusion (disregarding
everything not on the page).61 This method rescued literary criticism from a great
60 Although New Criticism was given its name by John Crowe Ransom and is
associated with him and a group of Southern intellectuals including Allen Tate and
Cleanth Brooks, it sweeps in a much wider cast of characters, including T. S. Eliot,
I. A. Richards, and others. It held sway in from the 1930s to the 1950s and—in my
view—continues to color the way literature is taught in the United States.
61 Cf. TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 43 (1983)
(making the same point with respect to the work of F. R. Leavis).
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deal of precious and trivial biographical criticism.62 (To this day, I remember a
fellow graduate student who was studying Fitzgerald’s novels complaining of the
reams of paper he had to wade through to get past books and articles that stopped
and started with commentary of the Scott-got-drunk-and-did-such-and-such type.)
But the rescue came at a price: namely, texts became reified and divorced from both
authors and readers.
There is no school of legal interpretation that is perfectly analogous to New
Criticism, although there are certainly “textualists” who believe that interpretation of
constitutional and statutory provisions should be performed within their four corners
and “originalists” who seek to interpret such provisions in light of their intent and
meaning when drafted. We will soon look more carefully at legal interpretation, but
for now it is enough to showcase the position of Justice Antonin Scalia of the United
States Supreme Court:
How upsetting it is, that so many of our citizens (good people, not lawless
ones, on both sides of this abortion issue, and on various sides of other issues
as well) think that we Justices should properly take into account their views,
as though we were not engaged in ascertaining an objective law but in
determining some kind of social consensus. The Court would profit, I think,
from giving less attention to the fact of this distressing phenomenon, and
more attention to the cause of it. That cause permeates today’s opinion: a
new mode of constitutional adjudication that relies not upon text and
traditional practice to determine the law, but upon what the Court calls
“reasoned judgment,” which turns out to be nothing but philosophical
predilection and moral intuition. . . . What makes all this relevant to the
bothersome application of “political pressure” against the Court are the twin
facts that the American people love democracy and the American people are
not fools. As long as this Court thought (and the people thought) that we
62 Perhaps the most influential articulation of the principle of authorial
irrelevance may be found in W. K. WIMSATT & MONROE C. BEARDSLEY, The
Intentional Fallacy, in THE VERBAL ICON: STUDIES IN THE MEANING OF POETRY 3
(1954) (“[T]he design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as
a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art . . ..”).
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Justices were doing essentially lawyers’ work up here—reading text and
discerning our society’s traditional understanding of that text—the public
pretty much left us alone. Texts and traditions are facts to study, not
convictions to demonstrate about. But if in reality our process of
constitutional adjudication consists primarily of making value judgments . . .,
then a free and intelligent people’s attitude towards us can be expected to be
(ought to be) quite different.63
In contradistinction to text-based interpretive theories, other theories
privilege the reader, holding that all texts contain lacunae that only readers can fill.
For purposes of concision, I’m going to refer to reader-based theories under the
generic label “reader response theory,” but there are a multitude of theoretical
strands at issue, a good part of which cannot be so easily bundled. As a point of
departure, we should at least nod to the “reception” theory of Hans Robert Jauss,
who elaborates on Edmund Husserl’s idea that reality is understood through
“horizons,” yokes it to Thomas Kuhn’s observation that scientific facts are generated
by dominant paradigms, and takes it to the level of technique through application of
Hans Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics.64 Jauss’ central point is that—
contrary to the central tenet of New Criticism—texts are interpreted differently over
time: “A literary work is not an object which stands by itself and which offers the
same face to each reader in each period. It is not a monument which reveals its
timeless essence in a monologue.”65 We can see this at the macro level as the
63 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000-01
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (bolded emphasis supplied). For a fuller theoretical
description of his position, see Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
64 See RAMAN SELDEN, A READER’S GUIDE TO CONTEMPORARY LITERARY
THEORY 106-16 (1985).
65 Id. at 115 (quoting Jauss).
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literary fortunes of writers rise and fall over time66 and at the micro level as the
meaning of words and phrases change. This explains why, for example,
Shakespeare’s plays must be heavily annotated and why the following quotations
make no immediate sense to many modern readers (for those playing along at home,
the answers are in the footnote):
 “Mice, rats and such small deer.” (King Lear)
 “Thy head is as full of quarrels as an egg is full of meat.” (Romeo and
Juliet)
 “I’ll make a ghost of him who lets me.” (Hamlet)
 “I dreamt a dream tonight.” (Romeo and Juliet)
 “Doth she not count her blest . . . that we have wrought so worthy a
gentleman to be her bride?” (Romeo and Juliet)
 “My ships are safely come to road.” (Merchant of Venice)
 “Heaps of pearl, inestimable stones, unvalued jewels, all scattered in the
bottom of the sea.” (Richard III)
 And in a meta-example: “O Captain! God’s light, these villains will
make the word as odious as the word occupy, which was an excellent
word before it was ill-used.” (2 Henry IV).67
Other reader-response theorists—while agreeing with Jauss that texts have
no predetermined meanings—have pushed interpretive responsibility even further
into the domain of the reader. Wolfgang Iser, for example, submits that a text is a
66 For instance, Robert Southey was a well-regarded contemporary of the
great Romantic poets, so much so that he was awarded the laureateship in 1813. But
by the time that I was an undergraduate, he warranted only a single poem of two-
dozen lines in the fourth edition of the Norton Anthology of English Literature.
67 PATRICK HARWELL WITH ROBERT BENTLEY, OPEN TO LANGUAGE 352
(1982). Answers: (1) deer—a small mammal; (2) meat—edible part of something
as opposed to its shell; (3) lets—hinders or prevents; (4) tonight—during last night;
(5) bride—bridegroom; (5) road—anchorage (6) unvalued—invaluable (7) occupy—
fornicate.
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“network of response-inviting structures” that encourages certain “implied”
readings. But each “actual” reader brings an “existing stock of experience” that
necessarily colors her interpretation.68 Umberto Eco, who approaches the subject
from a semiotic angle, argues that texts tend to construct two “Model Readers”: a
“semantic” reader who “wants to know what happens” and a “semiotic” reader who
“wants to know how what happens has been narrated.”69 The common thread
winding through Jauss, Iser, and Eco is that the perceiver is at least as important as
the perceived, which suggests that valid interpretations may exist across a spectrum
(which is not to say across infinity). To illustrate this process, let’s examine
Wittgenstein’s famed duck-rabbit puzzle:
Is it a duck looking left or a rabbit looking right?70 The answer is, of course,
that it depends on who is looking at the picture. Everyone has an immediate take on
it, (usually) one way or the other, and when informed of the other possible
interpretation, everyone I’ve ever shown it to says something like, “Oh, yeah, I can
68 SELDEN, supra note 64, at 112.
69 UMBERTO ECO, ON LITERATURE 222-23 (Martin McLaughlin trans., 2004)
(2002).
70 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 166 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 2001) (1953).
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see that, but I still think it’s a [duck or rabbit].” But I have never had someone say
that the picture is of a trout steam, a lawnmower, or a Gothic Cathedral, although I
have had an occasional person identify a particular species of duck or something
more general, like “a bird.” I don’t want to make too much of any of this, however,
because this is an example that is designed to be ambiguous and, consequently, is far
different from most interpretive dilemmas faced in the legal context. But before
turning to Fish’s particular take on reader-response theory, I want to round out our
preliminary discussion by considering one poetic example and one legal example.
Since I already referred to Robert Burns’ “To a Mouse” in the last chapter, I’ll start
with it:
WEE, sleekit, cow’rin, tim’rous beastie,
O, what a panic’s in thy breastie!
Thou need na start awa sae hasty,
Wi’ bickering brattle!
I wad be laith to rin an’ chase thee, 5
Wi’ murd’ring pattle!
I’m truly sorry man’s dominion,
Has broken nature’s social union,
An’ justifies that ill opinion,
Which makes thee startle 10
At me, thy poor, earth-born companion,
An’ fellow-mortal!
I doubt na, whiles, but thou may thieve;
What then? poor beastie, thou maun live!
A daimen icker in a thrave 15
’S a sma’ request;
I’ll get a blessin wi’ the lave,
An’ never miss’t!
Thy wee bit housie, too, in ruin!
It’s silly wa’s the win’s are strewin! 20
An’ naething, now, to big a new ane,
O’ foggage green!
An’ bleak December’s winds ensuin,
Baith snell an’ keen!
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Thou saw the fields laid bare an’ waste, 25
An’ weary winter comin fast,
An’ cozie here, beneath the blast,
Thou thought to dwell—
Till crash! The cruel coulter past
Out thro’ thy cell. 30
That wee bit heap o’ leaves an’ stibble,
Has cost thee mony a weary nibble!
Now thou’s turn’d out, for a’ thy trouble,
But house or hald,
To thole the winter’s sleety dribble, 35
An’ cranreuch cauld!
But, Mousie, thou art no thy lane,
In proving foresight may be vain;
The best-laid schemes o’ mice an’ men
Gang aft agley, 40
An’lea’e us nought but grief an’ pain,
For promis’d joy!
Still thou art blest, compar’d wi’ me
The present only toucheth thee:
But, Och! I backward cast my e’e. 45
On prospects drear!
An’ forward, tho’ I canna see,
I guess an’ fear!
This poem, in scarcely four dozen lines, fairly represents a range of problems
common to both legal and literary interpretation. The first, and most obvious,
difficulty is the language, which is recognizable as English but full of Scots-English
forms that are no longer in everyday use. Thus, to understand the poem on a basic
linguistic level, one must either (1) know the dialect or (2) have a secondary source
at hand (e.g., a glossed or footnoted text). The second, and more interesting,
difficulty is figuring out what the poem means, given that an absolutely literal
reading takes us only so far—and not very far at that (assuming that even the
sharpest of Scottish mice do not understand any English, be it Scots or Anglo). So
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the first textual gap that the reader must fill is to identify the addressee (typically
referred to in reader-response literature as the “narratee.”)
Ostensibly, the speaker is addressing a mouse whose nest he had turned up
with a plow in November of 1785. If we leave aside certain basic issues—such as
whether the speaker is Burns himself71 or merely a character created for dramatic
effect (cf. Browning’s narrators)—we see that the poem breaks into three sections,
each of which has a different tone and sense of urgency. The first section—which is
the longest, running from lines 1-36—recounts the actual events and expresses the
poet’s sorrow for frightening the mouse and destroying her nest and, more generally,
for man’s breaking of nature’s grand social bond that once connected all creatures
great and small. In the penultimate stanza (lines 37-42), the poet shifts from a tone
of regret to one of empathy—something like: “Mouse, my friend, I know how you
feel—you’re not the only one to have had your hopes dashed.” And by the final
stanza (lines 43-48), the order is reversed: by comparison, the mouse has it good
because she always lives in the present, with no sense of past disappointments and
trepidation at what may come.
As readers, we’re left to wonder what the progression of the poem is
supposed to mean. Is it a statement of the human condition? The penultimate stanza
is general in scope, speaking of “men” and “us,” which hints at something larger
than a personal dilemma. —But could it be something more idiosyncratic, perhaps a
statement of personal disappointment? The final stanza has five personal references
71 According to the notes to the poem, “Burns’s brother said that this poem
was composed on the occasion it describes.” 2 THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF
ENGLISH LITERATURE 92 (M.H. Abrams ed., 4th ed. 1979).
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(I/my/me), which suggests an individual discouragement. Does any of this turn on
the fact that the poet is a poet stuck behind a plow on a dreary November day?
Reader-response theorists would tell us that we can’t answer these questions with
reference solely to the text—the reader must engage the text to produce meaning.
Take the last question I posed. Is that even an important point? Why did I raise it?
Would every reader raise it? Did I raise it because it made me remember feeding
cattle on bitter January mornings, picking up hay in oppressive July heat, and a host
of other things that I would rather not have been doing as a boy on the Great Plains
of western Kansas? Perhaps. I can’t say because I can’t stand outside myself as a
neutral observer.72 But I can say that I feel a sense of partnership every time I read
this poem and mull it over. And that, I think, is what response theory tries to
conceptualize.
Legal texts raise analogous issues. Nowhere is this more true than with
respect to the United States Constitution, which is now over 200 years old. The
problem is essentially a conflict between the original meaning of particular
Constitutional provisions and contemporary mores. This issue typically arises in
one of two ways: either a practice that was clearly permissible at the time that the
Constitution was adopted is now condemned or vice versa. For example, much
current litigation involves the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and
unusual punishments.” The United States Supreme Court recently held that neither
72 It is equally difficult to trace influences from the writer’s side of the
equation. In a couple of fascinating essays on the subject of influences, Umberto
Eco describes the difficulties inherent in trying to determine whether, how, and to
what extent other texts and personal experiences have impacted his own work. See
UMBERTO ECO, Borges and My Anxiety of Influence & Intertextual Irony and Levels
of Reading, in ON LITERATURE, supra note 69, at 118-35, 212-35.
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mildly retarded nor minor convicted murderers can be executed because that would
constitute a “cruel and unusual” punishment.73 In both cases, the Court followed a
similar course of reasoning:
The prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments,” like other
expansive language in the Constitution, must be interpreted according to its
text, by considering history, tradition, and precedent, and with due regard for
its purpose and function in the constitutional design. To implement this
framework we have established the propriety and affirmed the necessity of
referring to “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society” to determine which punishments are so disproportionate as
to be cruel and unusual.74
What is most interesting in this formulation is that it first pretends to a
textualist interpretive mode (note the references to “text,” “history,” “tradition,”
“precedent”) but then sweeps that mode aside in favor of an ex post facto one that
substitutes current “standards of decency” for the original meaning of the phrase
“cruel and unusual punishments.” To be clear, there was no dispute that the phrase,
when drafted, would not have barred the execution of 16- or 17-year-old minors.
Indeed, the Court had held—only a decade and a half before—that “cruel and
unusual punishments” did not include the execution of minors (at least above a
certain age) within its meaning.75 Setting aside whether a Supreme Court opinion is
the best vehicle for enacting constitutional changes in a democracy (there are good
arguments on either side of the issue), there is no doubt that cases like Roper
demonstrate that modern readers of the Constitution are in some sense “making” its
73 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (retarded defendant); Roper v.
Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005) (minor defendant).
74 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1190.
75 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
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meaning. And that is the point that reader-response theorists have been making all
along.
Stanley Fish’s contribution to this debate has been to posit that the textualists
and the receptionists are both right (or both wrong, I suppose). For Fish, constraints
on textual interpretation do not reside solely within the text (they are not self-
constraints) but at the same time a reader’s interpretive license is not
unconstrained.76 How do we explain this paradox? In Is There a Text in This
Class?, Fish sets out to show that
it is interpretive communities, rather than either the text or the reader, that
produce meanings and are responsible for the emergence of formal features.
Interpretive communities are made up of those who share interpretive
strategies not for reading but for writing texts, for constituting their
properties. In other words these strategies exist prior to the act of reading
and therefore determine the shape of what is read rather than, as is usually
assumed, the other way around.77
The point here is that we are all members of (many) interpretive communities, each
of which authorizes only certain ways of seeing, of fact-finding if you will. We will
examine the consequences of Fish’s theory in a legal context more closely in a bit,
but for now, I want to look at the process more generally.
Susan Glaspell’s one-act play Trifles (also published as a short story, “A Jury
of Her Peers”) opens in the gloomy and disordered kitchen of Nebraska farmhouse
of a century ago. The owner of the farm, John Wright, has been murdered—
76 There are of course ways to cast this discussion other than in the terms of
reception theory. One could, for instance, think in terms of the interaction between
“legal subject” and “legal object.” For a very interesting and wide-ranging analysis
that takes this approach, see J.M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The
Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 YALE L.J. 105 (1993).
77 STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 14 (1980).
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strangled—and his wife has been taken into custody. Five characters occupy the
stage as the curtain rises: County Attorney Henderson, Sheriff Peters and his wife,
and two neighbors, Mr. and Mrs. Hale. Mr. Hale had stopped by the farmhouse the
day before and found Mrs. Wright sitting in the kitchen looking “queer.” She told
him that Mr. Wright had “died of a rope around his neck” and that she didn’t know
who did it because—although she slept in the same bed—she “sleep[s] sound.”
Because of that story’s incredibility, Mrs. Wright was arrested and held for murder.
From the opening lines, though, we sense that this will be a story less about murder
than about gender. Glaspell first puts this in spatial terms, showing how the men set
about to discover clues upon which they can construct a story of Mrs. Wright’s guilt:
“what was needed for the case was a motive; something to show anger, or—sudden
feeling.”78 But they take up this task from a decidedly masculine point-of-view,
looking only at the immediate crime scene and masculine spaces like the barn:
COUNTY ATTORNEY: [Looking around] I guess we’ll go upstairs first—
and then out to the barn and around there. [To the Sheriff] You’re
convinced that there was nothing important here—nothing that would point
to any motive.
SHERIFF: Nothing here but kitchen things.79
The men denigrate everything feminine, unable to see feminine artifacts as anything
other than “trifles.” But these “trifles” hold the key to the mystery, to the narrative:
78 SUSAN GLASPELL, TRIFLES, in LAW AND LITERATURE: TEXT AND THEORY
151-64 (Lenora Ledwon ed., 1996). Glaspell based the play on a notorious farmland
murder that she covered as a reporter in 1900. For further background on that
murder, see Patricia Bryan, Stories in Fiction and in Fact: Susan Glaspell’s A Jury
of Her Peers and the 1901 Murder Trial of Margaret Hossack, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1293 (1997).
79 Id. at 154.
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MRS. PETERS: She was piecing a quilt.
MRS. HALE: . . . I wonder if she was goin’ to quilt it or just knot it?
SHERIFF: They wonder if she was going to quilt it or just knot it!
[The men laugh, the women look abashed.]
MRS. HALE: [resentfully] I don’t know as there’s anything so strange, our
takin’ up our time with little things while we’re waiting for them to get the
evidence. I don’t see as it’s anything to laugh about. . . . Mrs. Peters, look at
this one. Here, this is the one she was working on, and look at the sewing!
All the rest of it has been so nice and even. And look at this! It’s all over the
place! Why, it looks as if she didn’t know what she was about!
[After she has said this, they look at each other, then start to glance back at
the door. After an instant Mrs. Hale has pulled at a knot and ripped the
sewing.]
MRS. PETERS: Oh, what are you doing, Mrs. Hale?
MRS. HALE: Just pulling out a stitch or two that's not sewed very good.
[Threading a needle]. Bad sewing always made me fidgety.
* * *
MRS. PETERS: Why, here’s a birdcage. Did she have a bird, Mrs. Hale?
MRS. HALE: Why, I don’t know whether she did or not—I’ve not been
here for so long. There was a man around last year selling canaries cheap,
but I don’t know as she took one; maybe she did. She used to sing real pretty
herself.
MRS. PETERS: Seems funny to think of a bird here. But she must have had
one, or why should she have a cage? I wonder what happened to it?
MRS. HALE: I s’pose maybe the cat got it.
MRS. PETERS: No, she didn’t have a cat. She’s got that feeling some
people have about cats—being afraid of them. My cat got in her room, and
she was real upset and asked me to take it out. . . . Why, look at this door.
It’s broke. One hinge is pulled apart.
MRS. HALE: Looks as if someone must have been rough with it.
MRS. PETERS: Why, yes.
MRS. HALE: I wish if they’re going to find any evidence they’d be about it.
I don’t like this place. . . . Did you know John Wright, Mrs. Peters?
197
MRS. PETERS: Not to know him; I’ve seen him in town. They say he was
a good man.
MRS. HALE: Yes—good; he didn’t drink, and kept his word as well as
most, I guess, and paid his debts. But he was a hard man, Mrs. Peters. Just
to pass the time of day with him. [Shivers.] Like a raw wind that gets to the
bone. . . . I should think she would ’a wanted a bird. But what do you
suppose went with it?
MRS. PETERS: I don’t know, unless it got sick and died.
[She reaches over and swings the broken door, swings it again; both women
watch it.]
MRS. HALE: She—come to think of it, she was kind of like a bird herself—
real sweet and pretty, but kind of timid and—fluttery. How—she—did—
change. . . . Tell you what, Mrs. Peters, why don’t you take the quilt in with
you? It might take up her mind.
MRS. PETERS: Why, I think that’s a real nice idea, Mrs. Hale. There
couldn’t possible be any objection to it, could there? Now, just what would I
take? I wonder if her patches are in here—and her things.
[They look in the sewing basket.]
MRS. HALE: Here’s some red. I expect this has got sewing things in it
(Brings out a fancy box.) What a pretty box. Looks like something
somebody would give you. Maybe her scissors are in here. (Opens box.
Suddenly puts her hand to her nose.) Why— (MRS. PETERS bends nearer,
then turns her face away.) There’s something wrapped up in this piece of
silk. . . . Oh, Mrs. Peters—it’s—
MRS. PETERS: It’s the bird.
MRS. HALE: But, Mrs. Peters—look at it. Its neck! Look at its neck! It’s
all—other side to.
MRS. PETERS: Somebody—wrung—its neck.
[Their eyes meet. A look of growing comprehension of horror. Steps are
heard outside. Mrs. Hale slips box under quilt pieces, and sinks into her
chair. . . . ]
MRS. HALE: She liked the bird. She was going to bury it in that pretty box.
MRS. PETERS: When I was a girl—my kitten—there was a boy took a
hatchet, and before my eyes—and before I could get there—If they hadn’t
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held me back, I would have—(Catches herself, looks upstairs, where steps
are heard, falters weakly.)—hurt him.80
MRS. HALE: I wonder how it would seem never to have had any children
around. No, Wright wouldn’t like the bird—a thing that sang. She used to
sing. He killed that, too.
MRS. PETERS: We don’t know who killed the bird.
MRS. HALE: I knew John Wright. . . .
MRS. PETERS: We don’t know who killed him. We don’t know.
MRS. HALE: If there’d been years and years of nothing, then a bird to sing
to you, it would be awful—still, after the bird was still. . . .
MRS. PETERS: My, it’s a good thing the men couldn’t hear us. Wouldn’t
they just laugh! Getting all stirred up over a little thing like a—dead canary.
As if that could have anything to do with—with—wouldn’t they laugh!
MRS. HALE: Maybe they would—maybe they wouldn’t. [Mrs. Hale soon
hides the canary and its box.]81
The men end the play as they began it: literally and figuratively clueless.
They are so trapped within their masculinity that they cannot read the signs that are
so obvious to the women. In other words, they cannot construct a text—a coherent
narrative—that will make sense of the crime. As a result, the murderer will likely go
free, as the County Attorney predicts: “No, Peters, it’s all perfectly clear except a
reason for doing it. But you know juries when it comes to women. If there was
some definite thing. Something to show—something to make a story about—a thing
that would connect up with this strange way of doing it—.”82 The women, on the
80 This image of masculine cruelty is not unique in female-authored literature
of the time. An incident in Willa Cather’s A Lost Lady, in which a boy slits the eyes
of a woodpecker, comes to mind as a parallel.
81 Id. at 157-63.
82 Id. at 163.
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other hand have not only solved the murder but justified it to their own satisfaction
as well. In other words, as the play’s final line ironically suggests, they have tied up
all the loose ends:
COUNTY ATTORNEY: [Facetiously] Well, Henry, at least we found out
that she was not going to quilt it. She was going to—what is it you call it,
ladies!
MRS. HALE: [Her hand against her pocket] We call it—knot it, Mr.
Henderson.83
Trifles teaches us that membership in an interpretive community in some
sense controls what types of evidence we can find and what types of narrative we
can construct to explain a terminal fact. The consequences of this are profound, as
we will now see in the context of trials. As I mentioned before, most legal actors are
members of an educational and social elite. In nearly all cases in the U.S., judges
and counsel are lawyers, which normally implies at least seven years of higher
education, including—most importantly—three years of law school. Law school
culture differs in many ways from other graduate education (and even other
professional training), in that its primary mission is to teach students to what is often
referred to as “think like a lawyer.” As a result of this training, which Philip Kissam
has likened (echoing Michel Foucault) to a “discipline,” lawyers accede to
membership in a specialized interpretive community.84
But lawyers are not the only interpreters in the judicial system. Juries, which
only rarely include lawyers, are an important, if imperfect, counterweight. Different
83 Id. at 164.
84 PHILIP C. KISSAM, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW SCHOOLS: THE MAKING OF
MODERN LAWYERS 7 (2003).
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mythologies have grown up around jury practice, so I think it is probably worth a
moment to map out some borders. Over the course of American history, pressure
from two sources conspired to push jury membership away from elite interpretive
communities and into the hands of the laity: a belief that juries should represent a
cross-section of society and a suspicion that certain types of jurors may be too
knowledgeable and too sophisticated to be impartial. Both of these positions are
important to our discussion of interpretive communities, so we need to consider each
of them in greater detail. First, the notion that a jury should represent a cross-section
of society is of much more recent vintage than is typically assumed. Indeed, less
than 50 years ago, federal courts still impaneled “blue-ribbon” juries. According to
Jeffrey Abramson, “[t]he theory was that justice required above average levels of
intelligence, morality, and integrity. In place of random selection, therefore, jury
commissioners typically solicited the names ‘of men of recognized intelligence and
probity’ from notables or ‘key men’ of the community.”85 In short, jurors were often
drawn from the group of cultural elites of which lawyers were a subset.
Congress swept this system aside with the 1968 Jury Selection and Service
Act, which declared that it would henceforth be “the policy of the United States that
all litigants in Federal courts entitled to a trial by jury shall have the right to grand
and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the community.”86
The Supreme Court soon extended this policy to state courts as a matter of
85 JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF
DEMOCRACY 99 (1994 & 2000).
86 Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C., §§ 1861-69).
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constitutional law.87 As an immediate consequence, the “elite,” all-white jury
disappeared, replaced by one more (although not perfectly) representative of the
community at large.88 In some ways, this movement mirrors the larger cultural
movement that has successively extended the democratic franchise to larger and
larger groups. But the secondary consequences of replacing elite jurors with truly
lay jurors are profound. This is so because, as we will soon see, members of non-
elite interpretive communities sometimes evaluate trial narratives in ways that seem
extratextual to members of the elite, legal interpretive community. In thinking this
through, we must therefore ask whether interpretive perspective (necessarily) comes
at the expense of interpretive expertise.
We can now turn to the second force that has served to level the interpretive
sophistication of jurors—the passion for “impartiality.”89 Jurors should be
impartial. As stated, I don’t think that this proposition would draw much fire. But
if we begin to unpack the word “impartial,” we see connotations that probably
should be viewed as problematic. On the one hand, the term means things that could
be labeled as universal virtues, things like “unbiased,” “not prejudiced,” and
87 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975).
88 The cross-sectional ideal has never been fully realized, in part because jury
pools tend to be based on public records (like voting rolls) that underrepresent
certain groups and because peremptory challenges still have a palpable influence on
the composition of seated juries, even though they can no longer be used to strike
prospective jurors solely for racial or gender reasons. See ABRAMSON, supra note
85, at 11-12; Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (banning race-based
peremptory challenges).
89 Abramson persuasively argues that this is a recent phenomenon: “To look
at the history of juries in the United States is to see that insistence on disqualifying
prospective jurors for knowing or caring too much about a case was not always
typical of jury selection.” Id. at 21.
202
“evenhanded.” On the other hand, though, impartiality too often gets defined as
“ignorance.”90 As Abramson notes, it is this view of impartiality that Mark Twain
burlesques to great effect in Roughing It when he charges that “[t]he jury system
puts a ban upon intelligence and honesty, and a premium upon ignorance, stupidity
and perjury.”91 To illustrate this point, Twain tells the story of a particular jury trial:
I remember one of those sorrowful farces, in Virginia, which we call a jury
trial. A noted desperado killed Mr. B., a good citizen, in the most wanton
and cold-blooded way. Of course the papers were full of it, and all men
capable of reading, read about it. And of course all men not deaf and dumb
and idiotic, talked about it. A jury-list was made out, and Mr. B. L., a
prominent banker and a valued citizen, was questioned precisely as he would
have been questioned in any court in America:
“Have you heard of this homicide?”
“Yes.”
“Have you held conversations upon the subject?”
“Yes.”
“Have you formed or expressed opinions about it?”
“Yes.”
“Have you read the newspaper accounts of it?”
“Yes.”
“We do not want you.”
A minister, intelligent, esteemed, and greatly respected; a merchant of high
character and known probity; a mining superintendent of intelligence and
unblemished reputation; a quartz mill owner of excellent standing, were all
questioned in the same way, and all set aside. Each said the public talk and
the newspaper reports had not so biased his mind but that sworn testimony
90 Id. at 22.
91 However true this may be, it runs counter to the historical roots of the jury
system, in which the original British juries were comprised of “men drawn from the
neighborhood who were taken to have knowledge of all the relevant facts (anyone
who was ignorant was rejected) . . ..” PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 8 (1966).
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would overthrow his previously formed opinions and enable him to render a
verdict without prejudice and in accordance with the facts. But of course
such men could not be trusted with the case. Ignoramuses alone could mete
out unsullied justice.
When the peremptory challenges were all exhausted, a jury of twelve men
was impaneled--a jury who swore they had neither heard, read, talked about
nor expressed an opinion concerning a murder which the very cattle in the
corrals, the Indians in the sage-brush and the stones in the streets were
cognizant of! It was a jury composed of two desperadoes, two low beer-
house politicians, three bar-keepers, two ranchmen who could not read, and
three dull, stupid, human donkeys! It actually came out afterward, that one
of these latter thought that incest and arson were the same thing.
The verdict rendered by this jury was, Not Guilty. What else could one
expect?92
The logical fault underlying this type of jury selection is that it equates
knowledge with bias. I think that Abramson is exactly right to state that cases in
which the parties go to extraordinary lengths to find ignorant jurors “illustrate what
we might call a process of deselecting well-informed citizens, as if civic
engagement, concern for the issues on trial, and interest in reading the papers were
enemies of fair-mindedness.”93 It remains to be seen whether this prejudice against
the well-informed can have a salutary social impact. It certainly may (assuming that
juries are not packed with absolute dolts), but—in any event—I think that we can
learn a great deal from studying the ways in which non-elite jurors interpret trial
narratives and construct narratives that justify (to them) verdicts in particular cases.
92 MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT Ch. 48 (Hartford: American 1873), available
at http://www.mtwain.com/Roughing_It/49.html.
93 ABRAMSON, supra note 85, at 53. Abramson goes on to identify the trial of
Oliver North on charges stemming from the Iran-contra scandal as the “high-water
mark” of the ignorance-as-impartiality theory of jury selection. There, “[t]he only
persons whose impartiality was intact were those rarities who could say that they
‘saw North on television but it was like watching the Three Stooges or something’
or that all they remembered was ‘that it was about something overseas.’” Id. at 21.
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The results are sometimes surprising, most often, I think, when and because jurors
are members of minority (and I don’t mean this just in the racial and ethnic sense,
though that is certainly an important part of it) interpretive communities that are
under the sway of ontological and public narratives very different from those of the
mainstream majority. And as we will see in the examples that follow, particular
cases can have universal consequences.
5. A Study in Contrasts: The Rodney King and O.J. Simpson Juries
In keeping with many of the cases that we have reviewed to this point,
controversial jury verdicts pop up more often than not in cases with a strong racial
undercurrent. Perhaps nothing can illustrate this principle better than a comparison
of the famed Rodney King and O.J. Simpson trials, both of which took place at
about the same time and in about the same place. It is the second “about” that I want
us to keep in mind as we consider the two cases. For as I think the cases bear out, a
difference of a few miles between actual communities can represent a manifold gulf
between interpretive communities.
Most of the salient facts of the Rodney King case were never in dispute.
King, a recent parolee, and two friends were cruising one of Los Angeles’ freeways
on a Saturday night “looking for some action.”94 At some point, King tried to elude
a California Highway Patrol car, leading the officers, who were soon joined by,
among others, several officers of the Los Angeles Police Department, on a high-
speed chase through the Los Angeles foothills. After the police forced the car to a
94 JEWELLE TAYLOR GIBBS, RACE AND JUSTICE: RODNEY KING AND O. J.
SIMPSON IN A HOUSE DIVIDED 28 (1996).
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halt, King “came out of the car mugging and dancing a little jig.”95 He did not
immediately submit to the officers, and the confrontation between King and the
officers escalated. A crowd began to gather, one member of which, George
Holliday, turned a video camera on the scene. What Holliday’s video camera
captured was a large black man on the ground, closely ringed by four police officers.
While one officer shot him with taser darts, the others struck him with their batons
and kicked him. The officers then pulled him around with the wires from an electric
harpoon, with which they ultimately tied him. Throughout the eighty-one-second
video, the officers can be heard yelling at King, who at least twice can be seen
getting to his hands and knees. The video also shows a number of other officers
looking on but neither intervening nor participating. Throughout the incident,
King’s two companions lay stretched out in a prone position, watched by two
officers.
Within a couple of days, Holliday’s video tape had made its way onto the
national news. Politicians, civil rights activists, and ordinary citizens immediately
expressed outrage at what appeared to be an open-and-shut case of police brutality.
In accordance with this tide of public opinion, the Los Angeles district attorney
quickly convened a grand jury, which even more quickly found that there was
sufficient evidence to indict the four officers for criminal assault and use of
excessive force. The four officers did not, however, crumple in the face of the
indictments. Rather, they went on the offensive, successfully challenging both the
95 Id. at 29. Unless otherwise noted, the following factual recitations are
drawn from Gibbs’ account; I have tried, however, to strip them of at least some of
Gibbs’ pro-King diction.
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original judge assigned to the case and then—most important for our purposes—the
Los Angeles venue for which the trial was slated (on the ground that pretrial
publicity made a fair trial impossible in Los Angeles).
Simi Valley, the Los Angeles suburb to which the King-beating trial was
transferred, is a bedroom community about thirty-five miles northwest of downtown
Los Angeles. At the time of trial, the area was “predominantly white, middle-class,
and native-born,” with “a well-earned local reputation as a bastion of law and order,
family values, and conservative political views.”96 Not surprising, then, the court
seated a jury that reflected the population of Simi Valley (which was less than 2%
black): ten whites, one Asian, and one Hispanic. And moreover, the jury shared
significant attributes of the defendants:
The majority of the jury (nine of twelve) had served in the military or been
employed in the defense industry. Five men had served in the Navy, and two
women had been in the armed forces. There were over two thousand police
families living in the Simi Valley area, and one of the jurors was the brother
of a retired police sergeant. Three members of the jury were members of the
National Rifle Association. This was a jury who would resonate to the
themes of law and order, to protect and serve, to support the local police.97
All trials involve the competing personal narratives of the primary actors, as
well as the larger cultural narratives that frame them. In the King-beating case, this
meant that the jury’s task was, for the most part, to interpret the “text” of the
videotape and determine whether it represented the story of a “gentle giant”
wrongfully attacked by goonish LAPD officers or that of a feral “gorilla in the mist”
who presented a danger to not only the officers on call that night, but to society as
96 Id. at 38.
97 Id. at 49.
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well.98 To some degree, the interpretive die was cast when the prosecution made the
tactical decision not to call Rodney King to the stand, which meant that the
defendants were able to give an essentially unrebutted interpretation of the damning
videotape. A benign interpretation of the tape was first supported by an unbroken
line of testimony implying that not only had King been drunk that night, but that he
was “dusted” (i.e., under the influence of PCP, a drug known to make users
superaggressive and violent). But the most powerful evidence turned out to be the
tape itself, which the defense cleverly “renarrated” through the use of slow motion,
no sound, and a frame-by-frame analysis.99 This renarration was supplemented by
expert testimony, which—as critical race theorists Kimberle Crenshaw and Gary
Peller posit—served to recontextualize the incident within recognized and
appropriate police procedure:
The defense attorneys . . . had frame-by-frame stills made of each video,
which were mounted on clean white illustration board, and then used as a
basis for questions to “experts” on prisoner restraint. . . . Once the video was
broken up like this, each still picture could then be reweaved into a different
narrative about the restraint of King, one in which each blow to King
represented, not beating one of the “gorillas in the mist,” but a police-
approved technique of restraint complete with technical names for each
baton strike (or “stroke”).100
98 Shortly before the beating, one of the four officers had been called to
investigate a domestic-violence incident involving a black family. That officer sent
a computer message to officers in another car stating that he had been dealing with
“gorillas in the mist.” Id. at 42. The prosecution in the King-beating case and
subsequent commentators picked up on the phrase as evidence of rampant racism in
the LAPD.
99 For an interesting discussion of the “story” told by a videotape, compare
the majority and dissenting opinions of Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens in Scott v.
Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).
100 Id. at 46 (quoting Kimberle Crenshaw & Gary Peller, Reel Time/Reel
Justice, in READING RODNEY KING 56-70 (Robert Gooding-Williams ed., 1993)).
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In their closing arguments, the defense lawyers were tasked with assuring
that the deconstructed version of the videotape would be accepted as “what really
happened” and that it would thus be interpreted in a way tending to support not-
guilty verdicts. In other words, they had to make sure that their narrative version of
the facts plausibly fitted within a high-order narrative shared by the jurors. They did
this in two related ways, one particular, one general. First, they dehumanized King
by referring to him with a thinly veiled racial vocabulary: “bull,” “bear” and—with
no little irony—“gorilla.” Second, they repeatedly reminded the jury of “the ‘thin
blue line’ that separates law-abiding citizens from criminals, that separates
‘civilization from chaos,’ and, by inference, that separates middle-class suburbs
from the inner-city jungle.”101 All this was calculated to summon white,
conservative fears of marauding inner-city blacks overrunning the suburbs and, as
Gibbs puts it, “destroying their way of life.”102
This tactic proved successful: the jury—after only six hours of
deliberation—acquitted three of the four officers of all charges and found the fourth
guilty of only one count of use of excessive force. In some sense, this outcome
was—if not inevitable—something that the jury was predisposed to render. Why?
The presence (some would say omnipresence) of experts in trials adds a layer of
interpretive complexity to a jury’s task. That is, a typical jury these days must not
only interpret and evaluate “ordinary” trial narratives but the supposedly
disinterested meta-narratives of expert authority figures. For a very interesting
evaluation of this issue (with a particular focus on the King-beating case), see Curtis
E. Renoe, Seeing Is Believing?: Expert Testimony and the Construction of
Interpretive Authority in an American Trial, 9 INT’L J. SEMIOTICS 115 (1996).
101 Id. at 51.
102 Id.
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The jurors were not just members of a geographic community; they were members
of an interpretive community. In other words, the jury members were constrained to
read the videotape in the context of their own shared values and experiences. Thus,
as Gibbs astutely observes,
They had processed the infamous videotape according to their own
interactions with the police, which was the only way that they were able to
make sense of what they saw and what they heard. Just as Rodney King’s
thoughts, feelings, and actions had been irrevocably shaped by his
experiences as a black man in America, so too had these jurors’ thoughts,
feelings, and actions been shaped by their very different sets of experiences.
They were all—the victim, the defendants, the jurors, and the judge—
captives of their past racial history in the American society.103
Of course these actors—although the principal ones in the trial itself—were
not the only people to read and interpret the video, as subsequent events soon
showed. Within hours, violence erupted in South Central Los Angeles; the riots
lasted for four days. The verdict in the King-beating case certainly triggered these
riots, but they were representative of greater social ills. In fact, many black
Angelinos saw the King videotape as a commonplace example of police brutality
practiced against members of their minority community and the verdict as a majority
exoneration of those practices. The riots were, then—as John Mack, the then-
president of the Los Angeles Urban League, explained—“a manifestation of a whole
lot of things—injustice in the criminal justice system, reaction to the rampant police
brutality that is so blatant in our community, particularly in relation to young
African-American males. It was an expression, an acting-out of the have-nots.”104
103 Id. at 51-52.
104 Id. at 54 (quoting interview with John W. Mack (Oct. 29, 1993)).
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Put differently, it answered the rhetorical question that Langston Hughes poses at the
end of “Dream Deferred”:
What happens to a dream deferred?
Does it dry up
like a raisin in the sun?
Or fester like a sore—
And then run?
Does it stink like rotten meat?
Or crust and sugar over—
like a syrupy sweet?
Maybe it just sags
like a heavy load.
Or does it explode?105
I’ll come back to the consequences of the sort of social combustion generated by
friction between interpretive communities, but another example—this one based on
a jury that mirrored a very different community from that of the King-beating case—
will round out the context of our discussion.
Just a couple of years after the King-beating trial, another racially charged
case captured headlines across the country. Football star-cum-general celebrity O. J.
Simpson was charged with murdering his ex-wife, Nicole Brown Simpson, and a
friend, Ronald Goldman, outside her west-Los Angeles condominium. There was a
mountain of circumstantial evidence against Simpson, much of it based on the type
of scientific evidence (blood and other forensic evidence linking Simpson to the
crime) that is routinely sufficient to convict less famous and less affluent defendants.
But as a counterweight, the defensive Dream Team (which included Johnnie
Cochran, Robert Shapiro, F. Lee Bailey, Alan Dershowitz, Barry Scheck, and Peter
105 Langston Hughes, Dream Deferred (1951) (italics original).
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Neufeld) was able to construct a compelling narrative built on evidence of police
bungling, racism, and cover-ups.106 And all this was presented to a jury that was
very different from the Simi Valley jury that heard the King-beating case: nine
blacks (eight of whom were women), two white women, and one Hispanic man.107
From the outset, the Simpson trial was infused with a racial subtext, a
subtext deeply informed by the narrative that grew out of the King-beating case:
“jury consultants on both sides considered a person’s race to be an important
indicator of preconceptions about the case. The defense expert Jo-Ellan Dimitrius
compiled survey results showing that the Rodney King episode had increased
distrust of the police among all demographic groups in Los Angeles, but that African
Americans were off the chart.”108 Thus, the defense lawyers were charged with a
fairly narrow mission: give the predominantly African-American jury a credible
narrative upon which the jury members could hang their predilection to doubt the
bona fides of the LAPD. As Abramson explains,
106 GIBBS, supra note 94, at 164-79. For example, Mark Fuhrman, the
detective who was responsible for much of the incriminating evidence found on
Simpson’s estate, was exposed at trial as an extreme racist and a perjurer. And other
detectives could not adequately explain the chain of custody for much of the
damning blood evidence, which credible defense experts further undermined with
testimony of contamination.
107 These numbers reflect the final jury that rendered the decision (i.e., after
certain jurors were excused and replaced with alternates). Id. at 218-19. In another
reversal of the King-beating case, the district attorney chose to try Simpson
“downtown” rather than in relatively affluent Santa Monica, which was the
courthouse closest to where the crimes took place. As a consequence of that
decision, the jury pool automatically diversified. Nonetheless, the number of blacks
selected as jurors and alternates (fifteen of twenty-four) surprised many. See
ABRAMSON, supra note 85, at xiii.
108 ABRAMSON, supra note 85, at xiii.
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The key here was to disturb the jury with a story that begins with arresting
officers jumping to the conclusion that Simpson must be guilty from the
moment they learn the murdered woman is his ex-wife. So certain are the
officers that they do not bother to conduct a thorough search. Maybe they
make it easy on themselves by planting evidence to frame a man they
presume guilty.109
This narrative proved controlling: the jury found Simpson not guilty in less than
four hours, despite the nine-month trial and correspondingly lengthy trial transcript
(running some 45,000 pages).
As with the King-beating verdict, public reaction to the Simpson trial and
subsequent verdict was sharply divided along racial lines.110 An overwhelming
number of whites found the notion of a police conspiracy against Simpson
preposterous; a corresponding percentage of blacks saw the verdict as a legitimate
expression of reasonable doubt, especially in light of the LAPD’s treatment of
Simpson in particular and African-Americans in general.111 As subsequent events
were to show, each group’s position had merit: in 1997 Simpson was found
109 Id. at xi.
110 Compare, for instance, the contemporaneous reactions of author Shirlee
Haizlip and political/social commentator George Will:
The verdict stunningly affirmed the recognition that, along with the
nonblacks, the black people on the jury practiced the law-abiding behavior
that they had been socialized by and conditioned to: they believed they were
obligated to follow both the judge’s instructions and the letter of the law.
For them, the “mountain of evidence” was, at best, a sand castle of
possibilities.
Incited by Johnnie Cochran to turn the trial into a political caucus, the jurors
did that instead of doing their duty of rendering a just verdict concerning two
extremely violent deaths. The jurors abused their position in order to send a
message about racism or political corruption.
GIBBS, supra note 94, at 218, 219-20.
111 Id. at xii.
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responsible for the deaths of his ex-wife and Ronald Goldman in civil suits brought
by the Goldman and Brown families; the so-called “Rampart-division” scandals of
the late 1990s revealed wide-spread corruption (including evidence planting and
perjury) in the LAPD’s anti-gang unit.112 But most of us who followed the case even
slightly remember the divide in terms of the endlessly looped television footage of
law-student reaction at mostly black Howard University (jubilation) juxtaposed with
that of mostly white students at another school (somber mourning).113 Abramson is
right, I think in holding that this “juxtaposition of cheers and tears showed that the
trial of O. J. Simpson had ceased to be a murder case. Somewhere along the line,
the trial turned into a political event . . ..”114
What this signals is the volatility that ensues when large swaths of the
population belong to interpretive communities so vastly different that they cannot
read ordinary events in the same way. At the interpretive level that takes place at
trial and in the jury room, the jurors must reconstruct the evidence they have heard
in a way that is not just internally coherent but externally coherent with the larger
cultural narratives in which they believe. Patrick Hogan explains how this process
works as a matter of cognitive science.115 First, a jury is bombarded with a host of
112 With respect to the wrongful death judgment against Simpson, see Brown
v. Simpson, Case No. SC036876 (LA Sup. Ct.); Goldman v. Simpson, Case No.
SC036340 (LA Sup. Ct.). With respect to the Rampart scandal, see
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/lapd/scandal/.
113 This is another example of the public reinterpretation of legal narratives
that we discussed in connection with the multiple endings of Billy Budd.
114 ABRAMSON, supra note 85, at xii.
115 PATRICK COLM HOGAN, COGNITIVE SCIENCE, LITERATURE, AND THE ARTS:
A GUIDE FOR HUMANISTS (2003).
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fragmentary and decontextualized “discourse.” In the Simpson case, the jurors
heard months of testimony and viewed dozens of exhibits. From the prosecution
side, for instance, they learned about bloody gloves found at the murder scene and
behind Simpson’s estate that resembled gloves he had previously worn and about
footprints at the crime scene that were made by unusual shoes that Simpson was
known to have owned, as well as that Simpson had previously beaten his wife and
had “dreamed” about killing her. From the defense side, the jury members learned
that the blood evidence may have been tainted, that the police could not explain why
they entered Simpson’s estate without a warrant and that one of the key prosecution
witnesses was a racist and a liar. Second, from this disjointed “discourse” the jury
had to create a “story,” just as a reader of a literary text would:
In life as in art we only have the discontinuous, partially disordered
fragments of experience. We are in much the same cognitive situation in the
two cases. Unsurprisingly, then, we follow the same cognitive procedures.
Specifically, given an array of fragments, we construct agents, objects,
action, events, and causal sequences, hoping we “get the story straight.”
Here, as elsewhere, the human mind proceeds in the same way, whether it is
dealing with nature or with art.116
Drawing on insights of narratologists David Bordwell and Richard Gerrig,
Hogan explains that we transmute discourse into narrative through the agency of a
cognitive tertium quid that he calls “procedural schemas.”117 These schemas are
“cognitive structures of action,” by which he refers to the way in which the mind
works and is structured. “They allow us to do everything from walk to play music.
116 Id. at 116.
117 Id. at 117.
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In the case of narrative, they allow us to construct the story from the discourse.”118
Most important for us, these structures are at least partially subjective, idiosyncratic,
and experience based. For example, if I hear someone say the word “pet,” my mind
usually summons up the word “dog” and—depending on the context—the name and
images of my childhood dog, a sable collie named Laddie, or one of our two current
dogs, dachshunds named Sallie Ann and Senior. Someone else’s mind would have a
different cognitive structure and consequent lexical links, links that might not make
a first-order connection between “pet” and “dog”—perhaps “cat” instead. This is
not to suggest, however, that the range is open-ended—very few people, I think,
would immediately connect “pet” with “giraffe” and even fewer (I hope) with
“vacuum cleaner” or “nuclear reactor.” But we must bear in mind that interpretive
narratives (narratives constructed to make sense of raw data or competing narratives)
are always partially a function of the interpreter’s experience:
[Narrative] construction involves, first of all, the application of a vast wealth
of information—prominently including an array of representational
schemas—from our experience in the real world. Speaking of literary
narrative, Gerrig points out that “readers . . . must construct . . . situation
models, which integrate information from the text with broader real-world
knowledge.” Indeed, we evidently follow “a principle of minimal
departure,” according to which we assume maximum continuity between the
real world and the world of fiction. In other words, we basically assume that
the world of the story is identical with the world of our lived experience
except in those specific cases where there is a direct contradiction from the
narrative.119
118 Id.; see also WILLIAM SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS:
PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 25 (2007) (discussing mastery of
“schemas” as a hallmark of expertise).
119 Id. at 117.
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To put this in the context of the Simpson case, the jury members were
required to draw upon the world of their “lived experience” to determine, for
instance, whether the infamous bloody gloves fit better within a narrative in which
(a) Simpson dropped the gloves in his haste to flee the crime scene and
surreptitiously reenter his estate without detection or (b) overzealous and racist
LAPD officers planted the gloves to enhance the possibility of convicting the
suspect that they had already deemed guilty. Similarly, the jurors in the King-
beating case were asked to decide whether the infamous tape showed an out-of-
control “gorilla” who refused to be subdued or out-of-control police officers having
sport with a hapless “gentle giant.” Gibbs concludes, in conceptual agreement with
Hogan’s cognitive theory of narrative interpretation, that each of these juries was
constrained by its respective community to interpret the facts as it did:
[T]here is a famous principle in psychology that governs the way all human
beings process new information—the principle of cognitive dissonance. This
principle states that people more easily assimilate information that fits in
with or is consistent with their prior knowledge, beliefs, and experiences and
will tend to reject information that is not consistent with their prior
understanding of the world. Thus the jurors in Simi Valley were inclined to
believe the police officers’ defense because it was consistent with their prior
experiences and beliefs about the police. In contrast, the jurors in the
Simpson case were inclined to disbelieve the testimony of the police because
of their prior experiences and beliefs about police misconduct. In both cases,
these jurors viewed the evidence, processed it, and evaluated it in terms of
their own worldview and personal experiences.120
120 GIBBS, supra note 94, at 227. The idea that different geographic
communities may constitute separate interpretive communities would seem to be
one that courts and legislatures tacitly accept. For example, certain types of cases
(obscenity and medical malpractice come quickly to mind) must be decided
according to “community standards.” See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 37
(1973) (“obscenity is to be determined by applying ‘contemporary community
standards’”); Tresa Baldas, Movement Building to Abolish ‘Locality Rules’ in Med-
Mal Litigation, NAT. L.J. (July 23, 2007), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/
article.jsp?id=1184956607754 (finding that “21 states still retain laws dictating that
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This fits neatly within the framework of Fish’s interpretive-community
theory, which—at bottom—is as much an account of interpretive disagreement as of
agreement.121 For as Fish explains, if one believes in single determinate meanings,
then “disagreement can only be a theological error. The truth lies plainly in view,
available to anyone who has eyes to see; but some readers choose not to see it and
perversely substitute their own meanings for the meanings that texts obviously
bear.”122 This belief is rooted in the more general belief that disagreements can be
resolved by reference to “facts.” But this line of argument is circular: as Eagleton
observes, “[a]n interpretation on which everyone is likely to agree is one way of
defining a fact.”123 Thus, within the context of the Simpson case, it does little good
for one side or the other to point to the gloves as a dispositive “fact” because,
reverting to Fish, “not everyone believes the same thing or, to be more precise, not
everyone’s perceptions are a function of the same set of beliefs, and so there will not
be one but many standard stories in which the world will be differently constituted,
with different facts, values, ways of arguing, evidentiary procedures, and so on.”124
a doctor’s performance be measured against standards existing in that physician’s
community”).
121 FISH, supra note 77, at 338.
122 Id.
123 EAGLETON, supra note 61, at 86.
124 FISH, supra note 77, at 199. Put in the form of an aphorism, I think Fish’s
theory boils down to this: “We don’t see things as they are, we see them as we are.”
ANAIS NIN, SEDUCTION OF THE MINOTAUR 124 (1961).
218
So where one person may see a “cause” or a “motive,” another person may see a non
sequitur.125
To extend this point a little, I think we can fairly conclude that belief in
different public narratives can produce different facts. As we have seen in the King-
beating case (and to a lesser extent in the Simpson case), different public
narratives—when they come into contact with one another—can produce explosive
results. Oddly enough, though, pro-democratic consequences can flow from
volcanic social eruption. And I think that the jury system both facilitates the
exchange and ameliorates possible consequences. What I mean is this: most
institutional processes take place behind a veneer of relatively genteel discourse, in
which representatives of “The People” rarely say (or even know) what their
constituents are actually thinking. Institutional actors speak in what Yeats called
“polite meaningless words” that conceal more than they reveal.126 Juries and their
verdicts, by contrast, often disclose how relatively insular groups see the world. The
truth thereby unmasked can be ugly, but it can also facilitate institutional change
more quickly than would otherwise be possible. The reaction to the King-beating
verdict is a perfect example. Prior to the South Central riots and the Simpson
acquittal, there was little public discourse about racism in the LAPD. All that
changed after the disturbances. This came at a high price, of course, but perhaps not
125 Cf. MACCORMICK, supra note 5, at 222 (explaining principles of
“universal causation” and “rational motivation” as tools for understanding and
reconstructing past events).
126 William Butler Yeats, Easter 1916 (1916, 1920), ll. 6 & 8.
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as high as it might have been had the grievances of the minority communities in Los
Angeles continued to fester. After all, a riot is better than a revolution.
6. Is Jury Nullification Democratic and Within the Rule of Law?
Before leaving juries and turning in earnest to a theory of democratic legal
interpretation, I want to consider one additional pro-democratic aspect of the jury
system. Although both the King-beating case and the Simpson case have been
labeled as instances of “jury nullification,” that label is not apt. Nullification occurs
when a jury declines to follow the law as instructed.127 In the Simpson case, for
instance, the jury did not simply decide not to enforce the California law against
murder; rather, it found that the State of California had not met its burden of proof
for the reasons that we just examined.128 To illustrate this contrast, a brief look at
United States v. Marion Barry will be helpful.129
127 See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the
Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 700 (1995):
Jury nullification occurs when a jury acquits a defendant who it believes is
guilty of the crime with which he is charged. In finding the defendant not
guilty, the jury refuses to be bound by the facts of the case or the judge’s
instructions regarding the law. Instead, the jury votes its conscience.
128 It is, of course, difficult to tell with any degree of certainty exactly what
motivates any given jury to acquit. Given the sacrosanct “black box” of the jury as
it deliberates, the most that we can typically learn comes after-the-fact and is thereby
subject to the taint of faulty recollections, rationalizations, and lies. See generally
Note, Second Circuit Holds that Juror’s Intent to Nullify Is Just Cause for
Dismissal, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1347, 1352 (1998).
129 U.S. v. Barry, No. 90-0068, 1990 WL 174907 (D. D.C. Oct. 26, 1990),
aff’d, 938 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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In 1990, Marion Barry, an African-American, was the mayor of the District
of Columbia, the population of which was about two-thirds black.130 He was
enormously popular in the black community, but rumors of drug use and “chasing
women” continuously swirled around him. One day in January of that year,
Rasheeda Moore, an old friend of the mayor, contacted him and let him know that
she was in town for a short visit. Later that day, Barry dropped by her hotel and
invited her to meet him in the lobby for a drink. Moore suggested instead that he
join her in her room, which he did. The two talked for a while, and at some point
Moore produced crack cocaine and a pipe, which Barry eventually smoked (after
first declining). FBI agents and DC police officers then burst into the room and
arrested Barry, who learned that Moore was an informant and that their entire
encounter had been videotaped. Barry was later charged with over a dozen criminal
counts, including allegations of conspiracy to possess cocaine, possession of
cocaine, and perjury for lying to the grand jury that had investigated him.
After his arrest and indictment, Barry publicly proclaimed that he was the
victim of a racist prosecution. At trial, the jury apparently agreed, finding Barry
guilty of only one misdemeanor charge of cocaine possession, while acquitting him
on another and deadlocking on the remaining twelve. Among the charges on which
the jury refused to convict was one based on the videotaped FBI sting operation.
This result came about in a matter in which the trial judge (a white male)
subsequently stated that he had “never seen a stronger Government case” and that
the evidence of Barry’s guilt was “overwhelming” on nearly all of the thirteen
130 The following account is drawn from Butler, supra note 127, at 681-82,
which is itself based on several accounts in the popular press.
221
counts on which the jury acquitted or deadlocked.131 The judge singled out four
jurors for particular blame, finding that each had lied during jury selection to gain a
seat and use that seat to acquit. As a matter of policy, the judge concluded, “the jury
is not a minidemocracy or a minilegislature. They are not to go back and do right as
they see fit. That’s anarchy. They are supposed to follow the law.”132
But is this right? Must a jury always follow the law? To be clear, the Barry
case was not one in which the jurors reached an interpretation of the evidence that
seemed out of step with that of a dominant interpretive community. Rather, it was a
straightforward case of jury nullification—i.e., there was no doubt that Barry was
caught smoking crack, so the jury’s verdict can only be explained as a refusal to
apply the law as instructed. Now of course the root cause of nullification and
interpretive anomalies is the same—jury members under the sway of a public
narrative different from that of the mainstream. The difference can be described as
one of conscious intent. A Simpson-type juror votes to acquit because he or she
privileges certain evidence and discounts other evidence as a matter of interpretive
belief. A Barry-type juror willingly votes to acquit even though he or she believes
that the defendant committed the acts charged; that juror is voting his or her
conscience, making a political statement or showing mercy.133 But the decision to
131 ABRAMSON, supra note 85, at 65-66. As an interesting and potentially
revealing side-note, this judge, Thomas Penfield Jackson, is the jurist criticized by
the Court of Appeals for making improper public statements in the notorious
Microsoft case. U.S. v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 107-117 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
132 Id. Others would no doubt disagree. Devlin, for example, explicitly states
the opposite: “Each jury is a little parliament.” DEVLIN, supra note 91, at 164.
133 In the Barry case, some have suggested that the jury was in fact making a
political statement about race relations in the District of Columbia:
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cut against the grain is intentional, purposeful, and knowing. Not surprisingly, it is
this obvious, flagrant disregard for the law as instructed that gives some critics of
nullification the most pause. That concern, though valid, is nonetheless often
counterbalanced and is in some sense misplaced.
When a jury nullifies, many observers—like the Barry judge—decry the act
as an affront to the Rule of Law, civil society and the judicial process. That is true
enough in the sense that the jury disobeyed the instruction of a properly appointed
judicial official. But the criticism is also too broad because our judicial system—our
rules of law—grant juries that power, at least in certain circumstances. We find that
tacitly in the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment, which—by virtue of the Double
Jeopardy Clause—prohibits appellate reversal of or retrial after an acquittal
verdict.134 There is historical support as well, stretching from the seminal Bushell’s
Case, in which the English Court of Common Pleas held that a juror in a criminal
Columnist William Raspberry wrote in the Washington Post that “it would
surprise me not at all to learn that all 12 jurors secretly believed the mayor
guilty on virtually all counts.” . . . Raspberry speculated [that] the jury
behaved as if Washington were a “federal colony” with a black population
and a white power structure. The jury, Raspberry thought, bridled at the
years-long vendetta of the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the FBI to bring down
a popular black mayor. They refused to convict, beyond the one charge, out
of a sense that “occupying forces” had pulled out all the stops to topple a
powerful black man for merely personal sins. There may have been no legal
basis for some juror’s refusal to convict on the most serious charges, but
Raspberry congratulated them for using their nullifying powers to send a
powerful message to federal authorities about the nature of life in
Washington, D.C.
ABRAMSON, supra note 85, at 66.
134 See, e.g., Ball v. U.S., 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896) (“A verdict of acquittal,
although not followed by any judgment, is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the
same offense.”).
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trial could not be fined for acquitting against the will of a judge,135 to early state
constitutions, which specifically provided that “the jury shall be judges of law, as
well as fact.”136 And even today, two state constitutions allow criminal juries to
decide matters of law and fact, thus rendering a court’s instructions merely
advisory.137 I don’t mean to suggest that jury nullification is favored—it plainly is
not—but it is not, as the Barry judge would have it, anti-constitutional.
I also don’t mean to suggest that jury nullification is an ideal, or even a clear
net positive.138 To confirm that fact, we need only recall that many all-white juries
acquitted clearly guilty whites of crimes against blacks and civil-rights workers in
the 1950s and 1960s. But it does showcase narrative dissonance between
communities in a way that can spark important reforms and give a democratic voice
to socially hidden narratives. (After all, the Southern misadventures galvanized the
movement to seek racial equality across the board.) To some extent, then, juries are
of greater systemic importance as a source of information (concerning, for instance,
135 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670). The case arose when Bushell, a juror in
the trial of William Penn for unlawfully (and admittedly) assembling a crowd on
London streets, refused to pay a fine levied on the jury for rendering a verdict
contrary to the evidence and against the court’s instructions.
136 See ABRAMSON, supra note 85, at 76 (noting the Georgia Constitution of
1777 and the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790).
137 Id. at 62.
138 For instance, I think Paul Butler’s proposal that African-American jurors
should harbor a “presumption in favor of nullification” whenever faced with an
African-American defendant charged with a “victimless” crime is counterproductive
and ultimately self-defeating. Butler, supra note 127, at 715. What Butler fails to
consider is the inevitable backlash that would occur if black jurors were to begin to
acquit black defendants wholesale. This could take a number forms, ranging from
more juror dismissals for cause to an overall weakening of the jury system.
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the popular temper or particular community disaffection) than as a source of
individual adjudication. Ultimately, with Abramson, I agree that nullification carries
risks, but that these risks are part and parcel of the democratic enterprise:
[Q]uestions about the law’s justice or the wisdom of enforcing it against a
particular defendant can and should not be avoided in any system designed to
leave law’s final enforcement to the people. If jurors may never properly
decide that the specifics of a case make it unwise or trivial to enforce the
law, if jurors may never balk at enforcing laws they believe are
fundamentally unjust, then juries become the rubber stamp of legislatures
and judges, not independent sources of democratic judgment.139
As Abramson goes on to suggest, “[t]o permit juries to show mercy by not enforcing
the law in a given case is hardly to destroy the fabric of a society under law.” In
fact, the jury system, as I just observed, is in some sense a feedback loop built into
the larger legal system, a way—to refer back to Bankowski’s remark—“to let the
outside in.”140 And in so doing, a jury—by showing mercy in an individual case—
can ennoble the entire system, as Portia concludes in The Merchant of Venice:
The quality of mercy is not strain’d.
It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven
Upon the place beneath. It is twice blest:
It blesseth him that gives and him that takes.
’Tis mightiest in the mightiest; it becomes
The throned monarch better than his crown.
His scepter shows the force of temporal power,
The attribute to awe and majesty
Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings;
It is an attribute of God himself;
139 ABRAMSON, supra note 85, at xxi-xxii.
140 Devlin suggests that jury nullification provides a vital check on legislation
and (especially) executive overreaching. See DEVLIN, supra note 91, at 160-162
(“The . . . greater purpose that is served by trial by jury is that it gives protection
against laws which the ordinary man may regard as harsh or oppressive. I do not
mean by that no more than that it is a protection against tyranny. It is that: but it is
also an insurance that the criminal law will conform to the ordinary man’s idea of
what is fair and just. If it does not, the jury will not be a party to its enforcement.”).
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And earthly power doth then show likest God’s
When mercy seasons justice.141
7. Some Thoughts on Democratic Interpretation
Thus far, we have looked principally at how juries evaluate and reconstruct
narratives and how that process serves democratic ends. Now, I want to look at how
judges perform a cognate process when interpreting and applying legal rules and to
take some steps towards defining a theory of interpretation that is equally
democratic (or at least less antidemocratic than some of the alternatives). What we
find, as Bolt’s Thomas More believed, is that legal interpretation is in some ways
different from “ordinary” interpretation: “The world must construe according to its
wits. This Court must construe according to the law.”142 But what we also find is
that these differences are neither absolute nor even largely exclusive of one another.
As I have already shown, some statutes and common-law rules are particular
narratives universally stated. These particular narratives take hold only when they
accord with a higher-order narrative. Developments in the law can thus take place
when (1) an especially compelling particular narrative is aired (2) in the presence of
a higher-order narrative that makes the individual narrative both plausible and
worthy of universalization and institutionalization. We saw this in the case of Betty
Hundley: her personal story squared with a larger feminist narrative that had only
recently displaced a sexist narrative. It was thus time to change the rules that were
141 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1, ll. 182-
195.
142 BOLT, supra note 10, at 152.
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an instantiation of that displaced narrative.143 Sometimes this narrative provenance
is facially apparent, sometimes not. But the narrative is always there, if only as a
trace. Part of the task of judging is, I think, a duty to interpret and apply rules with
an eye to the narratives—both large and small—that gave rise to those rules. This
may require some digging—perhaps even imaginative reconstruction in some
cases—but the exercise is necessary because it assures that public opinion (as
embodied in public narratives) is considered, even if that opinion is ultimately
rejected for good reasons on the facts of a particular case.144
Before going further, we need to return to the question of what the process of
judicial interpretation means—i.e., whether that process is meaningfully different
from that of a juror interpreting the competing narratives presented at a trial, a
literary scholar interpreting a novel or poem to which she has devoted a lifetime of
study, or me reading the morning newspaper with our dogs yapping in the
background. The answer to this comes in two parts. First, judges are (what Karl
Llewellyn dubbed) “law-conditioned officials,” which means that they are members
of a specially trained professional community, one that is taught to make fine-
grained distinctions, to revere precedent, to be attuned to issues of causation, and to
143 Holmes saw this as the way that law naturally develops. See Oliver
Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897) (“We do
not realize how large a part of our law is open to reconsideration upon a slight
change in the habit of the public mind.”).
144 Judge Posner makes a similar point in discussing whether a judge can (or
should) dodge precedent or clear legislative intent: “My answer is that only in the
extreme case would the judge be justified in disregarding the legislative judgment.
For judges to conduct guerrilla warfare against legislatures and higher courts is
destabilizing, and in general a bad thing, but it is not always worse than the
alternative.” POSNER, supra note 2, at 71.
227
consider consequences of various legal strategies (including interpretation).145 Then,
too, judges must make difficult decisions, decisions with (sometimes) enormous
consequences. (As far as I know, no one suffered anything more than
embarrassment for offering a discredited reading of Moby Dick.) But second, judges
are members of other interpretive communities: each has a different basket of
religious beliefs, political inclinations, moral standards, life experiences, and—as
practitioners can readily confirm—abilities and temperaments. Thus, while a judge
will by training know how to read a precedent more or less broadly or narrowly or to
reason by way of a syllogism, how he or she chooses to do so in any given case may
depend as much on extra-legal influences as on legal training.
If we follow this extra-legal trail to its source, what we find is a desire for
law, or—perhaps more accurately—the desire for social conditions that are
(perhaps) available only in the presence of law. To this point, Stanley Fish suggests
that “[l]aw emerges because people desire predictability, stability, equal protection,
the reign of justice, etc., and because they want to believe that it is possible to secure
these things by instituting a set of impartial procedures.”146 In arguing for a
“pragmatic” theory of adjudication, Judge Posner emphasizes the need for these
procedures to (at least appear to) preserve these values:
The significance of the slogan that judges are to find rather than make law is
merely as a reminder that aggressive judicial lawmaking is likely to
undermine important systemic values. It is difficult to plan one’s activities if
the judges are at any moment to veer in a new direction; and judges who
145 See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING
APPEALS 19-20 (1960).
146 Stanley Fish, Almost Pragmatism: Richard Posner’s Jurisprudence, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1447, 1462 (1990).
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become too caught up in the essentially political role of making new policies
are apt to lose their neutrality and become partisans. We might even note a
tension between two of the components of the rule of law, impartiality and
predictability. Partial judges may be all too predictable. Impartial judges are
predictable only if their discretion is circumscribed, either by precise and
detailed rules laid down by a legislature or by a commitment to deciding
cases in accordance with precedent, which is how the common law is
stabilized.147
This need to circumscribe judicial authority is typically justified by an appeal
to objectivity, by which legal theorists mean a number of things. As I mentioned
before, some commentators think legal objectivity is achievable; others think that
the enterprise is doomed before it starts. The naysayers argue that objectivity is
merely a cultural fiction or a manifestation of a reigning ideology or a blindness to
the arbitrary nature of language or the mask of a powerful hierarchy or, most simply,
a human delusion.148 The yeasayers put their faith in the Enlightenment position
that, as Peter Railton puts it, “objectivity follows automatically once we proceed
rationally.”149 Of course there is a looming contradiction here: viz., how can an
internal, and thus inherently subjective, process always yield objective results?150
This question calls us to further ask what legal actors mean by objectivity and
whether this concept bears on the narrative theory that we have been developing.
147 POSNER, supra note 2, at 61-62.
148 Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It, 25 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 87, 87 (1996).
149 Peter Railton, Marx and the Objectivity of Science, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE 763, 764 (Richard Boyd et al. eds., 1991).
150 There is no way to carve objectivity and subjectivity at the joint. Nor
would this be desirable. For as Neil MacCormick has observed, a “subjective”
inquiry at a level of particularity can aid in the search for “objective” meaning at a
level of generality. See MACCORMICK, supra note 5, at 136 (arguing that divining
the subjective intention of individual legislators can facilitate the process of
ascribing an objective intention to a legislative body).
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Robert Nozick offers a contrast: “Something is objective when (or to the
extent that) it is determined in its character by the features of an object; it is
subjective when it is determined in its character by states such as consciousness,
emotions, and desires that are intrinsic to being a subject.”151 To help sort out this
difference, most commentators suggest a tripartite touchstone for discerning the
objectivity of a process:
 objective inquiry is value-free;
 objective inquiry is not biased by factual or theoretical preconceptions—
e.g., it does not adopt a theory until the evidence is in, and it refuses to
interpret evidence in light of the theory at issue; and
 objective inquiry uses procedures that are intersubjective and
independent of particular individuals or circumstances—for example, its
experiments are reproducible, its methods are determinate, its criteria are
effective, and it makes no essential use of introspective or subjectively
privileged evidence in theory assessment.152
151 ROBERT NOZICK, INVARIANCES: THE STRUCTURE OF THE OBJECTIVE
WORLD 75 (2001).
152 Railton, supra note 149, at 764. This sorting process also helps identify
several core indicia of a legal system’s objectivity, which Brian Leiter neatly
summarizes in four parts:
 We expect the content of our laws to be objective in the sense of treating
people the same unless they are “relevantly” different;
 We expect judges to be objective in the sense of not being biased against
one party or the other;
 We expect legal decisions to be objective in the sense of reaching the
result that the law really requires without letting bias or prejudice
intervene;
 In some areas of the law, we expect the law to employ “objective”
standards of conduct (like the “reasonable person” standards) that do not
permit actors to excuse their conduct based on their subjective
perceptions at the time.
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To these criteria (which can be summed up as accessibility from different angles,
intersubjectivity, and independence) Nozick would add a fourth, “invariance,” by
which he means that an objective fact is one that is invariant under various
transformations (e.g., Einstein’s Special Theory, which holds that all physical laws
are the same for all observers at rest).153
This is all well and good in the world of beakers, pipettes, and their high-tech
successors, but how do these standards help us achieve objective answers to legal
and ethical questions? The answer is, I’m afraid, far from clear. For as Posner and
Fish have argued, scientific objectivity in law is only “sometimes attainable,” and
the only way “to kick legal objectivity up a notch . . . is to make the courts and
legislatures more homogeneous, culturally and politically.”154 This sort of judicial
and legislative caste system would hardly serve democratic ends, and even then, it
seems to me, the procedures employed would be narrowly formalistic, which—as
we saw in Hynes—can lead to results that are legally justified yet unjust in a popular
sense. This is not to suggest, however, that I think that all legal decisionmaking is
or should be ad hoc or that replicable results are not achievable in the vast majority
Brian Leiter, Introduction to OBJECTIVITY IN LAW AND MORALS 1, 3 (Brian Leiter
ed., 2001).
153 NOZICK, supra note 151, at 76. In the realm of ethics, Nozick proposes
that “[t]he ethical status of an action or policy is invariant under transformations that
substitute one person for another. An ethical statement is (held to be) objective
when it exhibits this kind of generality . . ..” Id. at 289. Within the framework of
the law, I think the question of what kind of rule- or reasoning-based invariance
should be required is the most interesting. But in practice, the key component of
objectivity is often deemed to be “invariance across judging subjects.” Gerald
Postema, Objectivity Fit for Law, in OBJECTIVITY IN LAW AND MORALS, supra note
152, at 108.
154 Fish, supra note 146, at 1448.
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of cases. But I do think that we should guard against formalisms that do nothing
more than glue a veneer of objectivity over essentially political decisions in difficult
cases that turn on questions of interpretation.
Central to all textual interpretation is the question of language. What do
these words mean? As I’ve already said, this question is of critical importance in
law because the consequences of one interpretation over another can quite literally
(though rarely) have life-or-death consequences or—less dramatically—because
language is the medium through which the law works. Judge Posner observes with
respect to this latter point that
A systemic value that requires particular emphasis is the importance of
preserving language as an effective medium of communication. If judges did
not generally interpret contracts and statutes in accordance with the ordinary
meaning of the sentences appearing in those texts, certainty of legal
obligation would be seriously undermined. For judges in run-of-the-mill
contract and statutory cases to subordinate this consideration to weighing of
case-specific consequences would therefore be unpragmatic, although it
would be equally unpragmatic to refuse to consider case-specific
consequences altogether just because the language of the contract or statute
in issue seemed clear on its face . . .. The existence of [doctrines allowing
departure from literal meaning] shows, by the way, that interpretation can be
a good deal more complicated and uncertain than deduction, contrary to the
view of those legal formalists who equate interpretation to deduction in an
attempt to show that the language of a contract or a statute provides a sure
guide to “objective” adjudication. . . . Despite these qualifications, most
contract and statutory cases are decided quickly and easily on the basis of the
“plain meaning” of the relevant texts.155
As Posner correctly indicates, many commentators equate the “plain
meaning rule” with “objectivity,” thus identifying a fruitful line of investigation of
the latter through the former. The plain meaning rule tends, at least in theory, to
create uniformity in legal outcomes by constraining judges’ interpretations of
155 POSNER, supra note 2, at 62.
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statutes and constitutional provisions to the literal meaning of the words used in the
text at issue.156 One of the earliest modern commentators on the rule speculated that
“[t]he plain meaning rule seems to have been intended, originally, to rule out the
traditional judicial doctrine of ‘the equity of the statute,’ a doctrine which justified
alterations in the literal meaning of statutory language to avoid results which, in the
opinion of an interpreting judge, were unfair or inequitable.”157 In its contemporary
application, however, the rule is most commonly invoked to bar extrinsic evidence
of a text’s meaning (e.g., legislative materials like committee reports or social norms
at the time of adoption).158 There is nothing inherently suspicious in assigning
presumptive validity to plain-meaning interpretations: to the contrary, as Neil
MacCormick persuasively argues, judicial respect for literal textual meaning serves
democratic ends by forcing legislators to draft with clarity.159 The problem is thus
not with the general rule; rather, it is with resort to the general rule in those specific
cases that are ill-suited to a “quick look” mode of interpretation.
156 For an interesting article that shows, among other things, that “plain
meaning” has no plain meaning, see Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning and
Hard Cases, 103 YALE L.J. 1561 (1994).
157 Harry Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in Interpretation
of Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. L. Q. 2 (1939), reprinted in NORMAN SINGER, 2A
SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. 785, 788 (6th ed. 2002).
158 In many cases, “plain meaning” issues become entangled with issues of
“originalism,” “textualism,” “organicism,” and other interpretive approaches to legal
(especially constitutional) texts. Scholarly materials in this area are legion and well
beyond the scope of my argument. A good place to enter this literature is, I think,
with the historical perspectives presented in H. Jefferson Powell, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985) and Mark Tushnet,
Constitutional Interpretation and Judicial Selection: A View from The Federalist
Papers, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1669 (1988).
159 MACCORMICK, supra note 5, at 204.
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A couple of examples are perhaps the best way of demonstrating how strict
textualism can lead to results that are—if not absurd—undesirable. In Caminetti v.
United States, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether the Mann Act,
which criminalized the interstate transportation of women “for the purpose of
prostitution or debauchery or for any other immoral purpose” applied to the exploits
of a young college man who drove a young woman across a state line on the way to
a tavern at which they were to spend the night.160 There was no dispute as to
whether the two had sexual relations (no question of what “is” is), but it was equally
undisputed that there was no commercial transaction. It is clear from the legislative
history of the Mann Act that it was not intended to apply to the scenario that I just
outlined. Indeed the Act is entitled “The White Slave Traffic Act” and
Representative Mann, the bill’s author, had assured members of the House—in
response to this very line of questioning—that the Act was aimed solely as “vice as a
business.”161 Nonetheless, a majority of the Supreme Court found that the statute
was “plain and unambiguous” and that the conduct at issue fit within the statute’s
“other immoral purpose” proviso, no matter the actual intent of the Legislature.
What the Court missed was the misalignment between the higher order narrative that
gave rise to and is embedded in the Mann Act (“white slavery”/interstate
prostitution) and the particular facts of the case (a college lark/extramarital but non-
commercial sex). In other words, this case is another example of what we earlier
discussed as narrative misclassification: liability should only attach when the
160 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
161 Jones, supra note 157, at 791.
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particular narrative on trial is like the many particulars (the tales of abuse and
exploitation of individual women) that conjoined to form the public narrative
(against the white slave trade) that in turn gave rise to the universal rule against
participating in the business of interstate prostitution.
At times, courts are so concerned with appearing objective that they
shoehorn fairly obvious political or moral decisions into the plain meaning
framework, often with destabilizing consequence. Bowers v. Hardwick is a good
example.162 Hardwick “was charged with violating the Georgia statute criminalizing
sodomy by committing that act with another adult male in the bedroom of
respondent’s home.”163 Hardwick challenged the statute on several constitutional
grounds; the United States Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari to
consider whether the Georgia statute violated the fundamental rights of
homosexuals. Justice White, writing for the majority, reframed this issue in a way
that permitted an ultimate “plain meaning” determination: “The issue presented is
whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to
engage in sodomy . . ..”164 With the issue so constructed, Justice White was able to
take a literalist approach, one loath to “announcing rights not readily identifiable in
the Constitution’s text” or to making new “constitutional law having little or no
cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution.”165 The holding of
162 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
163 Id. at 188.
164 Id. at 190.
165 Id. at 186, 194.
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the case was thus not surprising, given the narrowness of the task that Justice White
set for himself—namely, to thumb through the Constitution and a few cases
construing it looking for the words “right to homosexual sodomy” and, finding none,
to consider the matter at an end. But as Drucilla Cornell ably shows in a
deconstructive reading of the opinion, Justice White misreads the historical narrative
at issue:
[T]he result for White is that “fundamental liberties” should be limited to
those that are “deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition.” For
Justice White, as we have also seen, the evidence that the right to engage in
“homosexual sodomy” is not a fundamental liberty is the “fact” that at the
time the fourteenth amendment was passed, all but five of the thirty-seven
states in the union had criminal sodomy laws and that most states continue to
have such laws. In his dissent, Blackmun vehemently rejects the appeal to
the fact of the existence of anti-sodomy criminal statutes as a basis for
continuing the prohibition, and the denial of a right, characterized by
Blackmun not as the right to engage in homosexual sodomy but as “the right
to be let alone.”
Quoting Justice Holmes, Blackmun reminds us that:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and
the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.166
Cornell of course recognizes that “a legal system if it is to be just must also
promise universality, the fair application of the rules.”167 And this calls up yet again
the twin faces of justice, one looking to the particular, the other to the universal. As
a result, Cornell notes, “we have what for Derrida is the first aporia of justice, the
166 Drucilla Cornell, The Violence of the Masquerade: Law Dressed Up as
Justice, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1047, 1056 (1990) (partially quoting Holmes, supra
note 143, at 469).
167 Id. at 1060.
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epokhe [suspension] of the rule.” At this impasse a judge has not only an obligation
to state the law but to judge it:
In short, for a decision to be just and responsible, it must, in its proper
moment if there is one, be both regulated and without regulation: it must
conserve the law and also destroy it or suspend it enough to have to reinvent
it in each case, rejustify it, at least reinvent it in the reaffirmation and the new
and free confirmation of its principle.168
In Cornell’s view, then, “Justice White failed to meet his responsibility precisely
because he replaced description with judgment, and indeed, a description of state
laws a hundred years past, and in very different social and political
circumstances.”169
What Cornell is getting at here is that public narratives concerning both
homosexuals in specific and privacy rights in general had changed (recall that high-
order narratives are always already in the process of revision, subsumption, or
replacement) over the course of several generations. Therefore, judging Hardwick’s
conduct under a statute animated by an outmoded narrative would be unjust. Justice
White was (willfully?) blind to these new narratives, and this blindness had negative
consequences for the democratic rule of law, if one assumes that predictability and
stability are virtues. For within two decades, the Court admitted its mistake in
Bowers, and overruled it.170
Cases like Caminetti and Bowers teach us that the very instruments of
objectivity can be turned against it. It is a laudable aim of the law to establish
168 Id. at 1060 (partially quoting Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: “The
Mystical Foundation of Authority,” 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 919, 961 (1990)).
169 Id.
170 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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procedures that insulate litigants from bias or whimsy. But we must remain mindful
that formalisms are of limited utility in hard cases. We must arm ourselves not just
for quotidian cases (i.e., the type of cases in which the facts and law are not credibly
in dispute and in which, therefore, a mechanical jurisprudence can be expected to
work fairly well), but for the more subtle, marginal ones as well. When setting out
to divine the “plain meaning” of a complicated text, an interpreter would be well
advised to heed Hotspur’s admonitory rejoinder to Glendower in Henry IV:
GLENDOWER: I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
HOTSPUR: Why so can I, or so can any man,
But will they come when you do call for them?171
By way of conclusion, I want to return to the image of law presented in
Kafka’s “Before the Law.” Law both produces and receives narratives; thus,
narrative failures of the sort that we have examined in the course of our various
discussions can happen just as easily from the institutional side of the equation as
from the human side. In his well-known reading of Kafka’s story, Jacques Derrida
suggests that the man from the country is trapped in what might be called a literary
dilemma, which means that his failure to enter the law may have been a failure of his
own making—a readerly failure, if you will:
[T]here is no literature without a work, without an absolutely singular
performance, and this necessary irreplaceability again recalls what the man
from the country asks when the singular crosses the universal, when the
categorical engages the idiomatic, as a literature always must. The man from
the country had difficulty in grasping that an entrance was singular or unique
171 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE FIRST PART OF KING HENRY THE FOURTH act
3, sc. 1, ll. 51-53.
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when it should have been universal, as in truth it was. He had difficulty with
literature.172
172 JACQUES DERRIDA, ACTS OF LITERATURE 213 (Derek Attridge ed., 1992).
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IV. Narrative and Legal Pedagogy
Introduction
Commentators from Dewey to Dworkin have argued that education is key to
the development of a truly democratic society.1 But the emphasis of this
commentary typically focuses somewhat narrowly on the content of secondary
education or the general need for access to higher education. Dworkin, for instance,
believes that many of the most important social issues of the day are so complicated
that they are beyond the judgment of many ordinary voters, thus causing them to
vote (if at all) for candidates based on religious affiliation or personal attractiveness.
As an antidote, he suggests that the secondary curriculum be overhauled to include
“courses that take up issues that are among the most contentious political
controversies of the day . . ..”2 This aim—though laudable—is one likely difficult to
achieve (as Dworkin readily concedes), and so I want to set my sights somewhat
lower and consider whether the narrative theory of law that we have been
developing offers opportunities to introduce reforms in legal education that could
facilitate democratic ends without creating the political difficulties inherent in
Dworkin’s proposal.
It sometimes seems as if there are as many accounts of law as there are
theorists to sponsor them: formalistic/scientific, realistic, autopoietic, positivist,
pragmatic, feminist, CLS, institutional, post-colonial, and on and on. As I hope that
1 See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION (Free Press 1997) (1916); RONALD DWORKIN, IS
DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW POLITICAL DEBATE (2006).
2 Id. at 148-49.
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I have already sufficiently shown, narrative offers a partial (yet nonetheless
significant) account of some aspects of legal systems and related democratic
institutions. It is not a comprehensive normative theory of how judges, legislators
and other legal actors should conduct the business of the law. In this respect, I think
the narrative theory as I have stated it bears some resemblance to the most current
version of law and economic theory. When I say “current,” I’m thinking foremost
of Judge Posner’s latest reflections on the subject; his thoughts are of special
importance because he was an early and certainly the most visible proponent of
economic legal analysis.3 Plainly, Posner once hoped that economics held the
interdisciplinary key that would unlock the secret to a perfectly functioning legal
system (and explain the breakdowns in less than perfectly functioning legal
systems). Thus, in 1975, he was able to opine that an
important finding emerging from the recent law and economics research is
that the legal system itself—its doctrines, procedures and institutions—has
been strongly influenced by a concern (more often implicit than explicit)
with promoting economic efficiency. . . . The idea that the logic of the law is
really economics is, of course, repulsive to many academic lawyers, who see
in it an attempt by practitioners of an alien discipline to wrest their field from
them. Yet the positive economic analysis of legal institutions is one of the
most promising as well as most controversial branches of the new law and
economics. It seeks to define and illuminate the basic character of the legal
system, and it has made at least some progress toward that ambitious goal.4
3 Posner’s most influential work in the law and economics vein began to
appear in the early 1970s. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Killing or Wounding to
Protect a Property Interest, 14 J. L. & ECON. 201 (1971); The Economic Approach
to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 757 (1975). The seminal work in what we now think of as
law-and-economics analysis traces to a decade earlier, especially with the work of
(now Judge) Guido Calabresi and Ronald Coase. See Guido Calabresi, Some
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961);
Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
4 Posner, supra note 3, TEX. L. REV. at 763-64.
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More recently, however, Posner has retreated from the notion of an all-embracing
theory of law formed by yoking the precepts of a unified normative system (like
utilitarianism) to the teachings of economics: “It has been many years since I flirted
with such an approach.”5
But that does not mean that economics does not inform legal analysis in deep
and interesting ways. For good or ill, economic concepts have swamped all others
in my primary practice area (antitrust). In most federal courts, an antitrust plaintiff
cannot get out of the gate in most types of cases brought under the Sherman Act
unless he can plead—in his initial complaint—that competition has been injured in a
market defined in precise economic terms.6 And this is so no matter how ruthlessly
anticompetitive the conduct at issue is alleged to be. As a consequence, it is
impossible to practice or to teach antitrust law without having a solid working
knowledge of economic concepts. Antitrust law thus illustrates one (of many)
doctrinal corners of the law that has become inherently interdisciplinary both as a
matter of practice and pedagogy. As Posner aptly observes, “[o]ne by-product of
[law and economics] research that has considerable pedagogical importance has
been the assignment of precise economic explanations to a number of fundamental
legal concepts that had previously puzzled students and their professors, such as
5 RICHARD A. POSNER, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY 78 (2003).
6 See, e.g., Apani Southwest, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Enters., 300 F.3d 620, 628
(5th Cir. 2002) (“Where the plaintiff fails to define its proposed relevant market with
reference to the rule of reasonable interchangeability and cross-elasticity of demand,
or alleges a proposed relevant market that clearly does not encompass all
interchangeable substitute products even when all factual inferences are granted in
plaintiff’s favor, the relevant market is legally insufficient, and a motion to dismiss
may be granted.”).
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‘assumption of risk,’ ‘pain and suffering’ as a category of tort damages, contract
damages for loss of expectation, plea bargaining, and the choice between damages
and injunctive relief.”7
What is important here is the way that economics has been seamlessly
integrated into a wide range of doctrinal law-school courses, rather than being
cabined solely in a “Law and Economics” seminar, as are so many supposed
“interdisciplinary” offerings. It is this aspect that is worth exploring at length in the
context of our narrative theory. But first we must pause to consider broader issues
in legal education.
1. The “Discipline” of Law Schools
7 Posner, supra note 3, TEX. L. REV. at 764.
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Outside the west entrance to Columbia Law School stands Jacques Lipchitz’s
massive “Bellerophon Taming Pegasus.” The sculpture towers over Revson Plaza,
into which it is seemingly spiked, and—with its furious circularity—contrasts neatly
with the strong vertical lines of the main Law School building (not so affectionately
known to its current and former students as “The Toaster”). I mention its context
because this is a case in which context is of extraordinary interpretive importance, as
Lipchitz himself suggested: “Don’t expect a blinded lady with scales and all those
things from me,” when Columbia Law School approached him in 1964 with the
proposed commission. “I will try to think of something else.”8 What he thought of
was a particular Greek myth, the story of how Bellerophon—armed with a golden
bridle that Athena provided—tamed Pegasus and used him to complete a series of
tests that Zeus had devised. To Lipchitz, the story of Bellerophon represented the
dominance of man over nature: “You observe nature, make conclusions, and from
these you make rules . . . and law is born from that.”9
Against this backdrop, there are, I think, two (overlapping) ways of looking
at the sculpture that are relevant to our discussion, each of which is suggested by a
different word in the sculpture’s literal context. First, we can emphasize the word
“law” in Columbia Law School. From that vantage point, the bridle represents law,
one of the instruments with which man gains dominion over nature. Second, we can
emphasize “school.” From that perspective, the bridle represents legal pedagogy,
8 I’ve drawn the basic factual background on the sculpture from Columbia’s




the way that students are taught “to think like a lawyer.” I think one wag of a law
professor opened this second line of inquiry—though facetiously, of course—when
he told the New York Times at the installation ceremony, “That looks like me trying
to teach criminal law.”10
If we think about the word education, and look at the fossilized metaphor
within it, “to lead,” we instantly see the link to Bellerophon and his bridle and the
further problematic associations of that image: break to lead, break to ride.11 The
Carnegie Report (tacitly) examines the disturbing implications of this image by—
ironically enough—picking through some of the talks that Karl Llewellyn gave to
his first-year law students at Columbia (decades before the Bellerophon-Pegasus
sculpture was installed on the campus).12 In these talks, which he later expanded and
collected in The Bramble Bush, Llewellyn explained the process of legal education
in terms that frankly admit (and seemingly revel in) its dehumanizing aspects:
It is not easy thus to turn human beings into lawyers. Neither is it safe. For
a mere legal machine is a social danger. Indeed, a mere legal machine is not
even a good lawyer. It lacks insight and judgment. It lacks the power to
draw into hunching that body of intangibles that lie in the social experience.
None the less, it is an almost impossible process to achieve the technique
without sacrificing some humanity first. Hence, as rapidly as we may, we
shall first cut under all the attributes of homo, though the sapiens we shall
then duly endeavor to develop will, we hope, regain the homo.13
10 Id.
11 I believe that Dean David Schizer speaks from time to time about the
ambiguous meaning of the sculpture and its placement.
12 WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR
THE PROFESSION OF LAW 77-78 (2007) (quoting KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE
BUSH (1930)) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT].
13 Id. (quoting LLEWELLYN at 101).
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If there’s any doubt that this “cutting under” that Llewellyn identifies is anything
other than Bellerophonic violence, that doubt is erased as Llewellyn “warms to his
theme”:
The first year . . . lays a foundation simultaneously for law school and law
practice. It aims, in the old phrase, to get you “thinking like a lawyer.” The
hardest job of the first year is to lop off your common sense, to knock your
ethics into temporary anesthesia. Your view of social policy, your sense of
justice—to knock these out of you along with woozy thinking, along with
ideas all fuzzed along their edges. You are to acquire ability to think
precisely, to analyze coldly, to work within a body of materials that is given,
to see, and see only, and manipulate the machinery of the law.14
Times have not changed all that much, as the Carnegie Report confirms in its
observation that the “temporary moral lobotomy” is still a prominent feature of
contemporary law-school pedagogy. I mentioned before Philip Kissam’s likening of
legal education to a Foucaultian discipline. In his The Discipline of Law Schools:
The Making of Modern Lawyers, Kissam is concerned to test many of the cherished
assumptions upon which American legal education has rested since Llewellyn’s time
and decades before.15 His critique is comprehensive (and we must cut it short here),
so I want to focus on just a couple of his points—viz., how law schools teach
students to read, write, and therefore think about the law in ways that are ultimately
constraining (and needlessly so):
The discipline teaches instrumentalist habits of reading and writing that both
empower and limit future lawyers. These habits consist of quick, productive
but often superficial ways of reading legal texts and writing about law, and
they are linked to law school’s distinctive oral culture, which celebrates oral
heroism and tacitly devalues complex reading and writing. The law school’s
distinctive oral culture in turn rests upon the discipline’s case method, its
14 Id. (quoting LLEWELLYN at 116).
15 PHILIP KISSAM, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW SCHOOLS: THE MAKING OF
MODERN LAWYERS (2003).
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large amphitheater classrooms, its Moot Court exercises and the speech-like
forms of effective final examination writing. But this oral culture and the
instrumentalist reading and writing habits of law schools tend to subordinate
more complicated, more reflective, more critical and more imaginative ways
of reading, writing and thinking about the law.16
For me, one aspect of this stands out above all others: the reliance on the case law
method and the specialized narrative form upon which it is based.
Many observers of legal pedagogy hold that the case method is linked with
the popular self-belief that the law school’s highest mission is to teach how to—as
Llewellyn stated in the quotation above—“think like a lawyer.”17 When the case
method arced into ascendancy in the late Nineteenth Century, there were few options
for learning law other than through apprenticeships or “reading” law, the latter of
which amounted to reasoning out legal propositions by seeing what courts had done
when faced with different fact patterns.18 The notion of learning law by reading
about it was formalized in the system devised by Christopher Columbus Langdell,
the then-Dean of Harvard, which promoted the use of casebooks and the study of
appellate court opinions as the primary means of learning to apply reason to legal
materials.19 The Langdellian system has without doubt been modified over the
course of more than a century, but I think that most law professors in the United
States would probably agree that the casebook/case method of instruction still rules
16 Id. at 7.
17 See, e.g., CARNEGIE REPORT at 47; Nancy B. Rapoport, Is “Thinking Like a
Lawyer” Really What We Want to Teach?, 1 J. OF THE ASS’N OF LEGAL WRITING
DIRECTORS 91, 95 (2002).
18 See id.
19 Philip C. Kissam, Lurching Towards the Millennium: The Law School, the
Research University, and the Professional Reforms of Legal Education, 60 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1965, 1970 (1999).
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the schools, especially in first-year core classes. It thus behooves us to consider
exactly what this “method” entails.
Casebooks are, as Kissam aptly and ironically describes them, “large heavy
books that are bound in serious, somber colors, blue, black or deep red, and carry
serious, somber titles such as ‘Contracts Law: Cases and Materials’ or ‘Federal
Income Taxation.’”20 These books consist largely of excerpts of appellate court
opinions (in some subjects mostly from the United States Supreme Court), together
with summaries of related cases, blurbs from scholarly writing, and a few discussion
questions and hypotheticals. Some casebooks—especially those prepared by editors
with cross-disciplinary leanings (e.g., economics)—may also include materials
designed to provide an analytical framework within which to evaluate particular
decisions. But, as Michael Hoeflich has observed, even in doctrinally expansive
casebooks, “the editors rarely consider the broader context of the case as published
nor do they suggest that reported decisions may not, in fact, give full accounts of
‘what really happened.’”21 By “broader context” Hoeflich is thinking principally of
things social and historical—i.e., the sort of materials that would make it possible
for a reader “to understand and evaluate the origin, historic rationale, or legitimacy
of the decision.”22 As a consequence of all this, Kissam concludes, “[t]he structure
of casebooks makes it difficult to understand opinions as comprehensible narratives,
20 KISSAM, supra note 15, at 31.
21 M. H. Hoeflich, On Reading Cases: The Law Student in Wonderland, 42
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1163, 1180 (1991).
22 Id.; see also Alan Watson, Legal Education Reform: Modest Suggestions,
51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 91, 93 (2001) (“What is going on in the case is very largely
incomprehensible.”).
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as comprehensible parts of larger coherent doctrinal or social contexts, or as useful
subjects for the development of legal arguments, counter-arguments and criticism.”23
How is it that nearly the entire profession of law teaching came to rely on
teaching materials that are so open to criticism? The answer is found in the
pedagogical system that the casebooks are intended to serve: the case method. This
method
rests upon the belief of Langdell that law was a science and that law had
underlying and universally applicable laws just as did the physical sciences.
He further believed that these rules could best be learned by students through
a process of exploration of what he considered to be the raw material of the
Common Law: appellate decisions. Thus, the purpose of introducing
students to cases in the law school curriculum was not to teach them how to
read cases critically nor to teach them how the law works in action, nor to
teach the relationship between law and society. Rather, the purpose of
teaching through cases was to teach students how to read cases for doctrinal
rules and teach students how to distinguish between various fact patterns so
as to determine which doctrinal rules would apply in new circumstances.
This is what has come to be called “black letter law.” The casebook as a
teaching device derives directly from the need of the case method teacher to
have a series of cases which clearly and concisely lay out the doctrinal rules
that the law professor wants to teach.24
This emphasis on rule-identification has of course moderated over time (as
witnessed by, for instance, the inclusion of social-policy and interpretive-theory
discussions in casebooks and classrooms), but its primacy—especially in first-year
classes—remains assured for a variety of reasons, ranging from the perceived need
to conduct large classes in an orderly fashion; to base grading on end-of-the-
23 KISSAM, supra note 15, at 32.
24 Hoeflich, supra note 21, at 1178-79.
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semester, issue-spotting examinations; and ultimately to prepare students for rule-
driven bar examinations.25
The case method no doubt effectively serves these needs. This service
comes, however, at a significant associated cost, as the Carnegie Report makes
clear. There is a basic polarity in how lawyers think and thereby perform their
greater social functions. In one mode, the analytical, “things and events are
detached from the situations of everyday life and represented in more abstract and
systematic ways.”26 This way of thinking promotes stability and consistency. In the
other mode, the narrative, “things and events are given significance through being
placed in a story, an ongoing context of meaningful interaction.”27 Things human
(e.g., meaning and values) reside here. Both modes are vital and significant, but the
case method privileges the former over the latter, as the Carnegie Report finds:
[The analytical mode] holds out the prestige of academic recognition, likely
career success, and the apparent satisfactions of remaining too tough to fall
into Llewellyn’s “woozy thinking.” [The narrative mode] continues to make
appeals to conscience and the ideals of the profession. However, by now it
should be obvious that this is by no means an even contest for the hearts and
minds of law students. The first-year experience as a whole, without
conscious and systematic efforts at counterbalance, tips the scales, as
Llewellyn put it, away from cultivating the humanity of the student and
towards the student’s re-engineering into a “legal machine.”28
With this backcloth stitched into place, we can begin to foreground the
central feature of the case method—viz., the edited appellate opinion—and what that
implies. An appellate opinion almost always takes a narrative shape, but that
25 See KISSAM, supra note 15, at 37-50.
26 CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 12, at 83.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 84.
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narrative is highly concentrated and formalized. The last opinion in any given case
stands at the head of a series of narrative regressions, those resulting from opinions
below, testimony of parties and witnesses, statements and briefs of counsel, and no
doubt others. The opinion that we find in a reporter is thus just the last—not the
only—narrative in the record of a case, even though over time it may be the only
generally available trace of a matter that is left to posterity.29 But by no means can
the opinion be taken as a complete statement of “what really happened” as a matter
of history (at most, the facts as stated are conclusive only in the sense that they may
bind the parties and perhaps those in privity with them). In sum, narrative coherence
comes at the expense of narrative completeness. And this has undesirable
pedagogical consequences, as the Carnegie Report warns:
[Casebook] opinions . . . are highly redacted accounts of legal proceedings
that render fact-patterns in condensed formulas. As a first encounter with
legal facts, this can give the misleading impression that facts are typically
easy to “discover,” rather than resulting from complex processes of
interpretation that are shaped by pressures of litigation.30
The version of an opinion that we find in a casebook (because of editing,
topical organization and surrounding commentary) is in some sense a revision and
recontextualization of a case’s final narrative—extrajudicial, yet of great importance
because many bedrock cases are never read by lawyers outside of law school. As
such, it suffers from two inherent deficiencies. First, as with the full version
29 In a masterful examination of law’s untold stories, Robert Ferguson shows
how particular narrative pieces of a proceeding can be repressed and contained
outside an official trial record. See Robert A. Ferguson, Untold Stories in the Law,
in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 84 (Peter Brooks & Paul
Gewirtz eds., 1996).
30 CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 12, at 53.
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published in a reporter, the casebook version is cut off from the underlying narrative
record upon which it is based. We must thus take it on faith that the judge who
wrote a particular opinion did so in good faith and fairly and accurately described
the facts, but this cannot always be the case: “we must also, in this post-Realist
world, accept the possibility that judges edit the facts and analysis which they
include in their published opinions.”31 The reasons for this editing can range from
the benign (trying to keep an opinion to a manageable length), to the problematic
(tailoring the facts, perhaps subconsciously, to fit a personal or political agenda), to
the corrupt (reaching a decision based on bribery). And we must remain largely
ignorant of these reasons (or even a judge-author’s basic editorial choices) because
we have no way to test the final, published narrative against its building blocks in
the overall record—all we see is what the judge wants us to see. In short, the
decision to conceal or foreground a narrative is a rhetorical decision that was made
long before the printed page passes before our eyes. But we can sometimes catch
that decision’s shadow in a case in which multiple judges write opinions.
Let’s take an example. Ake v. Oklahoma grew out of an especially horrid
multiple homicide that took place outside Oklahoma City in the late 1970s.32 The
crime had a deep public impact, so much so that I recall people still talking about it
in private conversations when I practiced law in Oklahoma City some 15 years later.
One of the murderers, Glen Burton Ake, was convicted of the crime, but he appealed
to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that the State of Oklahoma had violated
31 Hoeflich, supra note 21, at 1165.
32 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
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his due process rights by failing to provide him with a psychiatrist to testify in his
defense. Of the crime itself, here’s what Justice Marshall, writing for the majority,
had to say: “Late in 1979, Glen Burton Ake was arrested and charged with
murdering a couple and wounding their two children.”33 The remainder of his
factual recitation deals with Ake’s mental instability, pretrial psychiatric treatment,
and competence to stand trial. Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, had a much different
story to tell:
Petitioner Ake and his codefendant Hatch quit their jobs on an oil field rig in
October 1979, borrowed a car, and went looking for a location to burglarize.
They drove to the rural home of Reverend and Mrs. Richard Douglass, and
gained entrance to the home by a ruse. Holding Reverend and Mrs. Douglass
and their children, Brooks and Leslie, at gunpoint, they ransacked the home;
they then bound and gagged the mother, father, and son, and forced them to
lie on the living room floor. Ake and Hatch then took turns attempting to
rape 12-year-old Leslie Douglass in a nearby bedroom. Having failed in
these efforts, they forced her to lie on the living room floor with the other
members of her family.
Ake then shot Reverend Douglass and Leslie each twice, and Mrs. Douglass
and Brooks once, with a .357 magnum pistol, and fled. Mrs. Douglass died
almost immediately as a result of the gunshot wound; Reverend Douglass’
death was caused by a combination of the gunshots he received, and
strangulation from the manner in which he was bound. Leslie and Brooks
managed to untie themselves and to drive to the home of a nearby doctor.
Ake and his accomplice were apprehended in Colorado following a month-
long crime spree that took them through Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, and
other States in the western half of the United States.34
Why such a contrast between the two opinions? Justice Marshall has
concluded that Ake’s rights were violated and that his conviction should be reversed.
Straying into the facts of the crime itself could only detract from the rhetorical
33 Id. at 70.
34 Id. at 88.
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inevitability of that holding.35 Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand, thinks that Ake
is a faker (he later points to evidence in the record in which Ake told a cellmate that
he was going to “play crazy”), and so he wants to paint Ake as acting with conscious
deliberation (look back at the verbs he selects) as he went about his heinous acts—
i.e., he may have been Satanic, but he was sane. We can’t go further here (we don’t
have enough evidence before us), but we can see that Justice Marshall must shunt
the multiple-murder-attempted-rape-of-a-twelve-year-old story to the side to stake
his claim to authority and that Justice Rehnquist must do just the opposite.
Getting now to the second of our two points, a casebook editor further
eliminates content, generally to draw attention to a particular doctrinal aspect of a
case. And because an editor selects cases because he or she believes that each of
them well illustrates a rule, the development of a rule, or the application of a rule,
each case is edited and slotted in a casebook according to the editor’s overall
organizational rubric. If context adds meaning—and I think it indisputably does—
then where an opinion is placed in a casebook adds an important dimension to the
opinion. Here’s an illustration: I just pulled four antitrust casebooks from my
bookshelf, one that I use in the course I teach at Southern Methodist University from
time to time,36 one from a practitioners’ seminar I took about ten years ago,37 and a
35 For a thorough rhetorical analysis of Ake, see Shulamit Almog, As I Read, I
Weep—In Praise of Judicial Narrative, 26 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 471, 479-84
(2001).
36 WILLIAM R. ANDERSEN & C. PAUL ROGERS, ANTITRUST LAW: POLICY AND
PRACTICE (3d ed. 1999).
37 PHILLIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS,
TEXT, CASES (4th ed. 1988).
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couple of others that publishers have sent me for review.38 I searched through each
to see what the editors had done with one of the most-cited cases in all of private
antitrust litigation, Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.39 The case is
important because it limits the category of private plaintiffs entitled to sue under the
federal antitrust laws to those who can show “antitrust injury,” a concept that has
proven slippery in subsequent attempts at application.40 Andersen and Rogers edit
the case down to a bit more than five pages (including eight of the opinion’s original
footnotes) and place it as the first case in a section entitled “Private Enforcement.”
That placement makes sense, given—as I already mentioned—that the case is more
important in the civil litigation context than in others (like criminal enforcement).
Morgan slims the case down by another page (largely by eliminating all but two
footnotes) and lodges it at the end of the first subsection (called “The Transition
Cases”) in a chapter focusing on developments since 1975. Morgan emphasizes
history over practical application in his casebook, so he has selected Brunswick as
one of several examples of the modern Supreme Court’s application of economic
analysis to antitrust problems and to show how the Court began to change (most
often by limiting) the field of operation of the federal antitrust laws, a process that
38 THOMAS D. MORGAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN ANTITRUST
LAW AND ITS ORIGINS (3d ed. 2005); CHARLES J. GOETZ & FRED S. MCCHESNEY,
ANTITRUST LAW: INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION (3d ed. 2006).
39 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
40 Id. at 489 (“Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of
the type that the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and flow from that which
makes the defendants’ acts unlawful.”).
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continues to this day.41 In short, he locates the case within a historical narrative and
uses it as an element of his retelling of that narrative. The other two casebooks,
Areeda/Kaplow and Goetz/McChesney, do not reprint Brunswick at all, although
Areeda and Kaplow include a summary of the case (including a quotation of the
sentence for which Brunswick is most often cited) in a subsection entitled “Antitrust
Injury,” and Goetz and McChesney reprint cases that cite to Brunswick.
What do these various approaches tell us? At the one extreme, Goetz and
McChesney imply that Brunswick itself is less important than more recent cases that
cite it. In some ways, though, this is like reading the last chapter in Dworkin’s chain
novel without reading the first chapter. Granted, a casebook cannot include all—or
even many—cases in a series, but it seems to me that foundational cases that have
led to splintered or confused subsequent authority are worth direct analysis. One
step up the ladder is Areeda and Kaplow’s one-paragraph summary of Brunswick,
which reduces the case to a rule, supported by a few sentences of factual recitation
and commentary. If there is a teleology to the case method, the Areeda and Kaplow
approach to Brunswick neatly illustrates it: important cases can be boiled to an
essence. This may often be true, but it guides students towards a very narrow way
of reading. And, as Kissam suggests, it also tacitly teaches students that if that’s all
there is to the lawyerly enterprise, then there are surely more efficient ways of
getting to and mastering rules than rooting them out of musty casebooks like truffles
41 For instance, the United States Supreme Court recently held that vertical
price fixing (resale price maintenance) should no longer be considered per se illegal
and should be viewed under the rule of reason. In taking this step, the Court
overruled one of its most venerable precedents, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911). Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS Inc.,
127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007).
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from the forest floor: one common method is to turn to commercial outlines, in
which the truffles come pre-rooted.42 But no matter what option the beginning
student takes, all this
is likely to encourage an analytical, instrumentalist way of reading to obtain
“the rules” of at least “the major” cases, for it is these rules that will seem
most available and desirable to a bewildered, disoriented law student or to
one who is simply pressed for time. Understanding “the rules” will appear to
be a rational means of preparing for class discussions and especially for
examinations, where students need a grasp of many legal rules and case
holdings in order to identify issues and apply such law quickly to novel
situations. This instrumentalist reading as a routine will focus students on
certain analysis of texts to discover rules, but it ignores and tacitly discounts
other ways of reading that seek to ascertain the contexts of judicial decisions,
solve underlying legal problems, interpret or synthesize complicated legal
authorities, or use judicial texts to construct complex arguments.43
The other two antitrust casebooks that we have been discussing attempt to
avoid the rule-based trap by placing Brunswick in a larger context. I must admit that
the practitioner in me favors the Andersen and Rogers approach because it
underscores the foundational importance of the case to civil litigation. But,
ultimately, this is to locate Brunswick and the rule it enunciates within a larger set of
rules (the rules—principally Section 4 of the Clayton Act—conferring a private right
of action on certain persons injured by reason of a violation of the antitrust laws).
Morgan, on the other hand, places the case within a historical context, one that
reveals an underlying shift in one of the United States’ most central public
narratives: the story of Big Business. In our discussion of The Jungle, we saw how
that public narrative had tipped in a decidedly populist direction. The Sherman
Antitrust Act is a product of that narrative (and the era that gave it birth) no less than
42 KISSAM, supra note 15, at 33.
43 Id. at 33-34.
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the Meat Inspection Act. And its enforcement for the next several decades reflected
those origins: many common business practices were considered per se illegal, no
matter their actual impact on consumer welfare.
In the post-World War II period, the populist, anti-business narrative waned,
and by the 1970s—as Morgan points out—the United States Supreme Court
increasingly directed lower courts and enforcement agencies to consider the
“reasonableness” of practices that had theretofore been deemed unworthy of analysis
beyond proof that the alleged conduct had in fact occurred. The reasons for this are
complicated and subject to ongoing dispute, but there is no doubt that the Court
changed direction and that that change could be marked over the course of the 1960s
and 70s.44 For our purposes, it is enough to note that this narrative revision
happened and that Morgan identifies it, thus signaling a possible way of
reinvigorating some pedagogical practices. What I’m thinking of here are the
dimensions that a narrative approach to legal materials might offer. What if—in
addition to the public-narrative framework that Morgan employs—students were
encouraged to examine the personal narratives that gave rise to particular disputes in
the first place? Such an approach, it seems to me, would give students a greater
sense of how many rules are formed and provide a corrective to the greatest
44 What Morgan correctly suggests is that change was inevitable by the early
1970s. The economy had become so complex that per se rules could no longer be
trusted to produce desired results, and many older decisions either made little sense
in the revised context or could not be logically extended to new situations or
technologies. At the same time, influential critics like Robert Bork and Richard
Posner made powerful thrusts against the received wisdom; these critics found
sympathetic ears amongst the judiciary, including the Supreme Court, the
composition of which radically changed with the turnover of four seats between
1970 and 1975. MORGAN, supra note 38, at 467.
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shortcoming of appellate opinions: viz., their inherent narrowness of scope, a
subject that calls for greater scrutiny.45
2. The Problem with Appellate Practice and Appellate Opinions
Lawyers become so accustomed to reading appellate opinions for rules that
it’s easy for them to forget how narrowly those opinions are cast: e.g., they have a
limited purpose, are subject to powerful generic constraints, and are built on a
rhetoric of justification, not description. First, and in some ways most important,
appeals are based on particularized points of asserted error in the proceedings below.
At the level of the United States Supreme Court, then, it is most unusual for the
Court to consider more than one or two narrowly framed issues, and those are
selected because of their general importance, not because of their impact on the
actual litigants before the Court. These limitations are not a matter of speculation or
practitioners’ folklore; they are institutionalized in the Court’s rules. For example,
Rule 10, which sets forth the considerations governing review on a writ of certiorari,
specifically states that only extraordinary cases are subject to review, typically cases
that involve conflicting decisions among United States courts of appeals or between
those courts and state courts of last resort on an “important matter.” This means that
“[a] petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists
45 It’s also worth mentioning that classroom practices exacerbate the impetus
of the appellate opinion to narrow: “instructors encourage students to construct a
particular form of knowledge—a legal understanding of events that filters out some
aspects of the narrative under analysis while selecting and extracting the legally
relevant ‘fact pattern’ for attention.” CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 12, at 63.
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of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of
law.”46
This rule assures that only a certain type of case is heard; another rule
assures that the case is narrowly presented in a way that suppresses the matter’s
narrative aspects. Rule 14, which mandates the content (and thereby the non-
content) of a petition for a writ of certiorari, reveals a decidedly anti-narrative bias,
one focused on narrowly cast legal questions. It essentially directs that all appellants
use a one-size-fits-all formula under which:
 The questions presented for review [must be] expressed concisely in
relation to the circumstances of the case, without unnecessary detail. The
questions should be short and should not be argumentative or repetitive.
The questions shall be set out on the first page following the cover, and
no other information may appear on that page.
 A concise statement of the case set[s] out the facts material to
consideration of the questions presented.
 A direct and concise argument amplif[ies] the reasons relied on for
allowance of the writ.
 A petition for a writ of certiorari should be stated briefly and in plain
terms.
 The failure of a petitioner to present with accuracy, brevity, and clarity
whatever is essential to ready and adequate understanding of the points
requiring consideration is sufficient reason for the Court to deny a
petition.47
This emphasis on concision, directness, and brevity has certain consequences, the
most important being that from the very outset, a Supreme Court appeal will have a
tightly circumscribed, rule-focused ambit. It should come as no surprise, then, that
most appellate opinions mirror the petitions of which they are mere culminations.
46 SUP. CT. R. 10 (2005).
47 SUP. CT. R. 14 (2005).
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Robert Ferguson has identified a number of generic characteristics in
appellate opinions: a monologic voice, an interrogative mode, a declarative tone, all
of which cohere in what he calls a “rhetoric of inevitability.”48 As Ferguson
correctly notes, the question that a court chooses to answer—and the way that it
chooses to frame that question—is so fundamental as to make that process “the
methodological anchor of judicial rhetoric.”49 Not surprisingly, therefore, appellate
counsel devote much energy to hitting just the right notes in the version of the
question presented that they will sponsor because “[t]hey understand what an earlier
member of the profession, Francis Bacon, observed four centuries ago: the
questions we ask shape our knowledge far more than do the theories we propose.”50
In practice, this means that every stroke of the oar—from start to finish in the
appellate process—will be aimed at guiding the court to a “correct” statement of a
question (or a few questions).
By emphasizing the generic importance of questions presented in appellate
opinions, I do not mean to deny that those opinions have a narrative dimension.
They do. But it is a type of narrative quite different from the complex of narratives
that makes up the case prior to its arrival at the appellate court. The appellate
narrative is, as Ferguson explains it, driven by a declarative tone, one designed at
once to simplify and to convey certitude:
48 Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 201 (1990).
49 Id. at 208.
50 Id.
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The courtroom, as forum, takes the complexity of event—the original
disruption that provokes legal action in the first place—and transfers aspects
of that complexity into a narrative, the written form of which is a literal
transcript of what has been said in court. The judicial opinion then
appropriates, molds and condenses that transcript in a far more cohesive
narrative of judgment, one that gives the possibility of final judgment by
turning original event into a legal incident for judgment. Judgment, in turn,
guides a general cultural understanding of the original event for consumption
beyond the courtroom. . . . Every step of the process requires an unavoidable
series of simplifications. Judgment must reduce event to an incident and
further reduce incident to a narrative about acceptable behavior. This is its
mission. Everything about the enterprise, including the listener-reader of the
judicial opinion, welcomes the declarative tones that make it possible.51
This is, I think, just another aspect of what we have earlier discussed as the process
by which particulars can become universals and of how ontological narratives can
become strands in a higher-order narrative fabric. We have seen that this process of
narrative distillation is effective at making rules, but it impedes the process of
understanding rules because it necessarily obscures their narrative roots. And the
editing of opinions for inclusion in casebooks thickens the cloak that is always
already wrapped about an appellate opinion. Is there a classroom solvent that will
help strip away this cloak?
3. (Re)Introducing Narratives in the Classroom
I think there is: more exposure to the narratives large and small that underlie
case opinions. I am not suggesting an abandonment of all rule-based teaching;
51 Id. at 211. Sanford Levinson has noted how the tone of confidence present
in most appellate opinions often obscures an underlying ambivalence. “How often,”
he asks, “does one find a judicial opinion that frankly says that the question is an
exceedingly close one . . .?” Not often. The reason, he suggests, is that a turn to
judicial modesty in the face of a close call might be taken as a sign of the “terrifying
arbitrariness that underlies much of the legal system” and as proof that any decision
results from something other than the operation of the Rule of Law. Sanford
Levinson, The Rhetoric of the Judicial Opinion, in LAW’S STORIES, supra note 29, at
189.
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rather, I am advocating the greater use of narrative material across the curriculum so
that students will have another set of tools with which to evaluate and criticize legal
propositions. If, as we have previously seen, the original justification for common-
law rules usually follows the rubric of the normative/narrative syllogism, then in any
given case, it would be helpful to know what narrative elements figured (or did not
figure) in the formulation of the premises that led to the conclusion. Armed with
that information, a reader has an important critical tool with which to evaluate the
original legitimacy or the continuing vitality of precedent. As the Carnegie Report
puts it, “[a]wareness of narrative and context bring[s] . . . principles alive while also
giving conceptual nuance to their meaning.”52 A couple of examples may help us
here. First, there are the relatively easy situations in which certain lines of cases are
tainted because of corruption. We earlier looked at the Oklahoma Supreme Court
scandal and how opinions authored by Justice Corn are generally no longer cited by
Oklahoma practitioners. But relatively few readers outside Oklahoma know that,
and the opinions still appear right there in the Pacific Reporter, waiting for the
unwitting to read and rely on them.53 They bear no facially evident mark of the
52 CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 12, at 124 (discussing interaction of
narratives and legal principles in the context of clinical education).
53 A similar—and more widely known—example is that of Judge Martin
Manton, a former Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. Judge Manton was widely admired for his skill in handling bankruptcy
cases. But, alas, Judge Manton fell upon hard times himself (he had built a
considerable real estate empire in New York that suffered after the Crash of 1929),
and he began to entertain bribes. Thereafter, “[h]e continued to write model
decisions in bankruptcy cases complete with factual and analytic narratives
appropriate to the results. What he did not include in these published decisions was
the fact that really decided the cases: who paid him the highest bribe.” Hoeflich,
supra note 21, at 1167.
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bribes that may have influenced any one of them. In fact, most of them seem
reasonable, and an impartial, uncorrupted judge may very well have decided them
the same way. But they are nonetheless illegitimate, and we can only know that
through narratives existing outside the opinions themselves.
More troublesome are opinions that are driven by bias, yet manage to mask
the fact with an admixture of authoritative tone and high-sounding rhetorical
devices.54 This is to say that not all biased decisions proudly announce themselves
as such in the transparent manner of Plessy, Muller, or Bowers. Hoeflich neatly
illustrates this in a discussion of a case, Taft v. Hyatt,55 that is often cited for a basic
contract principle and sometimes anthologized or summarized in casebooks.56 I first
offer my own summary of the case, followed by Hoeflich’s conclusions based on his
reading of it, followed in turn by some of my own observations that will leave us
suspended in a state of indeterminacy that is nonetheless instructive. The case was
essentially an interpleader action in which members of a group that had offered a
reward for apprehension of a criminal pled (i.e., paid) money into a court so that
54 I am not offering these observations as a sponsorship of a Realist or CLS
claim that all legal decisions are arbitrary, political or elitist. That argument is for
another day. Here, I intend for us to test the notion that, for instance, there are
prosaic cases that may have been covertly influenced by the type of racial animus
that is overtly stated in Dred Scott or Plessy. We can do this, I think, without
deciding how far one should push Llewellyn’s famous fillip that “our government is
not a government of laws, but one of laws through men.” Karl N. Llewellyn, Some
Realism about Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1243
(1931). For a summary of CLS positions on judicial discretion and indeterminacy,
see Stephen B. Presser’s mimetically titled Some Realism about Orphism or The
Critical Legal Studies Movement and the New Great Chain of Being, 79
NORTHWESTERN L. REV. 869 (1984-85).
55 180 P. 213 (Kan. 1919).
56 Hoeflich, supra note 21, at 1168-79.
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rival claimants could set up their respective claims to the reward. One of the three
claimants had prevailed in the trial court, as we will soon see.57 The background
facts are these: on May 16, 1917, residents of a small southeastern Kansas town,
Parsons, learned that Agnes Smith—the wife of a local physician, Dr. Asa Smith—
had been assaulted (she later died). Another physician, Dr. Robert Smith, was
suspected of the crime; he soon went into hiding. All three of the Smiths were
African-Americans. At some point before the afternoon of May 17, a local group
that Hoeflich identifies as the Anti-Horse Thief Association (referred to as A.H.T.A.
in the opinion) offered and publicized a $750 reward for the arrest or information
leading to the arrest of Robert Smith. Dr. Asa Smith was a member of this group.
During the afternoon of May 17, William Hyatt, a Parsons attorney, learned
that Robert Smith wanted to meet with him. Hyatt went to Smith’s hideout, where
“[t]he two talked together for an hour or more, but were unable to reach an
agreement as to the employment of Hyatt to defend Smith.”58 Before this meeting,
Hyatt knew of the reward. In what may be a recurring lawyer fantasy (unacted upon,
one would hope) in the face of a potential client unwilling to put up a retainer, Hyatt
returned from the meeting and immediately told the county attorney where Smith
was hiding. He even accompanied the deputy sheriff on the mission to arrest Smith.
But in the meantime, Smith had been spirited away to nearby Oswego, Kansas by a
group of five members of the Lodge of Colored Masons and Thomas Murry, the
chief of police of Parsons, all of whom considered Smith’s fears of mob violence
57 180 P. at 213-14.
58 Id. at 214.
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well-founded. Before the party left for Oswego, where Smith was ultimately placed
in the custody of the Labette County Sheriff, Murry placed Smith under arrest. At
the time of that arrest, Murry knew of the reward; the rest of the group did not.
Hyatt, Murry, and the five members of the Colored Masons all claimed that the
reward was theirs.
At trial, Hyatt prevailed. The other claimants appealed that judgment. The
Kansas Supreme Court took each of the rivaling claims in turn and found them all
wanting. Hyatt, the Court held, was not eligible to receive the reward because his
actions (even setting aside his unconscionable use of prospective client information
for his own pecuniary gain) did not lead to the arrest of Smith. It surely could
have—had Smith remained at their meeting place—but it did not:
The court finds that the information Hyatt gave would lead to the arrest of
the guilty person if it had been acted upon promptly, and the fact that it did
not bring about this result was through no fault of Hyatt’s. But this finding
does not help Hyatt’s case. It may have been that the officers to whom he
confided his information were too slow. Whatever the reason, before any
action was taken by them which resulted in apprehending the accused, the
latter was on his way to the county jail in the custody of another officer,
having, with the aid of his friends, surrendered himself. So far as the
apprehension of the guilty person was concerned, Hyatt might as well have
kept his information to himself.59
Murry’s actions, on the contrary, actually did lead to Smith’s arrest—he in fact
arrested him. But the Court acknowledged and relied on well-settled law that a
police officer may not “claim a reward for merely doing his duty”:
Murry cannot recover, because, as chief of police of the city of Parsons, it
was his duty to make an arrest of fugitives from justice or persons charged
with or suspected of crimes. The fact that he was not armed with a warrant
or other process for the arrest of the accused is immaterial, because there was
reasonable ground for believing that Smith had committed the particular
59 Id. at 215.
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offense charged against him, and his subsequent conviction established his
actual guilt.60
That leaves the collective claim of the members of the Colored Masons. It is
this claim that led to the establishment of the rule for which the case is most often
cited.61 The critical facts for the Court were that this group of claimants “had not
heard of the offer of the reward until after the accused had been surrendered to the
sheriff” and acted out of a desire to protect Smith from mob violence, not to bring
him to justice.62 These facts, coupled with the legal holding that the private (as
opposed to a statutory) offer of a reward should be analyzed under contract
principles, stymied the group’s attempt to secure the reward:
A private offer of reward for the apprehension of a fugitive from justice or of
a person suspected or charged with an offense stands, as a general rule, upon
a different footing from a statutory offer, or one made by virtue of a statute.
The offer of a private individual is a mere proposal, which, when accepted,
becomes a contract. Until it is accepted by some person who upon the
strength of the offer takes some steps to earn the reward, there is no contract.
Van Vlissingen v. Manning, 105 Ill. App. 255. There must be a meeting of
the minds of the parties—on the one side, of the person who makes the offer;
on the other, of the person who performs the service. Where a claimant for
the reward was not aware that it had been offered until after he had
performed his services, there has been no meeting of minds which would
constitute a contract. Besides, the undisputed facts with respect to those
60 Id.
61 See, e.g., Alexander v. Russo, 571 P.2d 350 (Kan. App. 1977):
As stated in Taft v. Hyatt, 105 Kans. 35, 180 P. 213:
“A private offer of reward for the apprehension of an accused person stands,
as a general rule, upon a different footing from an offer made by virtue of a
statute. When accepted, the offer becomes a contract; until it is accepted by
some person, who upon the strength of the offer takes some steps to earn the
reward, there is no contract; and where a claimant of the reward was not
aware that it had been offered until after he had acted, he is not entitled to
claim the reward.” (Syl. 3.)
62 180 P. at 215.
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defendants who called the chief of police to assist them in taking the accused
to Oswego are that these claimants were simply assisting the accused in
surrendering himself. Their testimony is that what they did was for the
purpose of protecting him from mob violence. They had never heard of the
reward, and, of course, are not entitled to any part of it.63
This holding, as Hoeflich notes, was not compelled in any legal sense.64 The
issue presented was one of first impression in Kansas, as the Court’s citation to a
single out-of-state opinion reveals. From this, Hoeflich begins to wonder whether
there was something else afoot, so he digs deeper. The opinion itself tells us that
Hyatt and Smith were “unable to reach an agreement as to the employment of Hyatt
to defend Smith” and at least part of the reason was because “they did not agree
upon the fee to be paid for the defense.”65 Hoeflich’s investigation of the appellate
record shows that at trial only the members of the Colored Masons were asked why
they wanted the reward. One claimant’s response (as abstracted in the record) is
63 180 P. 215.
64 Cf. Richard Posner, Jurisprudential Responses to Legal Realism, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 326, 327 (1987-88). In a discussion of how formalists sometimes
“smuggl[e] policy choices into the premises for logical reasoning without analysis or
even acknowledgement,” Judge Posner suggests that there may or may not be good
reason to recognize a claim for a reward only if the claimant knows of the reward:
Consider this question of perennial fascination to students of contract law:
should a person be allowed to claim, as a matter of contractual entitlement, a
reward for returning a lost article, if he did not actually know that a reward
had been offered? Langdell said no. And he said it on logical grounds: a
contract requires—is defined to require—conscious acceptance; if the person
who returned the lost property did not know about the reward he could not
have accepted that unilateral offer, and therefore there is no duty to reward
this person. Langdell’s mistake was to impose a definition on the word
“contract” without considering why one might want to make some promises
and not others enforceable and what the effect of making this promise
enforceable would be. Would it lead to more returns or fewer? Actually this
is a difficult question but it is one that Langdell thought he did not even have
to consider.
65 Id. at 214-15.
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particularly telling: “Witness testified that he was a friend of Dr. Smith; that he was
interested in seeing that mob violence was not resorted to; that he did not obligate
himself or pay anything towards the defense of Smith.”66 In other words, the group
wanted the reward to pay for Smith’s defense.
Because these questions have no relevance to the issue of knowledge of the
reward, Hoeflich is compelled to ask why they were asked. Could it have something
to do with the setting and circumstances—i.e., a black man accused of murder in
small Kansas town that was already on the verge of forming a lynch mob? Did the
townsfolk want to prevent Smith from mounting an adequate defense through the
use of the reward money? Could this have influenced the outcome at trial and,
perhaps, even on appeal? It is of course impossible to answer these questions with
certainty. I am inclined to think that the appellate court would not have been
directly swayed by a desire to withhold the reward money to keep Smith from using
it for his defense for the simple reason that Smith had by that time been convicted
and that conviction had already been affirmed.67 On the other hand, there are good
reasons to think that the Supreme Court may have been indirectly influenced, if only
because of the institutional tendency to show deference to trial court decisions.
And—based on my further investigation of the underlying murder case—there are
even better reasons to think that the trial court may have been swept along by the
racial undercurrents that Hoeflich senses in Taft v. Hyatt.
66 Hoeflich, supra note 21, at 1174 (quoting Abstract of Appellants at 14).
67 State v. Smith, 174 P. 551 (Kan. 1918).
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In Taft, the murder of Agnes Smith was reduced to the passing reference that
she had been “assaulted” and then, in a parenthetical aside, to the fact that she had
died and that Robert Smith had been charged and convicted of her murder.68 But
this was no ordinary murder. The narrative has plot elements straight out of Greek
tragedy and is reminiscent of modern Greek-influenced dramas like Eugene
O’Neill’s Desire Under the Elms. The list of major dramatis personae might read
something like this:
Dr. Asa Smith—A black physician; once widowed; now over 60.
Robert Smith—Also a black physician; now 33; employed by Asa Smith
since he was 13.
Agnes Smith—Wife of Asa Smith for one year; lived with the first Mrs.
Smith prior to her death; partially educated by Asa; now 24.69
The respective ages of the players suggest a couple of familiar plotlines, one of
which is borne out by the facts of the case. At trial, Smith was convicted largely on
the strength of Mrs. Smith’s “dying statement,” a large portion of which was read to
the jury as an exception to the general rule against hearsay:
I know that I am about to die and this is my statement in fear of death. Bob
Smith came in at about 11 o’clock A. M., May 16th and says, “Why don’t
you treat me better—why have you got it in for me?” I picked up some
scissors, off the table, and he started for me and he took them away from me
and seized me by the throat and choked me and threw me on the floor. He
choked me and poured something in my mouth and face and ran out, and I
got up and got to Mrs. Neighbors’ and lost consciousness.”70
68 180 P. at 214.
69 174 P. 551 (Kan. 1918).
70 Id. at 552.
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From the testimony of one of the attending physicians, we learn what the
“something” was that led to her particularly gruesome and drawn out death (she
survived for about a week):
Agnes Smith was found to be burned with carbolic acid. Dr. Boardman
testified that: “The odor was very strong. The acid was up in her hair, over
her face, and down on her upper chest. The acid was upon her cheeks,
around the back of her neck, and around her ears. Her eyes were entirely
burned. One had turned entirely white. *** She was unconscious.”71
On appeal, Smith’s most significant claim of error was that Agnes Smith’s
dying declaration should not have been received into evidence. For reasons that are
unimportant to our discussion, the Court concluded that the statement was proper
evidence. More telling, perhaps, was the Court’s quotation of the portion of the
statement that was not read to the jury: “I told him to get out of the house, and *** I
feared he would rape me.”72 Since this excised portion of Agnes Smith’s statement
was not directly at issue in the appeal, it seems to me that it may signal the crux of
the matter for the Supreme Court. If we recall that the dominant racial narrative in
predominantly white interpretive communities in the late Twentieth Century
portrayed young black males as feral and threatening to civil society (think of the
King-beating case), then so much the more so would this have been the case in the
early Twentieth Century. In other words, the Supreme Court may well have
concluded that Smith was just another out-of-control black man unable to control his
appetites, despite overwhelming evidence of his good character and at least
something more than a mere suggestion that Agnes Smith was suicidal. In other
71 Id. at 552.
72 Id. at 555 (emphasis supplied).
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words, a murder-attempted rape could have seemed the only coherent narrative
available to the all-white, all-male Kansas Supreme Court of a hundred years ago. I
may be overreading a bit, but I hear an echo of that in the Court’s last substantive
paragraph: “The record leads to the inevitable conviction that the cruel and
atrocious crime charged was committed, and whatever influences actuated him, or
whatever their source, the defendant was legally found guilty.”73
At a minimum, all this buttresses Hoeflich’s suspicion that race may have
played some part in Taft v. Hyatt. It does not mean that that the Supreme Court
strained to deprive the Colored Masons of the reward for racist reasons. Perhaps
nothing was amiss at all. But perhaps there was a desire to keep solidarity with the
decisions of the trial court below and with the Court’s own holdings only a year
before in State v. Smith. The point is, though, that one cannot even have this type of
discussion—cannot engage in critical reading—without going outside the four
corners of an appellate opinion. A fortiori, one cannot have this type of discussion
when salient facts have been bobbed from a casebook version or, even more to the
point, when the facts have been sanitized so as to present an intentionally
unparticularized statement of the case, presumably to minimize distraction from the
statement of universalized doctrine. Take, for example, the version of Taft v. Hyatt
that appeared in Lon Fuller and Melvin Eisenberg’s contracts casebook:
Smith, a member of a masonic lodge, was suspected of a murder which had
aroused the indignation of the community. Smith conveyed his fears of mob
violence to certain of his masonic brothers and asked their protection. They
accompanied a police officer to his hiding place and in the company of the
officer took Smith to the sheriff, who placed him in the county jail. Just
before the party got into the cab to go to the sheriff’s office, Smith was told
73 Id. at 556.
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by the officers that he was under arrest. The masons now claim a reward of
$750 which had been offered by the husband of the murdered woman “for
the arrest or information which will lead to the arrest” of Smith. Held, they
were not entitled because (1) they did not know of the offer until after Smith
was arrested, and (2) they merely assisted Smith in surrendering himself and
therefore did not arrest him or give information leading to his arrest within
the meaning of the offer.74
Every hint of race is erased from this summary, making it impossible to ask
the questions about the case that we just asked.75 In fairness, casebook editors have
to make choices and not every case can be presented in an extensive form. And
learning to extract legal rules from cases and manipulate them is a valuable lawyerly
skill. I nonetheless think that law students should learn to dig in to cases from time
to time (maybe three or four cases per semester) as a way of sharpening their critical
reading skills and, thereby, their analytical writing skills.76 Now is a perfect time to
74 Hoeflich, supra note 21, at 1178 (quoting LON FULLER & MELVIN
EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 414-15 (3d ed. 1972)).
75 I don’t mean to suggest that the technique that I am sponsoring is simply a
way to reveal bias in a Realist sort of way. For example, I think one could take a
case like Brunswick and show how it represents the waning of a public narrative that
had romanticized (and legally protected) Mom-and-Pop businesses and vilified big
business from at least the time of Teddy Roosevelt.
76 See KISSAM, supra note 19, at 2006-09 (1999) (discussing, among other
things, the link between reading critically and writing well). The Carnegie Report
(supra note 12, at 53) puts it this way: “It is important . . . that instructors also give
students experience with fuller accounts of cases in which students can grasp the
different meaning of ‘facts’ from opposing points of view.” And I am inclined to go
beyond actual case materials. Robert Ferguson has spoken of the “continuum of
publication” that marks a trial, from things like pleadings to things like fictional
projections. Ferguson, Untold Stories, supra note 29, at 84. I thus think it makes
sense to compare various narrative approaches. To take one example, one could
juxtapose opinions of the various courts involved in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, 464
U.S. 238 (1984), with the movie Silkwood. In the court opinions, Karen Silkwood’s
personal narrative is reduced to a few lines and then silted over with page upon page
of the history of and intent behind the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and its
subsequent amendments. In the film, she emerges as far more than a “decedent,”
and we are left to wonder whether anything approaching justice was done in her
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implement this type of curricular change because it has never been easier to
accomplish. As most courts have migrated to electronic filing, all manner of case
materials have become readily available for downloading. It has therefore become a
much simpler matter to build a case file that includes pleadings, briefs, documentary
evidence and testimony. The value of the reading-for-narratives approach that I am
advocating can be expressed in a number of ways, but none is more important, I
think, than the possibility of revealing the narratives that competed for victory,
universalization, and institutionalization in any particular case. In that way, young
lawyers can more fully understand that litigation is often no more than a competition
to convince this judge, this jury, and a majority of this appellate panel that one story
or another deserves favorable judgment. But it may be that in another time and
place, that story is no longer convincing. In short, as Robert Ferguson suggests
(following Thoreau), we must carefully attend to what we read:
“Books,” writes Henry Thoreau, “must be read as deliberately and reservedly
as they were written.” The judicial opinion deserves the same injunction.
Judges use words to secure shared explanations and identifications; they also
use them as weapons of control. Deliberation with reservation explores that
distinction, and the result is more than understanding. Here and elsewhere, a
practiced appreciation or resourcefulness in language is the first safeguard in
a republic of laws.77
case. I am, by the way, untroubled by the use of “fiction” in the classroom setting—
after all, teaching by way of hypotheticals is a law-school stock-in-trade. Wouldn’t
most law professors (at least grudgingly) concede that Nora Ehpron (the author of
the screenplay) is better at constructing a nuanced, full-blown hypothetical than they
are, if only because she was able to devote countless hours to the construction of her
narrative? The same could be said of Melville, Camus, Browning, Glaspell or any
of the other authors that I have discussed in this work.
77 Ferguson, Judicial Opinion, supra note 48, at 219.
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4. Democratic Education and the Law
What I have been arguing for here is, I suppose, a more thorough melding of
black-letter law and theory in legal education.78 But I don’t think that the advantages
of this type of approach would be limited to placing yet another argumentative arrow
in the future litigator’s quiver. I think, rather, that Ferguson is exactly right to
suggest that a “readerly” approach to the law can help shore up the democratic
values that the easy rhetoric of formalism and the rules that drive it so often obscure.
Over twenty years ago, Neil MacCormick suggested that
[T]here are six questions to which any serious approach to higher education
ought to allow of some answer, preferably one reached after substantial
reflection. In quick and summary form, the questions are: (1) What is there?
(2) What is the structure of the things there are, and how do different kinds
of existence interrelate? (3) How do we know what there is, and how do we
have acquaintance with the things that exist[]? (4) By what method should
we explain and expound the various matters open to our knowledge? What
is the place of human beings as rational agents in relation to whatever else
there is? and (6) In light of all this, how are we to live and conduct
ourselves?79
None of these questions is peculiar to law, but that is MacCormick’s point. For if
one is truly to understand law, one must learn more than the substance of a set of
legal rules, rules that are always subject to defeasance at the whim of a legislature or
high court. This “more than” is not a single identifiable technique but rather a range
of skills that permit one to evaluate laws critically in their social context.
MacCormick’s six questions mark a path along which to gather these skills and,
78 I think the Carnegie Report is correct in positing (after Amsterdam and
Bruner) “that the narrative structure of legal reasoning provides a natural deep
structure capable of uniting theory and practice.” CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 12,
at 42.
79 Neil MacCormick, Democratic Intellect and the Law, 5 LEGAL STUD. 172,
177 (1985).
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also, to build the quality of intellect necessary to maintain the cornerstone role that
law-as-profession holds within a thriving democracy:
The questions are ones which ought to remain open and alive for every law
teacher, law student and indeed legal practitioner of whatever rank and
eminence. That they are fundamental for lawyering and for legal education
is one reason why a jurisprudence course is of structural and vital importance
to any law degree within the tradition of the Democratic Intellect . . ..80
But this is not all. Legal education must be infused with matters of theory
and philosophy across the curriculum, not just through the pro forma addition of an
offering or two in jurisprudence or critical theory to the upper-level run of law-
school courses. To underscore this position, MacCormick invokes Zenon
Bankowski and Geoff Mungham’s Images of Law, which warns of the temptation to
lodge—and thereby emasculate and marginalize—all matters critical and theoretical
in separate courses.81 As I hope my earlier discussion of Taft v. Hyatt shows, a
critical approach may be of most value in core, traditionally doctrinal subjects:
If theory courses and substantive law courses run on quite different tracks,
the theory part can become a purely decorative fifth wheel. Moreover,
theorists risk the criticism (which is in some cases more than amply justified)
that they lack any real interest in real law. So theory and law are driven
apart.82
In the end, the programmatic and structural issues that I have just sketched
with respect to legal education are a specific application of a larger cultural critique.
When Edward Said called for a “democratic criticism” rooted in humanism, he was
80 Id. at 180.
81 Id. at 181 (citing ZENON BANKOWSKI & GEOFF MUNGHAM, IMAGES OF LAW
1-6, 49-72 (1976)); see also CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 12, at 84 (“It is
noteworthy . . . that jurisprudence is rarely given an important place in the North
American law school curriculum.”).
82 Id.
276
urging us to find ways of overcoming the burden of too much (yet too facilely
packaged) information, on the one hand, and too much balkanized (and jargon-
laden) expertise, on the other:
We are bombarded by prepackaged and reified representations of the world
that usurp consciousness and preempt democratic critique, and it is to the
overturning and dismantling of these alien objects that, as C. Wright Mills
put so correctly, the intellectual humanist’s work ought to be devoted. . . .
Expertise as a distancing device has gotten out of control, especially in some
academic forms of expression, to the extent that they have become
antidemocratic and even anti-intellectual.83
The remedy lies, Said suggests, in forms of discourse that mandate reflection and are
built on what he calls “detail,” a word that he uses in much the same sense that I
have used “narrative” throughout this work. For lawyers, this means that each of us
must work to read legal texts in ways that allow us to penetrate the omnipresent fog
of rules and see the stories for which those rules are often more or less accurate
shorthand and to write our own legal texts in ways that are both revealing and
intelligible to non-specialists. All this is to say that we should teach and practice
law democratically.
83 EDWARD W. SAID, HUMANISM AND DEMOCRATIC CRITICISM 71, 73 (2003).
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A Conclusion of Sorts
The narrative dimensions of law are manifold. Disputes or crimes that are
tried in court take the form of a story (or many). The ultimate disposition of a case
quite often results in a written opinion that takes a narrative shape. And as we’ve
seen, stories told to legal actors (be they legislators or judges) can actually become
laws. That’s not all, though, because the law exists and changes across time, which
means that its history can be narrated, as in fact it is every time someone sets out to
state what the law is on a particular subject. It’s these recurring (and most often
prosaic) narrative reconstructions—each executed in an ever-moving present and
amidst a swirl of ephemeral public and personal narratives—that allow us a glimpse
of the law’s narrative genetic structure and, thereby, insight into how the law
develops across cultures and over time.
In “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” T. S. Eliot describes a relationship
between the poet and the past that is a useful analogue to the relationships that I just
noted.1 He begins this essay by lamenting that “[i]n English we seldom speak of
tradition . . .,” a word that—when used at all—tends to appear only in a “phrase of
censure.”2 The crux of his argument is that we all too readily embrace novelty (i.e.,
difference from predecessors, especially immediate predecessors) and are thereby
blinded by prejudice. But “if we approach a poet without this prejudice we shall
1 T. S. Eliot, Tradition and the Individual Talent, reprinted in 2 THE NORTON
ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE 2293 (4th ed., M. H. Abrams gen. ed. 1979)
(1919). For an interesting take on law-as-tradition-as-narrative, see Dennis
Patterson, Law’s Pragmatism: Law as Practice & Narrative, 76 VA. L. REV. 937,
987-89 (1990).
2 Id. (italics added).
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often find that not only the best, but the most individual parts of his work may be
those in which the dead poets, his ancestors, assert their immortality.”3
Eliot immediately cautions, though, that “tradition” is much more than
“timid adherence” to the immediately preceding generation and its most obvious
successes, which are often “currents soon lost in the sand.” He has something else
in mind:
Tradition is a matter of much wider significance. It cannot be inherited, and
if you want it you must obtain it by great labor. It involves, in the first place,
the historical sense . . .; and the historical sense involves a perception, not
only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence . . .. This historical sense,
which is a sense of the timeless as well as the temporal and of the timeless
and the temporal together, is what makes a writer traditional. And it is at the
same time what makes a writer most acutely conscious of his place in time,
of his own contemporaneity.4
Thus conceived, Eliot’s ideal writer is suspended in a ceaseless temporal oscillation
between “now” and “then.” As a consequence, “[n]o poet, no artist of any art, has
his complete meaning alone.” He becomes part of a fabric that he at once alters and
is altered by: “The necessity that he shall conform, that he shall cohere, is not one-
sided; what happens when a new work of art is created is something that happens
simultaneously to all the works of art which preceded it.” The properly attuned
writer “will not find it preposterous that the past should be altered by the present as
much as the present is directed by the past” and, moreover, “will be aware of great
difficulties and responsibilities.”5
3 Id.
4 Id. at 2294.
5 Id.
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What Eliot ultimately develops here is a general theory of the relationship
between past and present narratives, one suggesting that the narrative cosmos is
neither an undifferentiated lump (“an indiscriminate bolus”), nor “one or two private
admirations,” nor “one preferred period.” Instead, it is all these things, and more:
viz., a main road that may change course from time to time but that does not
superannuate the principal milestones along the route.6 Pitched at this level, Eliot’s
critical theory may be seen as a general humanistic statement of what we have
observed more particularly in aspects of Dworkin’s concept of “integrity” or
MacCormick’s suggestion of an ultimate convergence of narrative and normative
coherence. For example, Dworkin argues that integrity “insists that the law—the
rights and duties that flow from past collective decisions and for that reason license
or require coercion—contains not only the narrow explicit content of these decisions
[read: the specific narratives embodied in those decisions] but also, more broadly,
the scheme of principles necessary to justify them.” And “scheme of principles” is
but another name for a high-order narrative, what Dworkin calls “an overall story
worth telling now.”7
Deciding what story to tell now is as much an act of judgment as of creation,
and this fact holds as much for the literary writer as for the lawyer/judge. In
6 Id. at 2295.
7 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 227 (1986). Dworkin is not unaware of
Eliot’s essay, although he cites it only for a position on authorial intention that he
appears to eschew in favor of Gadamer. Id. at 61 n.11. See also NEIL
MACCORMICK, RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW: A THEORY OF LEGAL REASONING
233-36 (2005) (discussing possibility of normative coherence as narrative
coherence).
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considering the position of the poet, Eliot posits simultaneous cross-judgments
between the past and present:
In a peculiar sense [the poet] will be aware . . . that he must inevitably be
judged by the standards of the past. I say judged, not amputated, by them;
not judged to be as good as, or worse or better than, the dead; and certainly
not judged by the canons of dead critics. It is a judgment, a comparison, in
which two things are measured by each other. To conform merely would be
for the new work not really to conform at all; it would not be new, and would
therefore not be a work of art. And we do not quite say that the new is more
valuable because it fits in; but its fitting in is a test of its value—a test, it is
true, which can only be slowly and cautiously applied, for we are none of us
infallible judges of conformity.8
In urging this bilateral judgment based on “fit,” Eliot sets forth a critical theory that
subsumes quite well the theory of narrative and normative coherence that I have
described and elaborated on throughout this work.9 Indeed, the interpretive work of
the poet and of Dworkin’s common-law judge largely coincide:
Law as integrity asks a judge deciding a common-law case . . . to think of
himself as an author in the chain of common law. He knows that other
8 Id. at 2294-95. Derrida makes a similar point when he asserts that
To be just, the decision of a judge, for example, must not only follow a rule
of law or a general law but also must assume it, approve it, confirm its value,
by a reinstituting act of interpretation, as if ultimately nothing previously
existed of the law, as if the judge himself invented the law in every case. No
exercise of justice as law can be just unless there is a “fresh judgment” (I
borrow this English expression from Stanley Fish . . .). This “fresh
judgment” can very well—must very well—conform to a preexisting law,
but the reinstituting, reinventive and freely decisive interpretation, the
responsible interpretation of the judge requires that his “justice” not just
consist in conformity, in the conservative and reproductive activity of
judgment.
Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority,” 11
CARDOZO L. REV. 919, 961 (1989-90).
9 I think this is also what Llewellyn is up to when he posits “the law of
Fitness and Flavor”: The work of the job in hand, and even more the work of the job
at large, must fit and fit into the body and the flavor of The Law. KARL LLEWELLYN,
THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 222 (1960).
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judges have decided cases that, although not exactly like his case, deal with
related problems; he must think of their decisions as part of a long story he
must interpret and then continue, according to his own judgment of how to
make the developing story as good as it can be. . . . The judge’s decision—
his postinterpretive conclusions—must be drawn from an interpretation that
both fits and justifies what has gone before, so far as that is possible. But in
law as in literature the interplay between fit and justification is complex.10
Both Dworkin and Eliot understand that any narrative—be it legal or
literary—exists in more than one plane: as part of a horizontal patchwork of all
present narratives (some more generically related than others) and as part of a
vertical column of generically related narratives stretching back through time. The
trick for the present author, then, is to craft a narrative that fits in both dimensions.
For example, a judge faced with an abortion case must craft a justificatory narrative
that fits with Roe, Casey, and Carhart and with the current state of “privacy” and
other relevant laws. This process preserves continuity with the past, while allowing
for development in light of changing circumstances. The law is thus enslaved
neither by its own past nor by fads of the day. As Eliot explains, “the difference
between the present and the past is that the conscious present is an awareness of the
past in a way and to an extent which the past’s awareness of itself cannot show.”11
In sum, although the past cannot be relived, its history can be (and indeed must be
continually) reworked.
Taking all this into account, we can say that a proper narrative theory of the
law is one that balances past and present. This entails acceptance of authoritative
standards of practice articulated and adhered to in the past, but “[t]hat initial
10 DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 238-39.
11 Eliot, supra note 1, at 2295.
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acceptance . . . does not preclude subsequent critique of the practice.”12 As a mode
of argument, then, narrative “suggests that the way law changes is through the
advancement of stories or accounts of the practice that have an internal unity that
captures the significant elements of the practice while pointing in a direction
different from the current understanding of the enterprise.”13 In this way, law—like
literature—“develops” (Eliot is careful to observe that change may be a “refinement,
perhaps, complication certainly” but not necessarily an “improvement”). At the end
of the day, development is, I suppose, an inevitable adjunct of the accumulation of
institutional knowledge. But, as Eliot posits, our newest knowledge merely teeters
at the always-already displaced mouth of a narrative stream stretching back to the
time when humans first began to “know” at all:
Someone said: “The dead writers are remote from us because we know so
much more than they did.” Precisely, and they are that which we know.14
The same may be said of lawyers.
12 Patterson, supra note 1, at 988.
13 Id.
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